Orel Bulge.
Chapter VIII KURSK: HITLER LOSES HIS LAST CHANCE OF
TURNING THE TIDE
Already in February, after Stalingrad, Hitler had declared that it was essential for the German Army "to make up in summer what had been lost in winter." This was not easy since the Germans and their allies had lost well over half a million men, perhaps as many as 700,000. Despite the "total mobilisation" introduced in Germany, only about half the losses could be replaced by the beginning of the summer fighting, according to German sources. Hitler's prestige had suffered severely from Stalingrad, and the recapture of Kharkov had not made up for it. The rout of the Germans in North Africa and the
prospect of an early invasion of Italy, with unpredictable (or perhaps all-too-predictable) political consequences, had added to Hitler's discomfiture. The war in Russia could
scarcely be won any longer, but what Hitler badly needed was a spectacular victory—
something similar to the Russian victory at Stalingrad. The "Kursk salient" between Orel in the north and Belgorod in the south (a salient which the Russians had captured in the previous winter) seemed the most obvious place for inflicting a sensational defeat on the Russians.
The Russians looked upon the Kursk salient as their springboard for the reconquest of the Orel and Briansk country to the north-west, and of the Ukraine to the south-west, and there were enormous Russian troop concentrations in it. Ever since March the Russians had been fortifying the salient with thousands of miles of trenches, thousands of gun emplacements, et cetera, and the defence in depth along the north, west and south sides of the salient extended as much as sixty-five miles.
In the spring of 1943, according to German sources, Hitler was determined for both
political and economic reasons to hold a front running from the Gulf of Finland down to the Sea of Azov, and to inflict a resounding defeat on the Russians with his "Operation Citadel" in the Kursk salient. To trap vast numbers of Russians there would greatly change the whole strategic position in the Germans' favour, and might even make a new offensive against Moscow possible.
As the Germans now tell the story:
The Kursk salient seemed particularly favourable for such an attack. A
simultaneous German offensive from north and south would trap powerful Russian
forces. It was also to be hoped that the operational reserves the enemy would throw into the fray could be smashed. Moreover, the liquidation of this salient would
greatly shorten the front... True, there were some who argued even then that the
enemy would expect the German attack precisely in this area and... that there was therefore the danger of losing more German forces than destroying Russian forces...
But Hitler would not be convinced, and thought Operation Citadel would succeed,
provided it was undertaken soon.
[Philippi and Heim, op. cit., pp. 209-10.]
But the operation was delayed owing to unfavourable terrain conditions and also to the slowness with which the German divisions were being replenished. In the circumstances General Model, commanding the German troops north of the salient declared that the
operation could not succeed without strong reinforcements by heavy modern tanks,
superior to anything the Russians had. The attack was therefore postponed once again till the middle of June, and meantime numerous new Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand
mobile guns were rushed from armaments works in Germany straight to the front. But
there were further hesitations and delays caused, among other things, by Hitler's fear that Italy was on the point of dropping out of the war. When he had satisfied himself that Mussolini was not giving up, Hitler decided to stick to his original plan.
The Kursk victory, he declared, would fire the imagination of the world.
Meanwhile the Russians under Zhukov and Vasilevsky had not wasted their time, and
nothing suited them better than that the Germans should attack them where they were
strongest of all. The extent of the Russian concentration of armaments in the main battle area may be judged from the fact that, in less than three months, some 500,000 railway wagons loaded with every kind of equipment had been brought from inside Russia to the Kursk salient.
The Germans had accumulated 2,000 tanks round the salient (according to the Russians, over 3,000), more than half of them in the southern sector commanded by General Hoth, and nearly 2,000 planes.
To quote Philippi and Heim:
With such heavy German concentrations, Hitler looked forward to the battle with
great confidence. He was sure that the northern and southern striking force would break through and close the ring east of Kursk. But, contrary to expectations, it took only a very short time to realise that the offensive was a failure, even though our troops exerted themselves to the utmost. Our attacking forces, though
penetrating into the deep Russian defences, were suffering very severe losses, and on July 7 the Russians threw in increasingly heavy tank forces. The German 4th
Panzer Army had to fight particularly heavy tank battles, in which the most it could hope to do was not to be driven back. Serious doubts grew as to the success of
Operation Citadel. Hitler nevertheless ordered on July 10 the offensive to continue.
That was the day on which the Western Allies landed in Sicily, and he needed his
"Kursk victory" more than ever.
In reality, after the initial tactical successes, the Battle of Kursk had long before come to a standstill, and on July 12 the Russian command suddenly struck out
towards Orel, in the rear of the German 9th Army [at the north side of the Kursk
salient]... On July 13 Hitler reluctantly ordered Operation Citadel to be
discontinued. This decision was further prompted by the Italians' failure to defend Sicily, and the possibility of having to send German reinforcements to Italy.
[Ibid., p. 212.]
In four days the Germans succeeded in no more than denting the Kursk salient—by some ten miles along a front of about twelve miles in the north, and by some thirty miles along a thirty mile front in the south. About 100 miles still separated the two German forces when the battle came to a standstill.
Nearly the entire German panzer force had been used up to an irreplaceable extent, and the initiative was finally lost by the Germans and taken over by the Red Army. Despite very heavy losses they had also suffered in the Battle of Kursk, the Russian command was now still able to launch its summer offensive along a very broad front, with superior forces.
There was tremendous tension in Moscow when it was first learned that the German
offensive had begun. The news was contained in an article, redolent of nationalism, in Red Star.
Our fathers and our forebears made every sacrifice to save their Russia, their
homeland. Our people will never forget Minin and Pozharsky, Suvorov and
Kutuzov, and the Russian Partisans of 1812. We are proud to think that the blood of our glorious ancestors is flowing in our veins, and we shall be worthy of them...
What was being fought in the very heart of Russia, in Turgeniev country, was a modern kind of Battle of Kulikovo on the outcome of which so much depended.
[ In which Prince Dimitri Donskoi routed the Tartars in 1380.]
On the very first day of the battle two things were clear: that Germany had thrown