Criss-crossing the desert were native tracks (trigh) with varying degrees of value as roads capable of bearing military traffic. Most of these trigh were on firm going but with constant use the hard surface rutted and the trigh widened as drivers left the original track to find smoother going or a less dusty surface. These tracks were useless in wet weather for rain washed away their surfaces and wheeled transport using them frequently bogged down. At a point where two trigh crossed there was usually some sort of landmark, a bir (well or cistern) or sidi (the grave of some Muslim saint). These track junctions played an important part in the fighting for they were landmarks or points of reference in a countryside totally devoid of distinctive features. Such strategically important places were usually held by a garrison or used as advanced supply depots.
A thin, fertile strip of land in which much of the population lived and which bordered the Mediterranean extended into the desert for only a short way and then, as the vegetation ended, the hard surface was met. Farther inland the going deteriorated and there were vast sand seas which were almost impassable, even to tracked vehicles. It was into these isolated and barren wastes that long-distance reconnaissance patrols were sent at infrequent intervals and it was the presence of these great impassable seas which prevented the deployment of masses of men and hemmed the combatants into an area extending inland from the sea to a depth of about 50 miles. Most of the battles and offensives which will be described in this book were fought out within this narrow strip of Libya. Rising above the level of the desert were escarpments (djebels), possession of which allowed some of the trigh and, in places, the Via Balbia to be dominated. At certain places along the coast the escarpments rose sheer out of the sea and at these points, as well as along some inland djebels, vehicles could not cross. But, in the main, most of the high ground could be conquered by tracked vehicles. Where the mountains ran almost to the sea the coastal plain reduced in width to form a narrow pass, ideal defensive positions across whose mouth a small number of defenders could hold off superior forces. Other defence lines could be constructed wherever there was a natural feature on the desert flank which.could not be bypassed. The British position at El Alamein where the desert flank rested on the impassable Quattara Depression is a classic example of that type of defence line.
Climatically the best campaigning seasons were the spring and autumn although both these times of the year were periods during which the khamsin or jibli blew. These hot winds raced across the desert at high speed whirling the sand into the air and producing a sort of hot, gritty fog with the air as thick as soup and of an enervating closeness. Some storms were of such intensity that they lasted for days and halted all movement as men and machines tried desperately to prevent themselves being sanded in. The side which could attack under the cover of the khamsin had the advantage of approaching almost totally concealed from sight and sound. Of the other seasons the winter produced bad weather and often rain which washed away the trigh while, in the opinion of OKH, the intense heat of summer was likely to reduce operations to small-scale, patrol affairs. In fact this turned out not to be the case and there were summer offensives during both 1941 and 1942 although the strain which the fighting placed upon both men and their vehicles was quite severe.
Despite the terrible disadvantages the desert had a charm, almost a fascination, which affected most of them who lived and fought there. The vast distances, the deep silences, the tricks of light, even the spartan conditions had a profound effect upon the soldiers who were in this desolate wilderness thousands of miles from their homes. This nostalgia, this longing for the empty spaces was best expressed in a poem written by one Cockney soldier during a winter in Italy.
Give me a brew can and let me go, far away up in the blue Sit in a laager and talk of the days of Medjez and Mersa Matruh Sand in my teeth, sand in my hair, free from all worry, far from all care And no redcap to check me for the clobber I wear; far away up in the blue
Because there were so few civilians and, thus few distractions the armies, German as well as British, turned in upon themselves and became such closely knit organisations that the word family best describes them. The desert and its ways produced in addition to peculiar ideas of dress the invisible but distinctive styles of comradeship, loyalty, and decency which were never found in any other theatre of operation. In Africa there were no mass atrocities committed as an act of policy against civilians or soldiers for the possibility of becoming a prisoner of war was a continual hazard in the ebb and flow of armoured warfare.
Tactics
Tactics are defined as the art of handling troops in the field to gain a desired end easily and smoothly. Weapons determine tactics and to a very great degree it is the ability to recognise the potential of a new weapon which shapes the course and the outcome of battles. It was Rommel's flair for combining the new weapons of blitzkrieg, the tank and the dive-bomber with the classic foot and guns, which brought him tactical victories on so many occasions and, although his ability had been demonstrated as early as the French campaign of 1940, it was in North Africa that this military genius truly flowered.
He had come to Africa with tactical doctrines based on European experiences and then found that some of these had little or no relevance to the new theatre of operations. Faced by new problems the Germans applied themselves with their customary vigour and in the lulls between the summer and autumn fighting of 1941 produced tactics in which at first only the men of 15th Panzer Division were trained and these innovations having proved themselves in the winter campaign of 1941 and the spring campaign of 1942, they were developed as a battle drill and introduced into other panzer units.
Rommel's doctrine was that all arms — infantry, guns, and tanks — should fight as fully integrated parts of a whole and that thereby they would be able to bring down a maximum concentration of effort upon any chosen target within the shortest possible time. In the desert this chosen target was the British armour whose destruction was the key to tactical success. One of the first discoveries made by panzer men in the desert was that the force did not need to move in column, which had been the practice in Europe, for given firm going the advance could be made in line abreast. Out of this knowledge evolved the tactic of a panzer unit advancing to contact already formed for battle and not having to waste time in deployment manoeuvring. A whole panzer division could move forward as a series of 'boxes' or 'handkerchiefs', each box forming an individual battle group and echeloned with a depth four times that of its front. The various components of the division were usually located within the box in the same position. The armoured brow made up of a tank battalion with artillery support. Then followed the second panzer battalion with heavier artillery and engineers, all forming another box. On the 'enemy' side of the divisional 'box' ranged the reconnaissance detachments and the anti-tank guns while located in the centre of the box were the soft-skinned vehicles and divisional headquarters. Behind this mass of trucks there were the heaviest guns of the divisional artillery and at the rear the infantry component, the remainder of the artillery, and the tank recovery details.