The Desert
The previous chapter has stated how 3rd Panzer Division was to be a nucleus in the Africa Corps organisation and that how, within six months, an expeditionary force had been selected, had been stood down, a new unit reformed, despatched, and was ready for action. In view of the urgency there had been little time for preparation and the German Army in undertaking a campaign in tropical desert regions was entering very much into terra incognita. With the exception of reports based upon the experiences of von Lettow-Vorbeck's force, which had fought in equatorial Africa during the First World War, and upon the recollections of veterans who had fought with the Turks in Palestine, there were no first hand experiences upon which the staff could make their plans.
Not until after the armistice with the French did discussions take place on the subject of equipment and supply for units serving in sub-tropical or tropical climes and, once again, contemporary information was lacking. There were no French or British papers dealing with the tactics or employment of motorised or armoured formations in desert warfare and the Italian material had, generally, dealt only with the recently concluded war against Ethiopia. In the autumn of 1940 the Italians produced their first reports based upon the campaign against the British in Egypt but these papers were lacking in detail, were often inaccurate in report, and frequently as wildly false as the maps which their cartographic service had produced. Basic and sometimes vital details were omitted from the Italian reports so that the first German units were supplied with unnecessary or badly designed equipment.
A case in point was the fact that upon Italian recommendation the Germans sent no diesel engines to Africa, although in tropical conditions the diesel was a more suitable engine than the petrol motor. The Italians also forgot to add that they had themselves designed a successful, special tropical pattern diesel. With no advice forthcoming the Germans made no special preparations to protect vehicle motors from the scouring effects of sand and dust, so that in the early months the life of a German tank engine was between 800 and 1000 miles, that is about half that of a British vehicle. It was only when special filters were fitted that the life span was increased to equal that of British machines.
The adverse effects upon the efficiency of tank engines of the great heat during the summer campaigns could not be completely overcome by mechanical means and it was found that there were less troubles if marches were undertaken by night or the vehicles moved in the cooler hours of early morning or late evening. Of course, night marches demanded the ability to read the compass efficiently and all tank crews had to be trained in this skill. An added advantage of this training and one which was only later appreciated was that panzer operations could then still be carried out even in the artificial darkness of a sand storm.
Experience was to show that during a tank battle the onset of darkness usually brought an end to the day's fighting and the post-battle actions of the combatants are interesting. The British almost invariably drew back from the battlefield to laager, to rearm, and to prepare for the morrow. Thus, after the strain of battle British tank drivers still had to undertake a march and then on the next day had an approach march to battle. This voiding of the field by the British meant that vehicles which had fallen out or were only suffering from slight mechanical faults were left in German dominated territory for that army, by contrast, laagered on or very close to the scene of the fighting and thus spared their drivers the extra strain imposed in driving.
The German tank recovery organisation was first class and its units followed close behind each panzer company ready to carry out, under fire, local and immediate repairs. For the more seriously damaged vehicles there were low-loader trucks able to bear weights of up to 18 tons and thus able to remove such tanks from the field to the workshops immediately behind the firing line so that specialised repairs could be carried out on them. Such organisation, much improvisation, and as a result of such practices the Axis forces were able to overcome the numerical inferiority from which they suffered. They further reduced the superiority of their enemy by taking into their own service or by blowing up the British tanks which had been left unrecovered on the field. [2]
The Italians were unable to give any details on camouflage, a difficult task in an area devoid of all natural cover, and the Germans tried many methods of concealment. The first vehicles to arrive in North Africa had been covered in standard European paint for the quartermaster's department had no paint suitable for desert conditions. To tone down the shades of grey and green the machines were first sprayed with oil and upon this foundation sand was strewn. The greatest need in all concealment is to break up the outline of the shadow which the vehicle casts and to do this extensive use was made of netting, sometimes set about with small tufts of camel thorn. The method which the infantry frequently used to escape detection was to dig slit trenches into the sides of wadis or if in the open desert then to spread a net across the trench opening and thus to have not only protection against detection but shade from the sun.
Not even by night were vehicles safe from detection for bright, desert moonlight illuminated them at considerable distances even from the air and it was necessary, therefore, for vehicles to move tactically dispersed when travelling in moonlight. In addition to camouflage against visibility, units concealed their locations and avoided being surprised during the hours of darkness or in periods of rest by practising wireless silence. Any message which it was essential to pass went out either on the ultra short-wave wireless frequency to avoid interception or by telephone, although this latter method was only used inside a laager during long halts or at night.
Very little information was available on the effect of tropical living upon northern Europeans although it was widely held at OKH that the summer heat would be too great to allow military operations to continue and that both armies would withdraw into summer quarters to await better campaigning weather, just as the armies had taken up winter quarters in cold climates in former days. Having no data the Germans made no special selection of men to serve in Africa, other than a simple medical examination. Nor was any special training given or, in the early days, any time spent in acclimatisation. By an unplanned piece of good fortune the first troops arrived in early spring and needed no period of acclimatisation before going into battle within weeks of their debarkation. Subsequently, reinforcements were sent to Bavaria or to Sicily to accustom them to the heat but still no special training or instructions were given other than a few lectures on hygiene.
These statements conflict with contemporary British newspaper accounts which described how hordes of blond stormtroops, the recruits for the Africa Corps, had been set to marching in vast glass, hothouses set up on Baltic beaches to prepare them for the great heat: the difficult, airless, and arid conditions under which they would live and fight in Africa. This legend of the highly trained supermen helped to salve British wounds inflicted when Rommel's small force beat the remnants of Wavell's Army, depleted by the removal of much of its strength to serve as an expeditionary force in Greece.