Another feature of the MiG-29 design that proves rather surprising is the nature of the surface finish on the aircraft. The fuselage design is elegant and smooth, especially in the forward areas where it is most critical. Many control surfaces are made of advanced honeycombed or composite materials. But toward the rear surfaces, the finish is often very rough. There are exposed rivet heads where Western aircraft would use flush fasteners. On close inspection, it can be observed that the front screws that hold inspection panels in place have unusual blue lines painted across them. The explanation for this is indicative of continuing Soviet problems in keeping high-tech equipment in service: the blue lines are used to ensure that ground crews properly reattach the panels to the aircraft. If the blue line on the screw head does not match the edges of the blue line on the panel, they are not tight enough. Western fighters avoid the problem by using specialized fasteners. The Soviets use an older fastener technology and, combined with doubts about the skills and experience of their ground crews, it can lead to some concern about aircraft maintenance.
Overall, the impression created by the MiG-29 induces respect for what the designers were able to accomplish using such mediocre technology. The MiG-29 is testimony to Soviet design ingenuity, which has long been a trademark of Soviet aircraft design. The MiG bureau has turned out a remarkable aircraft considering the raw material they have used. In World War II, Soviet fighter designers pushed plywood fuselage construction to the outer limits, approaching the design qualities of German fighters using aluminum. But the MiG-29 design also highlights the fact that the Soviets are still behind in many aspects of aerospace technology. There appear to be continuing bottlenecks in the mass production of advanced electronics, and the fighter designers have adopted less desirable configurations knowing that better components would not be available.
Details of the MiG-29's weapons are less well known. The MiG-29 is usually armed with four R-60 missiles, better known by their NATO code names as AA-8 Aphids, and two R-72 (AA-10 Alamo) missiles. The R-60s are a new infrared guided missile, replacing the old R-3S (AA-2 Atoll). The R-60s are not as capable as current models of the Sidewinder missile, such as the AIM-9L or AIM-9M. Their seekers are not as sensitive, they do not have as much range, and their warheads are a bit suspect. As suggested in the fictional scenario, the Soviets may have to launch two at a time to ensure a kill. A recent incident in southern Africa confirms the problems with these missiles. A small British Aerospace-125 business jet carrying the president of Botswana was accidentally attacked by an Angolan MiG-21, which fired two R-60s. One missile struck the right engine pod, blowing it off. However, the damage was not sufficient to cripple the aircraft, which landed safely.
Details of the newer R-72 are lacking. The missile comes in both radar-guided and infrared-guided versions. It is more comparable to the American AIM-7 Sparrow and offers longer range (and a bigger warhead) than the R-60. The problem with the R-72 and other semiactive radar-guided missiles, is that the aircraft must continue to illuminate the target with its radar until the missile impacts. This is difficult to do in high-speed dogfights, as a wildly jinking enemy aircraft can break radar lock if it can escape the limited cone of the radar's emissions.
Radar missiles are not really intended for dogfighting; they are intended for long-range engagements beyond visual range. They favor aircraft with big, powerful radars that can locate an enemy aircraft before they themselves are detected. In the fictional scenario, the Canadian CF-18 Hornets discover the attacking Soviet flight first and engage them with Sparrow missiles. The Soviets do not see the Canadians, since the Canadians are attacking off axis, from the side where the Soviet's radar cannot see them. The MiG-29's radar warning receivers (RWR) do pick up signals. But RWRs are notoriously fickle and a regular source of false alarms.
The new generation of radar-guided missiles, like the U.S. Air Force's AMRAAM, will mark a revolution in fighter weapons. The AMRAAM contains its own little radar in the nose. The fighter no longer has to continue to use its radar to guide the missile to its target. This will enable small fighters, like the F-16, to fire multiple radar-guided missiles at different targets nearly simultaneously. The AMRAAM represents a growing trend to extend the range of dogfights and the lethal envelope of the fighter plane.
By the time of the Vietnam War, most aviators were expecting that dogfights would take place primarily with missiles. However, the early generation Sidewinders and Sparrows were fickle. Their electronics took a beating, and they often worked poorly as a result. Missiles accounted for the majority of air-to-air kills in the Vietnam fighting, but they were expended at far higher rates than expected. As a result, there was a backlash against all-missile armament, and renewed interest in air combat maneuvering with a gun. The best evidence of the revival of classic dogfighting is the establishment of special air combat maneuver courses such as the well-known "Top Gun" program.
In spite of the backlash against missiles due to the Vietnam experience, newer generations of missiles have overcome many of the reliability problems. During the Falklands War, British Harriers shot down eighteen Argentinian fighters, using twenty-seven AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles. Israeli F-16s during the 1982 Lebanon war shot down thirty-five Syrian fighters with forty-seven AIM-9L or AIM-9P missiles, and five more with 20mm guns. These recent conflicts suggest that missiles will remain the primary weapon in air-to-air combat, although the gun will remain an important supplement. New weapons like AMRAAM will continue to extend the range of dogfights. The majority of dogfights in past wars have been within visual range. The availability of weapons like AMRAAM will increase the percentage of engagements that occur beyond visual range.
Besides the aircraft and missiles, the other key ingredient in fighter combat is the pilot. Indeed, a good many pilots would argue that the pilot is the key ingredient in dogfighting. How do Soviet pilots stack up against NATO pilots? This question is nearly impossible to answer due to the lack of information and lack of evidence of Soviet pilots in actions.
NATO judgment of Soviet piloting skill has been influenced by Soviet performance in World War II and, indirectly, by the performance of Soviet-trained pilots in the Mideast and Asia.
Soviet pilots in World War II, on average, were not very good. German pilots were so contemptuous of Soviet pilots that high scores won by German aces on the Eastern Front were considered equal to scores only a fraction as large won fighting against the better trained British or American pilots in Western Europe or the North African campaign. And Soviet-trained pilots in Korea and the Mideast have not done well. The embarrassing performance of the Syrians in Lebanon in 1982, when they lost more than seventy aircraft to the Israelis without extracting a single loss from their opponents, rebounded on the Soviets, staining them with the taint of Syrian ineptitude. Western views of Soviet pilot quality are further soured by negative judgments about Soviet tactics. The Soviets have fevored ground control of fighters, particularly when they are used in an air defense role. NATO fighter tactics place greater emphasis on individual pilot initiative.
This combination of historical factors and recent experience with Soviet-trained pilots has created many myths about contemporary Soviet pilots. Here are some of them: Soviet wingmen are helpless without their leader. Soviet pilots are good at interception, but they are totally dependent on ground control and do not train for maneuvering engagements. Soviet training is so rigid that pilots will not display initiative in combat.