To understand how the burdens of Soviet secrecy arose, we will follow the life course of the secret or top-secret document. Although “top secret” differed from “secret” in other ways, the system’s auditors and stocktakers would often refer to “secret and top-secret” documents in the same breath, treated them similarly, and counted them with the same obsessive attention.
The evidence is taken from three microfilm collections in the archive of the Hoover Institution. Those used here are from a party agency, the KPK (Commission of Party Control, responsible for looking into wrongdoing
| table 3.1. The secret document’s life course: Documentation created at each stage | |
|---|---|
| Stage | Documentation |
| Production;Distribution;Filing and storageTransfer of ownershipIInspection and audit;Incineration or transfer to archive | Logged within the document |
| Correspondence ledgers | |
| Deeds of inventorization | |
| Deeds of transfer | |
| Inspection and audit reports | |
| Deeds of destruction or records of entry in archive catalogue | |
| Source: See the text. | |
by party members), and two government agencies, the Gulag (chief administration of labor camps of the Soviet Interior Ministry) and the KGB (Committee of State Security, or secret police) of Lithuania, at the time a province of the Soviet Union.
The life course of the secret document was marked by rites of passage, enacted at certain fixed staging points: production, distribution, filing and storage, transfers of ownership, inspections, and destruction or archiving. Each stage generated its own documentary evidence, as shown in Table 3.1.
Production
The original secret document was usually typewritten with a fixed number of carbon copies. On 7 February 1965, deputy chief Juozas Petkevicius of the Lithuania KGB signed a six-page report to Moscow on popular responses to Khrushchev’s dismissal in 1964.[132] As illustrated in Figure 3.1 (panel A), the front page shows that the archive holds copy no. 2 of a document classified “top secret.” A standard block of information on the back of the last page states that two copies were made. Copy 1 went to Moscow and
| figure 3.1. Birthmarks of the secret document | ||
|---|---|---|
| In Russian | In English | |
| (A) | ОТП. 2 ЭКЗ | typed 2 copies |
| I - в адрес | I - to address | |
| 2 - дело № 236 | 2 - file no. 236 | |
| исп. Балтинас | executor Baltinas | |
| печ. Кузина | typist Kuzina | |
| б.П.ббг. | 6.II.65 | |
| (B) | ОТП. 2 ЭКЗ | typed 2 copies |
| I - в адрес | I - to address | |
| 2 - дело № | 2 - file no. | |
| исп. Пыльников | executor Pyl’nikov | |
| печ. Тимонова | typist Timonova | |
| 3.1У.65Г. | 3.IV.65 | |
| Черновик уничтожен: | Original destroyed: | |
| Sources: (A) Hoover/LYA, K-l/3/639,6. (B) Hoover/LYA, K-l/3/639,15ob. | ||
copy 2 to “file no. 236.” The person responsible for the document is identified as Baltinas and the typist as Kuzina. The date of typing is 6 February, one day before the signature. This information was standard although not completely uniform. The next document in the file (panel B) shows small variations. Copy 1 went to Moscow, but the file number for the second copy is not entered; we see this quite often. The last line adds that the original draft was destroyed, but the space for confirmation is left blank.
Distribution
Every office was required to maintain daybooks or ledgers that recorded, line by line, every item of outgoing and incoming secret and nonsecret documentation, including letters, instructions, and telegrams. Some ledgers listed correspondence such as reports and memoranda; others itemized the instructions that cascaded down from above. Every item was logged as outgoing by the sender and as incoming by the receiver. Thus, any and every item could be tracked and its whereabouts established, whether it was at rest or in transit. In principle, this assured secure distribution.
The ledgers, which were inevitably also classified secret, amounted to substantial documentation. Ledgers were typically bound volumes of one hundred double-sided sheets (two hundred pages) with handwritten entries that recorded in rows and columns every item sent or received, any copies made, to whom they were distributed, by whom acknowledged, when returned, and whether destroyed, with dates of each event.[133]Over time, every office quickly accumulated many ledgers. When the officer responsible for the MVD Gulag secretariat was changed on 7 January 1953, the outgoing and incoming officers cosigned an inventory of its paperwork. It was recorded that, in the two years from 1951, the office had acquired 343 ledgers (nearly 70,000 pages) listing incoming correspondence, more than half of them secret items. Another 15 ledgers itemized more than 11,000 incoming coded telegrams and more than 2,000 outgoing in 1952 alone.[134]
With such a system, what could go wrong? Either sender or recipient could be guilty of a lack of care. When that happened, the minutes that were normally needed to enter an item in the correspondence ledger turned into hours of painful investigation. To illustrate: a secret packet arrives. You sign for it, so now you are responsible. When you open it, you find a missing page, or perhaps an incorrect serial number. Who can say it’s not your fault? You convene your colleagues. Together you write and swear a witness statement (necessarily classified secret) to confirm the discrepancy.[135]
In that example the fault belonged to the senders. Alternatively, the sender could be a victim of the recipient’s lack of care. Here is a tale with which any student can empathize. Having borrowed a secret handbook from the KGB training library, you handed it back to the librarian. But the librarian failed to record that you did so. Now it seems you must have mislaid it, so you will be charged with a violation: the loss of a secret document. You’re saved only when the book turns up—back on the library shelf.[136]
133
To illustrate, ledger no. 221 of the Lithuania KGB listed decrees, directives, and instructions from the KGB headquarters in Moscow through 1972, divided into sections: top secret (pages 1 to 30), secret (31 to 90), nonsecret (121 to 180), and “for personnel” fpo lichnomu sostavu) (181 to 200). Hoover/LYA K-1/10/403, 1-110.
134
Hoover/GARF R94i4/ia/i93,4-40 (deed of transfer signed by former chief of MVD Gulag Chirkov and deputy chief Kovalev, 7 January 1953).
135
Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,107 (deed signed by military unit 7557 chief of secret unit Kozyrevskii, manager of archival file office Yakushev, and secret unit despatcher Ludtsev, 10 November 1951)—a document with the wrong serial number. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 28 (deed signed by MVD security administration chief of secretariat Polovnev and filing officer Laskina, 13 June 1951)—a document with the wrong number of sheets appended. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 31 (deed signed by MVD Sakhalin ITL administration, chief of secret unit Sil’vanovskii, senior inspector Karpukhina, and senior inspector Kovbasa, 31 July 1951)—a document lacking “secret” classification. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 33 (deed signed by Riazan oblast UMVD, chief of secretariat Aleshin, filing officer Gracheva, and typist Kochetygova, 13 August 1951)—a document intended for another recipient. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 35 (deed signed by MVD Gulag senior operational commissioner of secretariat Shaposhnikov, assistant Petrova, and assistant inspector of secretariat Baranova, 17 August 1951)—documents wrongly numbered and wrongly addressed. From another archive, Hoover/LYA K-1/10/308, 56 (deed signed by 301 Training Parachute Regiment Capt. Sliadnev, Junior Sergeant Shlez- inger, and servicewoman Os’kina, addressed to USSR KGB special department chief, copied to Lithuania KGB second administration, 22 March 1963)—a document wrongly classified and wrongly addressed.
136
Hoover/LYA K-1/10/406, 1-2 (memo to Lithuania KGB deputy chairman Aleksandrov, signed by seventh department chief Bukauskas and seventh department second section chief Abramov, 14 March 1972). Hoover/LYA K-1/10/406, 16 (memo to Lithuania KGB acting deputy chairman for personnel Armonavicus, signed by USSR KGB training department chief Ivanov, 21 March 1972). Hoover/ LYA K-1/10/406, 17 (memo signed by Lithuania KGB chairman Petkevicius, 29 March 1972). Hoover/LYA K-1/10/406, 18-19 (finding of investigation, signed by Lithuania KGB investigation department senior investigator Urbonas and chief Kismanis, 3 March 1972; confirmed by Petkevicius, 4 April 1972). The proceedings were dropped, and the inspector was severely reprimanded.