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This was a minor source of irritation to Frank, but as one of the pilots had once pointed out, the president’s safety was a matter of immediate national security. The lives of the president’s staff and the press corps, as valuable as they were, could not be considered a national security issue.

Of course, the president could have ignored the safety guidelines.

Many presidents had. But there were too many people who spent their lives trying to protect him — too many whose jobs and training would require them to sacrifice their own lives in order to save his. He owed it to them to do what he could to protect himself. And that meant, among other things, fastening his seat belt even when he didn’t feel like it.

He gave the belt an extra tug. It was a nice seat belt, as seat belts went.

Like every one on the plane, the buckle was embossed with the presidential seal.

Satisfied that he had done his tiny part to comply with the safety protocols, the president looked up at the small group of people on the opposite side of the briefing table.

National Security Advisor Gregory Brenthoven sat directly across from him, flanked on the left by White House Chief of Staff Veronica Doyle, and on the right by Undersecretary of State Lawrence Mitchell.

The president leaned forward and rested his arms on the briefing table.

“Let’s start with China.”

Brenthoven glanced at his notebook. “Both sides have stepped up their military air presence over the Taiwan Strait, sir. About three o’clock this morning local time, a pair of Taiwanese Mirage 2000s made simulated attack passes on three Chinese J-10s. Nobody actually launched, and none of the aircraft crossed the invisible line down the middle of the strait, but they traded lock-ons with their fire control radars and generally crowded the hell out of each other.”

“Playing chicken?”

“That’s all it is so far, Mr. President,” Brenthoven said. “But both sides are flying about three times as many sorties as usual, and they all appear to be carrying full wartime weapon load-outs. Having that much military hardware flying around creates a lot of opportunities for mistakes.

This could turn into a shoot-out in about a split-second.”

The president looked at Undersecretary Mitchell. “Larry, your boss has been back and forth between Taipei and Beijing about a dozen times recently. What does the water feel like over there? Is this whole thing just posturing? Or do you think they could be gearing up for a fight?”

“The diplomatic rhetoric is hard-line as hell on both sides of the strait, Mr. President. China is about a half-inch from threatening outright war if Taipei continues to move toward a formal referendum on independence.

And the new Taiwanese government is openly referring to this latest Chinese ballistic missile test as nuclear blackmail. The Taiwanese army is repositioning land-based missile launchers and recalling reserve personnel for combat training. And China is mobilizing army units for their largest military exercise in ten years. The Chinese government says that the timing is a coincidence, but nobody’s buying that.”

The president nodded. “What about the naval side of things?”

“We’re keeping a close eye on the infrared picture for both navies,” Brenthoven said. “Our satellites can detect the heat plumes when their ships light off their engines. So far, the deployed force levels for both navies look pretty much status quo. No sign that anyone is rushing to put more ships to sea, but that could change pretty quickly.”

“How quickly?” the president asked.

“It would take either side about two hours to put a significant patrol force to sea,” Brenthoven said. “And about twelve hours to scramble most of their frigates, destroyers, and submarines. The newer gas turbine ships can get under way in about an hour, but the older steam-powered ships will require the better part of a day to light off their engineering plants, heat up their boilers, and get up a head of steam.”

“How many ships are we talking about?”

Brenthoven scanned his notes again. “China has what the CNO likes to call a ‘frigate navy,’ sir. Their order of battle includes about four hundred patrol boats, missile boats, and torpedo boats, but they have fewer than fifty major combatant ships. Taiwan is severely outnumbered with regards to patrol, missile, and torpedo boats but has roughly the same number of major combatants as China. However, from a qualitative standpoint, Taiwan’s ships are a lot more modern and generally a lot more mission capable. If it comes down to a gunfight, they’re pretty evenly matched.

Taiwan has the edge in shore-launched anti-ship missiles, though. And that could well tip the balance in a major naval engagement. The Chinese military has concentrated more on ballistic and surface-to-surface missiles than on anti-ship missiles. That’s going to cost them if they try an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.”

“An amphibious invasion?” Under Secretary Mitchell asked. “I didn’t think China had enough amphibious transport ships to do the job.”

“They don’t, Mr. Secretary,” Brenthoven said. “According to our latest assessments, China can only move about one division at a time, and that’s not enough to seize and maintain a decent foothold if the Taiwanese resistance is even half as good as we think it would be.”

Doyle nodded. “At least we don’t have to worry about the Chinese mounting an invasion.”

“That’s not necessarily true,” the national security advisor said.

The president stared at him. “Make up your mind, Greg. The Chinese either have the amphibious capacity to mount an invasion, or they don’t.

Which is it?”

“They … might, sir,” Brenthoven said. “If you count strictly military assets, they certainly don’t. But a few years ago, the RAND Institute’s National Security Research Division published a report on the military aspects of a China-Taiwan confrontation. The report referred to something called a reverse Dunkirk tactic. The short of it is, China has a large number of commercial vessels that could be pressed into service as troop ferries, along with a few thousand smaller civilian craft, all of which could be used to transport small numbers of troops.”

“Will it work?” the president asked.

“About half of the military experts say no, and the other half say yes, sir. A lot of it depends on Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles, and on whether or not Taiwan can gain air superiority over the strait.”

“So it still comes down to a coin toss,” Doyle said.

Brenthoven nodded. “Pretty much. But if that coin gets tossed, a lot of people will die, no matter which way it falls.”

The president exhaled through his teeth. “What can we do to prevent that coin from being tossed?”

“We’re already doing it, sir. Our carrier-based F-18Es are flying regular sorties over the straits too. They’re sticking to the neutral zone between Taiwanese and Chinese airspace, but their presence is sending a pretty strong signal. The Chinese know that Taiwan will gain air superiority over the strait if we help them. China can’t launch an effective invasion if Taiwan owns the sky over the strait.”

“Once again we’ve got our finger stuck in the dike,” the president said.

“If we pull the carriers out, do you think the Chinese will actually try anything?”

Brenthoven shrugged. “The Pentagon thinks an invasion scenario is possible but extremely unlikely.”

“So we can’t rule it out,” the president said.

“No, sir.”

The president sighed. “Okay. We keep working the diplomatic angle, but we leave the carriers in place, for now at least.”

He leaned back. “Germany.”