It is a fact that, in 1987, when Gorbachev finally admitted that the old figure was deceptive, he could not immediately find a new one to replace it. He promised that the new figure would be available in “two to three years.” That alone suggests that a substantial research project was anticipated. It does not follow that the necessary work was actually undertaken, however.
The process of disclosure awaited one more step: to trace the deception back to its origin. In 1999, a new historical series for Soviet defense outlays was published, adjusted retrospectively to the 1989 basis. This provided an opportunity to learn more about hidden Soviet defense spending and the reliability of the new figures.
The authors of the new historical series were former Soviet defense insiders Yurii Mashukov and Yevgenii Glubokov. In Soviet times, Mashukov had been head of two key bodies, the state military-industrial commission (VPK, for a few months in 1991) and the national planning board (Gosplan, from 1988 to 1991). Glubokov had been a specialist member of the VPK. Mashukov, moreover, was one of the Seven who had put together the compromise on disclosure in 1987. They wrote with authority, therefore.
The Masliukov-Glubokov findings are shown in Table 7.7. The earliest year reported was i960. In that year, as Table 7.2 showed previously, the deceptive official budget claimed 9.3 billion rubles of defense outlays. Corrected to the 1989 basis, this should have been 15.3 billion rubles. If so, hidden defense spending already stood at 6 billion rubles in 1960. After that, the table suggests, hidden spending grew rapidly—11 billion by 1970, 30 billion by 1980, and 57 billion by 1989.
But was correction to the 1989 basis sufficient? In percent of Soviet GNP, Figure 7.1 shows the tremendous gap between the deliberately deceptive figures for Soviet defense outlays before 1989 and most Western table 7.7. The new “official” history of Soviet defense outlays, 1960 to 1990 (selected years), as published by Mashukov and Glubokov on 1989 basis
| Billion rubles | Per cent of GNP | ||
| 1960 | 15.3 | 7.5 | |
| 1970 | 29.2 | 7.3 | |
| 1980 | 48.9 | 7.4 | (7.9) |
| 1985 | 63.4 | 8.3 | |
| 1986 | 67.7 | 8.4 | |
| 1987 | 72.7 | 8.8 | |
| 1988 | 76.9 | 8.9 | (8.8) |
| 1989 | 77.3 | 8.4 | (8.2) |
| 1990 | 71.0 | 7.5 | (7.1) |
Source: Masliukov and Glubokov, “Planirovanie i finansirovanie voennoi promyshlennosti,” 105. Percentages of GNP are as published in the source, except for figures in brackets, which are corrected by the author. The basis for correction is the GNP series shown below (in billion rubles):
| 1960 | 203.1 | |
| 1970 | 397.6 | |
| 1980 | 661.9 | (619) |
| 1985 | 777.0 | |
| 1986 | 798.6 | |
| 1987 | 825.0 | |
| 1988 | 863.0 | (875) |
| 1989 | 924.1 | (943) |
| 1990 | 963.0 | (1,000) |
Again, GNP figures are as published in the source, except for figures in brackets, which are corrected by the author as follows. For 1980, the figure of 661.9 billion rubles reported by Masliukov and Glubokov and used in their calculation of the defense burden in that year is most likely a typographic error; the figure of 619 billion is a better fit in the series and was published twice without revision in Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 g., 6, and Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990 g., 5. For 1988 and 1989, the figures reported by Masliukov and Glubokov appeared in Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 g., 6, but were revised the following year in Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990 g., 5. As for 1990,1 prefer the figure from Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990 g.,5, for consistency. figure 7.1. The Soviet military burden, 1960-1990: Alternative views of defense spending in rubles, percent of GNP
Sources: CIA estimates in rubles, percent of GNP, are reported by Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 129-30. M&G (Masliukov and Glubokov) corrected as Table 7.7. Budget pre-1989 figures are as Table 7.2, divided by GNP corrected as in the note to Table 7.7.
estimates, represented here by the CIA. Into this gap now stepped the new historical series provided by Mashukov and Glubokov. The new series tracked the CIA estimates to some extent. For example, both series now showed the Soviet military burden peaked before declining at the end of the 1980s. But still, if (and, of course, only if) the CIA set the standard of credibility, then Masliukov and Glubokov had closed less the half the gap.
In presenting these figures, Mashukov and Glubokov discussed when and why the deception began, the methodology they used to reconstruct the 1989-basis figures, and why their new series should be preferred to others. First, when and why did the deception begin? The authors wrote:
In the postwar period the USSR continually posed the issue of cutting the defense budgets of all countries so as to facilitate substantial disarmament or a lower level of confrontation. This idea was already expressed at the first session of the United Nations General Assembly and further specific proposals were put forward.
In 1963 the USSR unilaterally cut [its] allocations to the armed forces to show goodwill and the USA also made some cuts, but the West did not support the 1964 proposal to cut military budgets by 10 to 15 percent. The USSR made proposals to cut military allocations successively in 1973,1976, 1978,1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1987. At the same time, the necessity of providing for strategic parity in the arms race that was imposed on us, and of improvement of the technical level of armament and military equipment, demanded further development of the defense complex and growth of the volume of finance. Therefore, defense spending in real terms rose and peaked in 1988-89. In 1989 it amounted to 77,294.2 million rubles (16.1 percent of the overall budget of the country).[434]