High tech is not the only way to skin a cat. Low tech can work, though perhaps not as elegantly. There are two approaches to defeating armor using low-tech artillery: attacking the thin tops of armored vehicles and attacking the thin bottoms. Since it is nearly impossible to hit small targets like tanks with ordinary artillery projectiles, artillery designers have developed ICMs (improved conventional munitions). These are also called cargo rounds. Unlike normal artillery shells, these rounds contain dozens of small, unguided submunition grenades. They work like a shotgun. Before they hit the ground, a special fuse breaks open the round a few hundred feet in the air. Instead of one big explosion in one spot, they cover a much larger area with a lot of little
explosions. There can be forty to one hundred of these in a projectile, each capable of punching through the thin roof armor of a tank. The warheads are not large enough to do a lot of damage unless they get a lucky hit; for example, they might detonate near ammunition stowage or fuel. The ICMs have not been used extensively in any recent war due to their novelty. But computer simulations have suggested that they could be very deadly against light armored vehicles like infantry transports or self-propelled artillery. But they must be used in heavy concentrations to ensure a good probability of hitting their targets.
Artillery-scattered mines attack the other Achilles' heel of tanks — their soft underbelly and tracks. Conventional antitank mines had to be laboriously emplaced by hand before a battle began. The new artillery-scattered mines can be delivered as the battle develops, covering only those areas where an enemy is attacking. A lot of mines are required to lay down a minefield thick enough to have a good probability of stopping most of the tanks. But tanks are very poorly protected underneath, and their tracks can be broken easily. Artillery mines can assist in stopping a tank attack, as was suggested in Chapter 3.
Little is known about Soviet low-tech antiarmor munitions like these. It seems likely that the Soviets do have such systems. They do not require sophisticated sensors, although they do require very careful quality control at the factory and precise light machining. Such munitions mesh with Soviet tendencies toward the employment of massed artillery. To be really effective, these munitions have to be expended in large numbers. The greater the density of the minefield, the more likely enemy tanks will run over it. The more submunitions scattered over a target, the greater the likelihood of lethal damage to enemy vehicles.
The Soviets see reconnaissance-strike complexes (RSC) as the wave of the future in artillery. An RSC is not a single weapon, but rather a group of weapons and sensors. The main emphasis is on new ways for the artillery to identify and target enemy vehicles and defenses. An RSC would consist of a conventional artillery unit, an airborne reconnaissance system (either aircraft or unmanned scout drone), and a communications and data handling post, which would coordinate the information collected by the reconnaissance system with the artillery unit. The NATO armies are already developing these systems, although progress has been slow. The U.S. Army's Aquila unmanned scout drone program proved to be overly complex, but the army has managed to put together an impressive artillery fire control system with Tacfire, and future systems like AFATDS (artillery fire and target designation system).
One area where the Soviets have shown more activity than the U.S. Army is rocket and missile artillery. The Soviets were among the pioneers in the use of rocket artillery in World War II. The legendary Katyusha multiple rocket launchers have remained a staple of the Soviet artillery since their initial use in 1941. Rocket artillery is an area saturation weapon and has less precision than conventional tubed artillery. A multiple rocket launcher like the BM-21 Grad can hurl nearly two tons of high explosive and metal against a target in a single salvo. Such an enormous amount of firepower hitting a target in a few brief seconds has tremendous shock value.
The disadvantage of multiple rocket launchers, aside from their lack of precision, is the time it takes to load them; it takes about ten minutes to reload a BM-21. Rockets are also inherently more expensive than artillery projectiles with the same payload. Rockets require more propellant than conventional artillery, so they weigh more and take up more precious cargo space than tubed artillery. Rocket artillery will never replace tubed artillery, but it acts as an important firepower supplement.
The U.S. Army used multiple rocket launchers in World War II, but on a smaller scale than the Soviets. They largely ignored this form of artillery until the late 1970s, when the M270 MLRS was developed. The MLRS is much larger than most Soviet systems, firing a more potent rocket. The Soviets are currently fielding a vehicle of somewhat similar size, the BM-22 Uragan, and have an even larger 280mm rocket launcher in development.
The Soviets also have had a more active interest in ballistic missiles for tactical artillery use.
They have deployed the R-65 Luna-M (FROG-7) in divisions since the 1960s, and at army and front level have the R-300 (SS-lb Scud) and OTR-22 (SS-12 Scaleboard). The U.S. Army has the Lance, a FROG-7 equivalent. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty of 1987 has altered the use of missiles in the artillery role. The SS-12 Scaleboard is being destroyed under the terms of the treaty, as is the new OTR-23 (SS-23 Spider). As a result, the missile weapons have been pushed up a notch in the organization hierarchy. The FROGs and their new replacement, the SS-21 Scarab, are now found at army level rather than in the divisions.
Missile weapons of this type are primarily intended for the delivery of tactical nuclear warheads. Older missiles, such as the Scud, are not accurate enough to be used with conventional high-explosive warheads. The Scud received some prominence in the late 1980s owing to its use by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian and Iraqi Scuds were fitted with conventional high-explosive warheads, but because of their lack of accuracy, they were used to bombard cities rather than smaller military targets. As missile accuracies improve, their use with nonnuclear warheads becomes more feasible. Because of their cost, they are usually reserved for high-priority targets. Typical targets in a conventional war would be communication and command posts, airfields, and major transport centers like rail yards.
The capabilities of Soviet artillery are often neglected in public discussion of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance. Artillery has not played a decisive role in modern wars since World War I and has been overshadowed by the tank and other armored vehicles. Nevertheless, artillery is likely to remain the primary cause of casualties in future wars, and new munitions and fire control technologies are likely to increase its importance on the modern battlefield.
Soviet interest in combat engineers stems largely from their experience in World War II.
Mobile warfare inevitably means that rivers will be frequently encountered. Rivers are the most formidable natural obstacle to mobile operations.
The Soviets have tried to diminish the impact of rivers on mechanized operations by making the lead combat elements, such as tanks and light armored vehicles, capable of crossing on their own. It is nearly impossible to make tanks amphibious due to their weight. The Soviets solved this problem by equipping tanks with "deep wading" equipment. Soviet tanks are designed so that all their major openings — engine grills, hatches, ventilation covers, and air intakes — can be hermetically sealed. Snorkels are fitted to the vehicle to provide air for the crew and the engine. The tanks can then be driven across the bottom of riverbeds.