Noriega was carrying a Bible and a toothbrush.
The party entered the school, continued through it, and walked down the steps leading to the soccer field, where two Blackhawks were waiting.
Monsignor Laboa gave Noriega a final blessing, which concluded, "My son, now I leave you."
Downing then took Noriega a little further; Laboa did not wish to be present when the dictator was handcuffed. As they neared the helicopters, two large special operators were waiting with flex cuffs. As they approached him, Noriega put up a protest. "I am a general," he announced. "I am a prisoner of war. I don't need to be treated like this."
His protests were ignored. For his own protection, he was quickly cuffed and placed in the lead helicopter, and the helo lifted into the fog. At Howard Air Force Base, an MC-130 was waiting with its engines running and two DEA agents on board, along with a special operations doctor. As the tailgate was closing, Noriega was read his rights, then placed under arrest by the DEA agents.[30]
En route to Homestead Air Force Base, he was made to undress for a physical examination. He pulled off all his clothes except his underwear. When he was told to take that off, too, it turned out he was in fact wearing two pair — white boxer shorts and red bikinis underneath.
The JSOTF surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel "Tony," gave him a thorough physical. He was physically fit, and no physical harm had been done to him. He was then given an Air Force flight suit and a pair of hospital sandals. After he put these on, he was handcuffed, shackled, and placed in a seat at the front of the aircraft near the bulkhead, where he slept for the next four hours.
Before landing, he asked to put on his general's uniform, and was allowed to do so. At Homestead Air Force Base in Florida, a Learjet was waiting to fly him to Miami for arraignment before a federal judge.
During the drama of Noriega's surrender, Senator John Warner and I monitored every detail in the operations center at Fort Clayton (Warner was there to show his support and make a personal assessment).
As the Blackhawks lifted into the fog for I Ioward Air Force Base, shouts went up from the seventy-five or so operations officers and NCOs who had been working practically around the clock since the start of Operation JUST CAUSE. This was IT! The last objective had been accomplished!
Now we could devote our full attention to getting Panama back on its feet — free from oppression. Senator Warner rushed to the big operations map and with a Magic Marker wrote: "Great job! We are all very proud of you!" Then he made a few much-appreciated inspirational comments.
The word spread quickly. Joyful Panamanians filled the streets — ex — pressing their thanks so effusively the troops had a hard time eliminating the last pockets of resistance.
THE VETTING PROCESS
On Friday, December 22, 1989, President Endara decided to abolish the PDF, except for a two-hundred-man presidential guard force, a specially trained and equipped reaction force (whose numbers were yet to be defined), and the new Fuerza Publica (public police force), with a new chief to lead it. In the past, the functions of police, customs, and defense had all been merged into the PDF. These functions were now separated.
The task remained to sort out the PDF. Some were being held by our infantry companies in the west. Others were being held in the detention camp.
The sorting-out task was assigned to Vice President Calderon, who soon asked for our help. At a meeting with Thurman and me, the three of us agreed that U.S. forces would handle the working out of this process, and Calderon would represent the Panamanian government.
Practically, it worked this way: A team would take helicopters to the various PDF cuartels, and either I or a brigade commander would go along to assist. When we came to a cuartel, all the PDF there would be assembled, and an announcement would be made: "The new government is in charge, and the decision has been made about the future of the PDF." Then the sorting-out began: First, all those on the most wanted list were identified and segregated. Then the officers and the enlisted were separated into groups, and the members of each group were given the opportunity to take and sign an oath of allegiance to the new government.
All those who signed were paid on the spot with money that U.S. forces had confiscated, and they were sent home to buy food for their families.
Many of these volunteered for the new police force.
All those who refused to take the oath (very few, as it happened) were placed with those on the most wanted list and then flown off under U.S. guard to the detention camp.
At the detention camp, there were a total of 4,600 detainees. The truly violent were segregated in one section, looters in another, PDF members in another, and Dignity Battalion members in another, with a separate section for women. PDF members were then segregated by rank — officers in one section and enlisted in another. Though everyone was given the opportunity to pledge allegiance to the new government, those on the most wanted list, former prisoners, or anyone caught committing violent crimes were kept in confinement at the camp.
Most detainees were younger PDF enlisted members who had simply been caught up in the U.S. dragnet. They were swiftly released.
Because of past PDF oppression, enmity ran deep among Panamanians toward most PDF cuartels. This meant that U.S. forces had to guard the cuartels and work out ways to minimize reprisals against the former PDF, until the new government was fully in charge.
OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY
"I can handle the combat part of this operation," I remarked to General Thurman during the first planning session for Operation JUST CAUSE, "but who is going to be responsible for planning the 'nation building'?
"The combat part is the easier of the two," I told him, "because when you are shooting at someone, you are in control of the variables. But, when you enter the nation-building phase, you are not. The new government is in control, and you have to respond to their needs and priorities. For that reason, the transition from combat operations to stability to nation-building must be seamless, so there is no loss in momentum. And the planning for it must be integrated from the beginning.
"It will require a different kind of command-and-control structure, different kinds of forces — with more technical and specialized capabilities — and a different approach to psychological operations. Their objectives and themes must be focused on support for the new government. Some of the forces needed, particularly Civil Affairs, are in the Reserves and must be identified now for call-up when needed.
"It is this phase," I concluded, "and the way we leave Panama, that will form the basis for judging the success or failure of this whole operation."
"This is very important," Thurman answered. "But I want you to focus exclusively on the combat operations; and SOUTHCOM will handle the planning responsibilities for nation-building. Some work has already been done; the BLIND LOGIC plan has gone through considerable development, but it needs to be revised and made to conform with the new combat plan."
As planning progressed, the concept of operations for the critical nation-building phase was as follows:
• Transition from combat operations to stability operations to nation-building.
• Establishment of a military support group to administer nation-building programs.
• Conduct nation-building with in-country forces, plus augmentation as required.
During the transition phase, the combat units would also establish the security environment needed for nation-building, and use their own organic capabilities for food distribution, medical care, transportation, and cleanup.