Beneath the turgid etiquette, the competition between the ambassadors was an unscrupulous tournament to influence policy and gather information, starring adventurers of ersatz aristocracy, pickpocketing actresses, code- breakers, galloping couriers, letter-opening postmasters, maids, temptresses and noblewomen paid by foreign governments. Most despatches were intercepted by the Cabinet Noir, a secret government bureau that opened, copied and resealed letters, then broke their cyphers. The Russian Cabinet Noir was particularly effective."" Kings and diplomats took advantage of this system by not using code when they were writing something they wished a foreign government to know - this was called writing 'en clairV0
Rival ambassadors employed an expensive network of spies, especially domestic servants, and they spent a fortune on paying 'pensions' to ministers and courtiers. Secret service funds were used either to secure information (hence English gifts to Alexandra Engelhardt) or to influence policy (Catherine herself received English loans during the 1750s). These latter payments often had no effect at all on policy and generally the scale of bribery was vastly exaggerated.11 Russia was reputed to be especially venal but it was probably no more so than France or England. In Russia, the main bidders for influence were England, France, Prussia and Austria. All were now to use every weapon in their arsenal to court the favour of Potemkin.
Europe faced three sources of conflict in 1778. France, eager to avenge the Seven Years War, was about to support the American rebels and go to war against England. (The war started in June 1778 and Spain joined the French side the next year.) However, Russia was much more concerned with the other two flashpoints. The Ottoman Sultan had never been reconciled to the terms of the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi, especially the independence of the Crimea and the opening of the Black and Mediterranean Seas to Russian merchant ships. In November 1776, Catherine and Potemkin had to send an army to the Crimea to impose a khan of their choice, Shagin Giray, in the face of disturbances inspired by Constantinople. Now the Khanate was rebelling against Russia's protege, and the Ottoman and Russian Empires moved closer to war.
The third axis of conflict was the rivalry for the mastery of Germany between Prussia and Austria. Russia always had a choice between alliance with Austria or Prussia: each had its own advantages. Russia had been allied with Austria from 1726, and it was only thanks to Peter III that it had switched to the Prussian option in 1762. Austria had not forgiven Russia for this betrayal, so Catherine and Frederick were stuck with each other. Foreign Minister Nikita Panin had staked his career on maintaining this alliance, but the Northern System - his network of northern powers including Britain - had never materialized beyond its Prussian fulcrum. Furthermore, it had given
Frederick an influence over Russian policy in Poland and the Ottoman Empire that almost amounted to a veto.
However, Potemkin always believed that Russia's interests - and his own - lay southwards, not northwards. He cared about the Austrian-Prussian and Anglo-French conflicts only in so far as they affected Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire around the Black Sea. The victories in the Russo-Turkish War had exposed the irrelevance of the Prussian alliance along with Frederick's duplicity.
Serenissimus began to study diplomacy. 'How courteous he is with everyone. He pretends to be jolly and chatty but it's clear that he is only dissembling. Nothing he wants or asks for will be refused.' In 1773-4, Potemkin had paid court 'most assiduously' to Nikita Panin.12 The Minister was a dyspeptic monument to the slowness and obstinacy of Russian bureaucracy - piggy- eyed, amused and shrewd, he squatted astride Russian foreign policy like a swollen, somnolent toad. The diplomats regarded Panin as 'a great glutton, a great gamester and a great sleeper', who once left a despatch, unopened, in his robe de chambre for four months. He 'passes his life with women and courtesans of the second order' with 'all the tastes and whims of an effeminate young man'. In reply to the Swedish Ambassador's brave attempt to discuss affairs of state during a meal, he delivered the bon mot: 'It is evident, my dear Baron, that you are not accustomed to affairs of state if you let them interfere with dinner.' There was not a little admiration in Harris's tone when he told his Court that 'you will not credit me if I tell you that out of 24 hours, Count Panin only gives half an hour to the discharge of his duties'.13
Initially, Potemkin 'thought only of establishing his favour well and did not occupy himself with foreign affairs in the direction of which Panin showed a predilection for the King of the Prussia', noted the Polish King Stanislas- Augustus. Now he began to flex his muscles. Early in his friendship with Catherine, it is likely that Potemkin persuaded her that Russia's interests were to maintain Peter the Great's conquests on the Baltic and keep control of Poland, but then use an Austrian alliance to make the Black Sea a Russian lake. Catherine had never liked Frederick the Great nor trusted Panin, but Potemkin was suggesting a reversal of Russian policy in turning to Austria. This had to be done slowly - but tensions with Panin began to grow. When the Council sat one day, Potemkin reported that there was news of disturbances in Persia and suggested there mjght be benefits for Russia. Panin, fixated on Russia's northern interests, attacked him bitterly, and an angry Potemkin broke up the meeting.14 The rivalry between the two statesmen and their two policies became more obvious.
Panin was not going to give up without a fight, and Catherine had to move cautiously because Potemkin was as yet unproven on the international stage. Panin grew nervous as it became clear that Potemkin was there to stay. In June 1777, Corberon wrote that Panin had even said to a crony: 'Wait. Things can't stay like this for ever.' But nothing came of it as Potemkin consolidated his power. Catherine was deliberately pushing Potemkin forward on foreign policy: she had asked him to discuss affairs with the visiting Prince Henry of Prussia. When Gustavus III of Sweden, who had recently retaken absolute power in a coup, arrived on an incognito visit calling himself Count of Gothland, Potemkin met him and accompanied him during his stay. Potemkin's challenge was to destroy Panin's power, overturn the Northern System and arrange an alliance that would let him pursue his dreams in the south.
The two eastern conflicts of Europe escalated simultaneously at the beginning of 1778 - in ways that made the Prussian alliance still more obsolete and freed Potemkin's hand to begin building in the south. In both cases, Catherine and Potemkin co-ordinated diplomatic and military action.
The first was the so-called 'Potato War'. The Elector of Bavaria died in December 1777. Emperor Joseph II, whose influence was growing as his mother Maria Theresa aged, had long schemed to swap the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria, which would increase his power in Germany and compensate for Austria's loss of Silesia to Prussia. In January 1778, Austria occupied most of Bavaria. This threatened Prussia's new Great Power status in the Holy Roman Empire, so Frederick, now aged sixty-five, rallied the German princes, threatened by Austrian aggrandizement, and in July invaded Habsburg Bohemia. Austria's ally France was busy fighting Britain and would not support Joseph. Catherine was cool about aiding her Prussian ally too. Joseph marched towards Frederick. Central Europe was at war again. But neither side dared risk a pitched battle. There was skirmishing. The men spent a cold winter digging up paltry Bohemian potatoes, the only things left to eat - hence the 'Potato War'.