The launcher itself weighs 1.5kg, but a load of 12 40mm grenades adds another 2.7kg – a significant addition on top of the rifle and its ammunition. It can fire the full range of NATO-standard low-velocity 40×46mm grenades, but only high-explosive and practice rounds are currently issued. Buckshot rounds (for close fighting) and non-lethal baton rounds have been postulated as potential future developments to enhance the launcher’s capabilities. Other potential future improvements include an enhanced aiming module to enable better indirect fire, and a longer-cased medium-velocity round to extend the weapon’s range.
IMPACT
The verdict of battle
TACTICAL IMPACT
Until the SA80 was adopted in 1985, British infantry-platoon organization was essentially unchanged from World War II, with a very small platoon HQ plus three eight-man rifle sections. Each section (led by a corporal) was built around a three-man GPMG team under a lance corporal, plus five riflemen with SLRs. The arrival of the SA80 changed this. Each section was now broken down into two equal four-man bricks, each containing three riflemen with L85 IWs plus an L86 LSW gunner. Meanwhile, the platoon HQ was enlarged to include a single GPMG (SF) on a tripod for sustained-fire support. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, new weapons were added so each brick ideally had one L85, one L85 with UGL, one Minimi as the primary automatic weapon and an LSW, which was retained in a ‘heavy rifle’ role for accurate long-range shooting.
In Afghanistan, changing tactical requirements meant the section was often replaced by the ‘multiple’, essentially a half-platoon typically made up of three four-man bricks. Meanwhile, some bricks received the L129A1 7.62mm semi-automatic Sharpshooter Rifle to take over from the LSW in the long-range fire role, or became ‘heavy’ bricks with two Minimis.
The SA80 family was intended to replace four weapons: the L1A1 SLR, the Sterling SMG, the L4A4 LMG and the L7A1 GPMG in the ‘light’ role, i.e. all except those used in a dedicated sustained-fire role or as a vehicle-mounted weapon. The L85 was a significant improvement over the (effectively obsolete) 9mm Sterling, offering much better range and lethality, while being almost as compact and not much heavier. It also took one type of ammunition out of the platoon supply chain completely. The L85 provided direct replacements for the ageing SLRs. While some preferred the older weapon, it is worth recalling that although policy still prevented women serving in the infantry, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts saw female soldiers serving in front-line roles as medics, search-dog handlers, etc. While these women were able to handle the L85 without difficulty – and the press made a certain amount of fuss when the first insurgent was killed by a female soldier using the weapon – it is unlikely that most would have been able to use the larger SLR. The L85 was also much easier for rear-echelon personnel such as drivers to carry in the course of their duties, and the non-linear nature of recent conflicts made it more likely that such personnel would need to defend themselves.
The L4A4 LMG – effectively the old World War II Bren gun re-barrelled for 7.62mm ammunition – was only retained in limited roles: generally where the mobility of a box-fed machine gun was more important than weight of fire. The LSW took over this role adequately, though the Minimi performed better and ultimately displaced the LSW in turn. It is fair to say that the LSW failed as a replacement for the GPMG. With its lighter calibre and with its sustained-fire capability compromised by the lack of a belt feed or quick-change barrel, it was never able to lay down the weight of fire required. Some units – such as The Parachute Regiment – simply retained their GPMGs, while units that had given them up re-acquired them. The adoption of the Minimi went a good way to improve the situation, but infantry units could still be seen lugging GPMGs on foot patrols in Afghanistan, despite the greater weight of the gun and its ammunition. Indeed, the Afghan conflict even saw some units forming specialist ‘fire support groups’ with multiple GPMGs, recreating the old-style battalion machine-gun platoon.
Overall, the British Army found itself with as many different weapons as it started with. The only real disappearance was that of the 9mm SMG, which virtually no other country still deployed as a front-line weapon anyway.
The SA80’s accuracy is one of its greatest strengths, especially with the SUSAT optical sight fitted. The MoD stated that the L85A1 was 20 per cent more accurate than the SLR it replaced, with the latter usually regarded as a reasonably accurate weapon. The MoD routinely used the most flattering data for comparisons, however, and it is likely that the comparison was between an iron-sighted SLR and an L85A1 fitted with the SUSAT, in which case much of the improvement should probably be attributed to the sight unit rather than the rifle. According to the Defence Select Committee report, pass rates for the Annual Personal Weapon test during troop trials rose from 72 per cent for troops armed with the SLR to 100 per cent for troops armed with the SA80, while the proportion scoring highly enough to achieve marksman standard rose from 8 per cent to 50 per cent.
Even without the SUSAT optical sight, the L85 has a full-length barrel despite its compact size, making it significantly more accurate than shorter-barrelled rivals such as the AK-47 or the US M4 Carbine. This was even more notable for the LSW, where the extended barrel and bipod gave it better accuracy and range than any assault rifle, and it enjoyed a brief period of use as a ‘dedicated marksman’ rifle even after its poor sustained-fire capability led to it being replaced in the light support role.
The British Army has long preferred careful aimed fire over the US use of automatic fire as a default, let alone what it has often disparagingly referred to as the ‘spray and pray’ shooting of opponents such as the Taliban. While automatic fire is extremely useful in certain circumstances – such as reacting to an ambush – it is inevitably less accurate than aimed single shots, and British training discourages its use in most situations. Sergeant Dan Mills of The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment noted ‘fully automatic… would be used only very rarely, for in-your-face tasks like trench clearing. It’s very hard to aim on fully automatic because of the recoil. On single shot, a soldier is expected to hit a target at 300 metres. But you’re a pretty good shot if you can hit something more than 600 metres away’ (Mills 2007: 40).
The hitting power of the SA80 is often compared unfavourably to that of the 7.62mm SLR, especially by ‘armchair critic’ firearms enthusiasts. In mathematical terms, the 5.56mm SS109 cartridge fires a 4g bullet at 940m/sec, giving around 1,770 joules of energy at the muzzle. Meanwhile, a 7.62×51mm round fires a 9.3g bullet at 840m/sec, giving muzzle energy of around 3,300 joules, almost twice as much. This doesn’t automatically mean that the larger round is twice as lethal, however.