Post-Soviet Russian foreign and security policy has often been described as imperialistic since the early 1990s, especially regarding its relations with other states in the former Soviet region with the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic States evaded the potential for continuing Russian influence, first by opting out of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, and later by becoming members of NATO and the European Union. For the rest, just as Russia had expected that it would automatically inherit the Soviet Union’s great power status, it was also assumed that ongoing influence over the former Soviet region was a given. Already in 1992, the chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet’s Committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, Evgenii Ambartsumov, wrote that:
as the internationally recognized legal successor to the USSR, the [Russian Federation] must proceed in its foreign policy from a doctrine declaring all the geopolitical space of the former Union as a sphere of its vital interests… and must seek the world community’s understanding and recognition of its [special] interests in this space. Russia must also seek from the world community the role of political and military guarantor of stability on the whole former space of the USSR. (Page 1994: 794)
As it turned out, and unexpectedly for Russia, neither its neighbours nor the West shared this expectation. As the newly independent states developed their own foreign and security policies, they cooperated with Russia when it suited them, but also kept an open mind to other options. The West believed that, as sovereign states, Russia’s neighbours were free to pursue their own interests (Renz and Smith 2016: 17–18).
Why is influence and a dominant position in the former Soviet region still so important to Russia? As subsequent chapters will show, insecurity and the perceived need for a buffer zone play a role. Given that Russia does not have a strong reserve of historically close allies, adding to its feelings of insecurity, having a ‘sphere of influence’ is particularly significant (Renz and Smith 2016: 16). Strategic and material interests, as well as status concerns, are also important factors. Military force has been a vital means for the preservation of Russia’s privileged position in its perceived sphere of influence, starting with the various ‘peacekeeping’ operations in the early 1990s, as discussed at length in chapter 4. However, until 2014, Russian efforts to ensure its dominance and privileged position in the region never relied on territorial expansion or direct political subordination. Whether the annexation of Crimea was a reversal of this trend, or an exceptional case, is far from certain. As examples in Russia’s own history show, the cost of expansion is significant if the suppression of resistant populations is involved, and prohibitive in situations that could lead to military confrontation with other great powers.
Multilateralism
Based on Russia’s history and the importance its leaders have traditionally attached to a strong military, Western observers have often viewed it as an actor that prioritizes the maximization of its own power at the expense of existing institutions (Tsygankov 2009: 51). Recent developments in Russian foreign policy, and especially the operations in Ukraine and Syria, have led to renewed fears that the country is yet again preparing to go it alone in its quest for great power status. Such an interpretation of Russian foreign policy risks being onedimensional, because it neglects the important role multilateralism historically has played in the country’s international politics.
Russia’s search for multilateralism dates back to the time of Alexander I. A new European security order – the Concert of Europe – was agreed in 1814–15 by four great powers: Russia, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. Tsar Alexander I and the British foreign minister, Viscount Castlereagh, both believed that regular meetings and discussions between rulers and foreign ministers under this framework would serve to maintain peace in Europe. Indeed, the Congress of Vienna treaty succeeded in preserving peace in Europe until the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853–5). For Alexander I, the Russian Empire’s interests in Europe went beyond the expansion of territory and the maximization of power. He wanted Russia to play a leading role, together with other great powers, in the affairs of the continent and also beyond (Seton-Watson 1989: 174–5). This period of history is often referred to in Russia today as providing an example of the best way of ensuring international security and as a model for the country’s desired global role (Baunov 2015). As Jeffrey Mankoff has put it ‘The Russian worldview is analogous perhaps to the Concert of Europe’ (2007: 129).
A similar system emerged after the end of the Second World War. The victorious powers agreed to respect each other’s ‘sphere of influence’ and set up the United Nations. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the victorious powers were granted a privileged place in this new institution. This new system of multilateralism operated at first on the basis of cooperation, and later on opposition between the great powers as the Cold War developed. While multilateral institutions remained, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev preferred bilateral relations between the world’s two superpowers. This approach continued into the Brezhnev period, although multilateralism enjoyed a renaissance at the time of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Russia’s search for multilateral engagement continued into the post-Soviet period. As Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen wrote, ‘both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin consistently professed a deep attachment to the principles of multilateralism’ (2009: 1). In a long article discussing Russian foreign policy from a historical perspective in 2016, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined his country’s long history of cooperation through multilateral effort and stressed that this factor remained important. In his words, Russia had never been ‘fighting against someone but for the resolution of all issues in an equal and mutually respectful manner as the only reliable basis for a long-term improvement in international relations’ (2016).
Assessing the specific understanding of multilateralism in contemporary Russia is important for evaluating its role in the country’s foreign policy, and statements like Lavrov’s. This understanding, as noted above, remains heavily linked to nineteenth-century ideas about cooperation in Europe and, as such, to Russia’s self-perception as a great power. Moscow’s view on the concept has been described as ‘great power multilateralism involving leading states that may or may not take into consideration the concerns and wishes of smaller states’ (Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009: 2). In the sense that multilateralism is seen as an activity between great powers, it is closely related to the idea of multipolarity. In the Russian context, both concepts are often used interchangeably or in overlapping ways (Tsygankov 2009). Former foreign minister Igor Ivanov’s book on Russian foreign policy reflected the same understanding of multilateralism. Citing examples of constructive interaction by permanent members of the UN Security Council, he argued that Russia did not pursue the vision of a multipolar world where it was in opposition to the West. Instead, he suggested that Moscow wanted to create a mechanism enabling collective responses to international challenges. In his vision, such a mechanism would enable the solution of international problems without compromising the national interests of any of the leading powers. It would also serve as a forum for the resolution of disputes between the great powers themselves (Ivanov 2002: 47). In effect, he proposed a club or ‘concert’, where great powers could cooperate, even if they continued to compete with each other in a multipolar setting.