Weapon maintenance was not helped by the poor quality of the initial-issue cleaning kits; the brushes were inadequate, the pull-through was difficult to get down a fouled barrel and the oil bottles split or leaked, leading to many soldiers replacing them with non-issue items until an improved cleaning kit was finally issued with the A2 version.
In recent conflicts – whether in Northern Ireland, Iraq or Afghanistan – when and how British troops could use their weapons was governed by strict ‘Rules of Engagement’ (ROE) intended to prevent civilian casualties. These rules were printed on a card known as ‘Card Alpha’ or the ‘yellow card’ and issued to every soldier. There were actually several different sets of ROE such as ‘Rule 429’ and ‘Rule 421’, some more restrictive than others. Almost all except the ‘war-fighting’ Rule 429 effectively meant that troops could only fire against clear targets engaged in hostile acts, although this need not mean actually firing weapons.
For instance, insurgent forward observers in Iraq initially stood – conspicuously unarmed – in plain sight, observing the fall of mortar fire at British troops through binoculars and correcting the aim via mobile phones. The Army received legal advice that this did constitute ‘engaging in direct attack’, however, and the next insurgents to do so were promptly eliminated. In many circumstances – even in war zones – troops were interviewed by Royal Military Police officers after a shooting incident, and were aware that they could face legal or disciplinary consequences for improper use of force. In Northern Ireland, troops had to account for every live round issued to them and not returned. Doug Beattie, Regimental Sergeant Major of 1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment, explains how the ROE worked from the point of view of a man in combat:
I took one shot – and another – at a quartet of enemy fighters scurrying between a pair of compounds just the other side of the canal. Then I switched the weapon to automatic, loosing off short bursts at more fleeting figures as they darted back and forth…
In Afghanistan British troops work under the rules of engagement as defined on the so-called Card A. As I tried my damnedest to kill my enemy, the wording on that card came into my mind.
Firearms must only be used as a last resort in protection of human life. You are only to open fire against a person if he/she is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger human life and there is no other way of stopping it.
Well, I was covered there, then. Human life was being endangered. Mine. I fired another burst.
A challenge MUST be given before opening fire unless to do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or any other person other than the attacker(s).
Yep, covered there pretty well too.
I ducked down to release the now-empty magazine and shove a fresh one home. Raising my head again, I caught sight of two more Talibs, in the open, a mere twenty metres away. Should I give them fair warning? ‘Army, stop or I shoot’? Sod that.
I brought my rifle to bear and pulled the trigger. One of the men went down as the rounds hit him, while the other scampered away.
If you have to open fire only fire aimed shots, fire no more rounds than are necessary, take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.
Targets? These weren’t ****ing metal plates with human effigies painted on them, sitting at the bottom of the range. They were fighters whose goal was to wipe us out. I wasn’t counting rounds. I was trying to stay alive.
This guidance does not affect your inherent right to self defence. However in all situations you are to use no more force than absolutely necessary. (Beattie 2009: 143–44)
In some cases, this meant that opponents who understood British ROE were less intimidated by the SA80 than by theoretically less dangerous weapons, as David Hardy, part of a vehicle patrol from the Light Infantry, found out when attacked by a Belfast mob:
We trained our gats (SA80s) on them as we peered through our firing slots, but they knew that we wouldn’t fire live rounds at unarmed civilians. Then, they began to advance on us to try and surround us, so we had to keep our eyes to the front and rear; behind us were ginnells and alleyways from which they could sneak up on us.
There was only the one vehicle – a four man brick with a full screw in charge of us and nothing appeared to be coming to reinforce us. Then the Corporal said ‘Stick one in the chamber (of the baton gun) and stick it out of the turret.’ As soon as they saw this appear, they knew that we meant business and began to back off… they quickly learned that whereas we wouldn’t use live ammo on them unless we knew that firearms would be used against us, they also knew that we wouldn’t hesitate to use baton rounds when we were threatened. (Quoted in Wharton 2008: 389)
Troops in Afghanistan could easily find themselves operating in both relatively arid desert and the lush irrigated ‘green zone’ along the Helmand River during a single mission, leading to a new ‘Multi Terrain Pattern’ camouflage replacing desert DPM from 2010. These soldiers are wearing late-pattern Osprey body armour, and the new Mk 7 helmets. Protective kneepads, ‘eyepro’ protective glasses, night-vision gear and personal radios were now standard issue for all infantry, and Glock 17 pistols were issued as back-up weapons. Troops on foot patrol were usually heavily laden with armour, ammunition and water, the latter being required in large quantities when patrolling in the heat of the Afghan summer. The leader of this four-man brick has an L85A2 IW fitted with the rail interface system, ‘grip pod’ forward handgrip, and laser module. The second soldier has an L85A2 fitted with a 40mm L123A2 under-barrel grenade launcher (UGL). Both L85A2s are fitted with the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) and Magpul polymer magazines. One of the remaining two soldiers is armed with an L108A1 Minimi LMG, which provides the brick’s automatic firepower, and the other carries an L129A1 7.62mm Sharpshooter Rifle, which had taken over the role of accurate long-range shooting. By this point, the L86 LSW was not usually seen in front-line units.