One of the most important requirements in the African campaign was the ability to identify quickly and at long range men or vehicles encountered in the desert and in this field, too, the Germans had to learn from experience. The effect of sun upon sand caused severe eye strain - a form of sand blindness -often produced mirages, and always shimmering heat waves. All or any one of these reduced the range of effective vision and thus the ability to identify vehicles with speed. In open desert vision was only slightly affected between the hours from first light to about 09.00hrs and from 16,00hrs to dusk. At those times accurate vision varied between 2000 and 5000 yards. As the day wore on and the temperature rose the effective range decreased to less than 1500 yards.
It should have been apparent to the German planners, but seems to have escaped their notice, that North Africa is, by and large, a treeless waste. Yet they made no attempt to supply fuel oil for cooking or for workshop firing and relied on wood which had to be brought from Italy thus reducing shipping space which could have been used for more vital supplies. They were also unaware that the desert terrain is not a vast series of sand dunes as a result of which the lorries fitted with double tyres for better traction in such conditions suffered from punctures caused by the infiltration of sharp stones picked up and wedged between the double tyres when the vehicles crossed the hard-going which constituted much of the desert's surface. Later during the campaign special wide tyres were fitted to the Volkswagen cars and thereby improved the cross-country performances of those vehicles.
By and large it can be said that the Italians did nothing to prepare themselves for a desert campaign and that the Germans were unable to do anything through lack of time and foreknowledge. But it must also be admitted that once there were experiences upon which to base conclusions or to make appreciations then Rommel's force adapted, improvised, and fought a good fight.
On the problem of food suitable for soldiers in tropical areas the Germans, again lacking first-hand information, drew very heavily upon out of date sources and upon theories. The dieticians issued instructions on the type and preparation of food that were completely at variance with available resources and showed little forward planning and even less imagination. They were convinced that potatoes, the German soldier's staple diet and bread, his other basic foodstuff, were liable to spoil and turn mouldy in the North African climate. Substitutes for these two basic foods were issued: beans in place of potatoes and biscuits in place of bread. The British Army which faced the same problem had solved the potato question by canning those vegetables, a solution which the German scientists seem not to have considered. In the event German field bakeries began to turn out a flat type of rye biscuit but then went over to baking real bread. Experiments were made using sea water, to economise on sweet water supplies, but these proved unsuccessful.
In view of the fact that butter or margarine melted in the heat, olive oil was used as a substitute and with the exception of small amounts of cheese and tinned beef there were no other ration foods available. The diet was monotonous and lacked not only variety but vitamin C.
With typical German attention to detail instructions were given on how to prepare freshly killed meat or game, on hygiene, on the fact that water should be drunk only during the cool periods of the day, on sanitation, and on relations with the local population. For the greatest part of the years they spent in Africa the German soldiers had little fresh meat, of game there was no sign, the hygiene instructions were commonsense, and it was difficult to establish relations with the Arabs. Those in the populated coastal areas avoided contact and there were few dwellers in the desert places. In later years, in Tunisia, there was such a rapport that native battalions were raised but these men had, perhaps, enlisted more as an anti-French gesture than as a demonstration of pro-German feeling. The Germans certainly made great efforts to win the friendship of the Arabs for their commanders knew that with such support they were assured of a freedom from guerrilla warfare, from partisans, and from sabotage.
Uniforms
The uniform with which the Army in Africa is most closely identified — the long visored cap, the shorts, and high boots - was a development of a pattern of clothing of which the first issues were made late in 1940. The material was an olive-coloured cotton cloth and the cut was the same for all the ranks. The tunic was a lighter version of the standard European pattern garment and the breeches were intended to be worn with the specially designed leather and canvas high, lace-up boots. A sun helmet was covered with olive green canvas and was fitted with light alloy decais of the same pattern as that painted on the steel helmet.
Practical use showed the uniform to be badly designed. The jacket restricted movement and the breeches were.too tight, the sun helmet was too bulky for front line use and gave almost no protection against head wounds. A second disadvantage with the sun helmet was that sand and dust entered the ventilation holes and matted the hair. Only the boots were practical and long lasting.
In the course of time the Germans became aware that it was possible to survive and even fight in the desert during the hottest months of the year so long as clothing was light, loose, and comfortable. The impractical uniform which had been issued was either discarded or amended. The sun helmet was the first item to go and to be replaced by the long-visored field cap, and the steel helmet was brought back for front line use. The tight breeches were discarded and were replaced either by slacks, paratroop overalls buttoning at the ankle, or by short trousers. These latter were not authorised wear in every unit for some regimental officers realised that long trousers gave better protection to the legs against small, accidental cuts and grazes which quickly and almost invariably turned ulcerous.
After long wear and frequent washings the German olive green uniform colour, tended to fade to the shade of khaki worn by the British and when in 1942 vast stocks of British uniforms were captured in Tobruk these were adapted and issued to German units so that on some sectors, except for the rank insignia and specialist badges, both sides wore the same pattern uniform. This use of enemy clothing was not a new phenomenon - equipment and vehicles in particular were often captured and put into service against their former owners. The British had in this fashion used Italian tanks captured during WavelTs offensive, Rommel's command vehicle was a British truck, and after the Mechili operation the captured British soft-skinned vehicles had been issued to the German units to give them a greater mobility. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that most soldiers had great difficulty in correctly distinguishing friendly from enemy units although to aid identification British vehicles in Axis service were frequently marked with a swastika flag and almost always painted with a German straight-edged, black cross.
Terrain
Mention has already been made of the fact that the Germans, in a false assessment of the terrain conditions, sent trucks with double sets of tyres to the African theatre of operations. It is a common fallacy, and one which was held by the OKH, that the whole of the North African desert was a vast sea of loose sand formed into rolling dunes.
There were, of course, large stretches of country in which this condition obtained but the desert also had more areas of firm going on which rocks of varying sizes were met and when in later years the Axis armies entered Tunisia they were climatically in an area akin to southern Italy with mountains, vegetation, and cacti. There was in Libya only one single, all-weather road, the Via Balbia, which traversed the country extending from the Tunisian frontier to Egypt and upon this tarmac surface traffic could move as swiftly as in Europe. The Via Balbia was one of the factors which determined the success or failure of an offensive and it followed very closely the line of the Mediterranean linking, in its west to east journey along the coast, the widely spaced towns and settlements of the Italian colony for there were no important inland towns. The distances between the towns was enormous and it was, therefore, upon a battlefield of vast lateral extent that the campaign was fought out. From Tripoli, the capital city, to Buerat on the eastern border of the province was more than 300 miles. To El Agheila, on the south-western edge of Cyrenaica, it was 470 miles, Benghasi was 650 miles away, and the Egyptian frontier was nearly 1000 miles distant.