"How did you know that?"
"Because your plane used the same call sign as last time," they said, smiling.
My concerns turned out to be far misplaced. The get-together was very jovial.
And then, as I was leaving, the Italians announced, "We thought the operation with the ship went well; it was the politicians that screwed things up."
Unfortunately, after readying a Blackhawk and two of our best breachers for the flight to Malta, it turned out we were not able to assist the Egyptians.
We learned later that a Libyan employee in the control tower at Malta had convinced the Maltese to stipulate that assistance could only be flown in by an Italian helicopter, knowing full well the time it would take to get clearance for such a mission from Rome. The Egyptians, meanwhile, went ahead with the operation. In the process, they used far more explosives than were necessary, resulting in the death of sixty passengers, making it the bloodiest hijacking up to that time.
CONSEQUENCES
My earlier fears about the capacity and responsiveness of the Italian judicial system proved to be misplaced. The Italian judicial authorities not only quickly brought the hijackers to trial, they widened their investigation, and were able to identify many others involved in the conspiracy that led to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. The investigation was completed in record time and the cases were brought to trial before the Genoa Assize Court in 1986.
The following received sentences as indicated.
PLO officials deemed ultimately responsible:
• Abu Abbas: life in absentia
• Ozzudin Badrakham (a PLO accomplice): life in absentia
• Ziad el-Omar (a PLO accomplice): life in absentia
HIJACKERS
• Magied al-Molqi: thirty years
• Ibrahim Abdel Atif: twenty-four years
• Ahmed al-Hassan: fifteen years
• Abdullah Ali-Hammad: charges dropped; he was a minor at the time
ACCOMPLICES
• Youssef Saad: six years (for furnishing funds and weapons)
• Abdul Rahim Khalid: seven years (for furnishing funds and weapons)
• Mohammed Issa Abbas: six months, added to an existing seven years (for possession of weapons and explosives)
• Said Candura: eight months (for possession of forged passports)
Some years later, before I left active duty as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, my wife, Sue, and I were invited to Egypt by the Egyptian Minister of Defense on behalf of President Mubarak. They invited me to review Egyptian special-operations capabilities and the assistance the United States could provide Egyptian forces in dealing with the terrorist threat then causing internal problems — terrorist attacks on tourist buses, bombings, and the like.
We could not have been treated better, and the follow-up to that visit has been beneficial to both countries.
X
PANAMA: OPERATION BLUE SPOON
From JSOTF, Carl Stiner moved on to command the 82d Airborne Division, and from there, now a lieutenant general, he moved up to command the XVIII Airborne Corps — the Army's quick response force: Its lead elements could be "wheels-up" within eighteen hours to go anywhere in the world. At the time, the Corps contained four divisions, two separate combat brigades, and an armored cavalry regiment: The 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, 10th Mountain Division, 24th Mechanized Division, the 194th Armor Brigade, the 197th Infantry Brigade, and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.
On August 5, 1989, while evaluating the 28th Infantry Division at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, during the division's annual summer training, Stiner took an afternoon off to fly to Fort Monroe, Virginia, for General Max Thurman's change-of-command and retirement ceremony. High-ranking officers from every service would be there, as well as key people from the Department of Defense and Congress.
Thurman, the TRADOC commander, was known as a man who got things done — who could successfully take on the toughest jobs. Some years earlier, when Thurman had been a two-star, the Army's recruiting program had been on the rocks, and a number of recruiters were facing courts-martial for untoward activities. General Shy Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, had picked Thurman to straighten the mess out, and he had, in spades.
Since Stiner had to rush directly from the field to the aircraft, he had no chance to change out of his fatigues. This was just as well; he had to be back in Pennsylvania later that evening to supervise live-fire activities, which would prevent him from attending the evening reception; but he did not want to miss the ceremony itself, and the chance to celebrate his old friend's accomplishments. The two men had known each other since 1973, when Thurman had been the Commander of Division Artillery and Stiner the G-3 Operations Officer in the 82nd Airborne Division. They had served together again from August 1979 to March 1980, this time in the Pentagon, working for General Meyer (Thurman had been the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation for the Army, while Stiner was the Exec for Staff Action Control).
After the ceremony ended, Stiner stood at the rear of the reviewing stand to greet General Thurman and apologize for missing the reception. "Let's step over here for a minute," Thurman replied. "I have something I want to tell you. But let me get rid of these people." He turned to other well-wishers waiting to shake his hand. "I'll see you all over at the reception," he told them, shooing them off. "I have to talk to Carl Stiner for a couple of minutes. "
He led Stiner to a quiet spot about thirty feet from the reviewing stand. "What 1 am about to tell you is close-hold, he said. After a quick nod from Stiner, he went on. "I am not retiring. The Noriega regime in Panama has got the President very worried. For that reason, I'm being retained on active duty to take command of SOUTHCOM" — the United States Southern Command. SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility included Central and South America, and its mission was mainly security assistance and counterdrug activities. "Though I'm not the CINC yet, I have already talked to Carl Vuono and Admiral Crowe" — Vuono was the Army Chief of Staff and Crowe was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—"and you are my man in Panama. I'm holding you responsible for contingency planning and combat operations that may have to be executed there. I want you to go down and take a look at the staff, the training readiness, and whatever else needs it."
"What about the joint task force already down there?" Stiner asked. U.S. Army South (USARSO), commanded by Army Major General Bernie Loefke, included all the forces already stationed in Panama.
"You absorb it," Thurman answered. "I'm going to hold you responsible for everything. All forces will be under your control."
"Yes, sir."
"The reason I want you is that in XVIII Airborne Corps you've got a headquarters twice the size of SOUTHCOM's, and the best communications, equipment, and trained forces in the Army for conducting contingency opcrations."[24] By that he meant that XVIII Airborne Corps was a warfighting-capable headquarters, while SOUTHCOM, by the nature of its mission, was not.
"Here is how it is going to work. You remember Admiral McCain" — the CINCPAC from 1968 to 1972, who'd operated from Hawaii. Stincr nodded yes. "There was a man in Vietnam by the name of Westmoreland, who was doing the fighting from Saigon." He gave Stiner a hard look. "Me McCain, you Westmoreland. 1 can't give you detailed instructions now, but when I am confirmed by Congress, that is the way it is going to be. Now get with it."