One of the big surprises was that the MiG-29 does not use fly-by-wire flight controls. Fly by wire was pioneered on the F-16, and represents an important advance in this area. In the past, flight controls were directly linked to the pilot's controls. The pilot moved the stick or rudder pedals, and the control surface moved. In a fly-by-wire aircraft, the controls are linked to a flight computer and flight sensors. The computer takes the movement of the stick or pedals and then subtly manipulates one or more control surfaces to get the desired result by consulting, almost instantaneously, with the flight sensors. Such a system permits more precise control and makes the aircraft simpler to fly in a combat environment, where extensive maneuvering is necessary.
In addition, it permits the designer to select aircraft configurations that are more maneuverable. Aircraft that are inherently stable are not particularly maneuverable, even though they are easy to control. Aircraft that border on aerodynamic instability can be very maneuverable. Such designs have not been used in the past, since they would be too taxing on the pilot. But with fly by wire, the computer keeps the control surfaces moving to ensure stability and, when hard maneuvering is required, it takes advantage of the aerodynamic instability of the design and provides complex changes in the flight control surfaces that a human could not manage.
The Soviet designers, recognizing the limited possibilities in their industry for mass producing the high-tech items needed for fly by wire, developed a more conventional flight control package and aircraft design, which permits maneuverability approaching that of Western fighters. The designer in charge of the MiG-29 project, Mikhail Valdenberg, stated that computers were used only where absolutely indispensable. Understood in the context of traditional Soviet defensive rationalizations, this means that the Soviet aviation industry could not produce sufficient flight computers to equip the MiG-29 with more sophisticated controls. The MiG-29 does employ a stability augmentation system, rate dampers, and automatic leading edge devices and flaps, which are only several steps away from true fly-by-wire controls.
How close the MiG-29 comes to Western fighter performance is not clear, and probably won't be until pilots who have flown the F-16 or F-18 get a chance to fly the MiG-29. What is clear is that the MiG-29 is more demanding of its pilots than comparable Western fighters. Fly-by-wire controls free the pilot's attention from many aspects of flight control; the plane cannot be maneuvered in a way that would lose stability. This means the F-16 or F-18 pilot can push the plane to its very limits without fear of losing control. The Soviet pilot, on the other hand, must be extremely careful to avoid maneuvers that stray from controlled flight regimes or the angle-of-attack limits. To do so would risk losing control of the aircraft. During cruising this is no problem. It becomes tricky when the fighter is engaged in maneuvering combat, where he can least afford to divert his attention. This is why the angle-of-attack indicator is red-lined at a modest 25 degrees, which places some limits on maneuvering. The matter of flight controls is so serious that in the MiG-29 cockpit the alpha/load indicator has a more prominent position than even the Syrena radar-warning receiver.
In view of its sizzling performance, other aspects of the MiG-29 design proved to be a bit surprising. The cockpit of the Fulcrum is a 1960s configuration with hints of 1970s technology. The instrumentation resembles that of the F-4 Phantom generation. The dials and instruments are straightforward analog systems. There are none of the digital displays or multifunction displays found on later Western fighters. The radar display is small and is covered by a viewing hood, which suggests that the Soviets have not yet managed to field sunlight-readable displays. This is awkward for the pilot, since he must bend forward to read the radar display. This may seem like a frill, but the interface between the man and the machine is proving to be increasingly important. Pilots today face a data overload. They not only have to fly the plane, they have to keep track of whether enemy radars are searching for them, whether someone is interrogating them with an IFF system, and whether all the complicated electronics systems are functioning properly. In peacetime flying, this can be managed. But in the confusion and stress of modern air war, this data overload can have fatal consequences. Ignore the radar warning system at the critical moment, and seconds later a missile will impact against your aircraft. Advanced displays are not gold-plating. They are an attempt to simplify the pilot's tasks by making the flow of data more coherent and easier to understand. Western fighters have an advantage in this regard.
The MiG-29 is typical of contemporary Soviet weapons design that accents machine performance but often takes shortcuts in the interface between man and machine. Another example: the pilot's seat is nearly vertical, while Western designs use an angled seat, which allows the pilot to better cope with high-g (gravitational) forces during combat maneuvering. The MiG-29 is stressed for nine g's, but its pilots are not. Although pilots can be trained in straining maneuvers to help them cope with high-g forces, their endurance can be enhanced by design features such as inclined seats. A pilot in an inclined seat will be more willing to push his aircraft into hard (and personally painful) eight-g and nine-g turns, knowing that he will not black out.
Other aspects of the design show that the Soviets have paid less attention to detail than the Western designers. The MiG-29 canopy configuration does not permit the pilot to "check his six," meaning he cannot swing his head around to check the six o'clock position directly behind him. On the early MiG-29s, there was a radio strip antenna in the upper canopy
that obstructed upward vision. Designs like the F-15, F-16, and F-18 were purposely built to allow the pilot to see behind him and in all other directions with a minimum of hindrance. The Soviets originally fitted the MiG-29 with crude automobile-style rearview mirrors to give the pilot some rear vision. On the newer production MiG-29s like the one at Farnborough, they have adopted Western-style curved mirrors, which reduce obstruction. But mirrors are not as beneficial as good cockpit design to give the pilot a clear picture of the environment behind him. Also, the helmet for the MiG-29 pilot is outdated compared to Western designs and is about twice as heavy. The trend has been toward lighter and more comfortable helmets, to encourage pilots to keep their heads moving, surveying the sky around them. The Soviet helmet is heavy due to the padding needed to protect the pilot against the high levels of cockpit noise — it seems no attention has been paid to reducing the helmet's size and weight. Combined with the restricted space under the canopy, the helmet inhibits the pilot from moving his head rapidly, and often, to check for hostile aircraft.
The buzzword in fighter combat these days is "situational awareness." It is fighter jock talk for the special skill needed to prevail in the modern dogfight. Situational awareness means knowing where you and your plane are, where the enemy planes are, and the status of your fuels and weapons. More than that, it implies an intellectual or instinctive ability to understand the dynamics of fighter combat. It is somewhat comparable to the instincts of a great chess player, who can see several moves ahead and who knows the likely responses an opponent will make to his own moves. Likewise, situational awareness implies a sharp foresight into how an enemy will respond to a pilot's actions. At the heart of this concept is a clear picture of the existing environment — where the enemy is, what he is doing. Good aircraft design cannot give the pilot situational awareness, but it can make it easier for a pilot to better hone his abilities. Soviet flight instrumentation and cockpit design inhibit situational awareness compared to Western designs.