A Russia which has recovered and set out on a path of economic and technological development would be of interest to European business circles. Investments would again become profitable, and the Russian market of 145 million consumers would look more attractive. At some point, some sanctions would have to be eased or even lifted. There would be no emergence of a Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, but some form of relationship between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union would make sense after the latter has survived the test of the present economic crisis. This would not make Russia “part of Europe,” but it might eventually lead to the two becoming partners in selected areas.
An economically stronger Russia would make its foreign policy even more effective. Russia has made a difference even when it was weak but punching above its weight. If it becomes stronger, it will make much more of a difference. With both its own integration into the West and the former Russian provinces’ integration into a Greater Russia no longer viable options, a Russia which is a single major nation-state, global in its outlook and interacting with all its neighbors in Greater Eurasia – the EU, China, India, Japan, South-East Asia and the Middle East – plus others elsewhere, could be an influential world player. The West should also be prepared for this outcome, no matter how unlikely it may seem at the moment.
Dealing with a stronger Russia, but one which no longer sees itself as part of the Euro-Atlantic community – which was Moscow’s official policy line as recently as six years ago – will not be easy. Competition, if anything, will intensify. Russia’s main goal at the global level is the establishment of a polycentric world order which would end the centuries-old domination of the West and cut short the second American century. In pursuit of this goal, Russia would broadly align itself with China, India, Brazil, Iran and a number of other non-Western countries.
Such an alignment would not result in permanent coalitions built around such fora as BRICS or SCO. There are serious issues within the non-West, not least between China and India. Moscow and Beijing do not always see eye to eye, and they have a host of practical issues to sort out in addition to some historical baggage. The non-West is not going to evolve into anything like the present-day West, a homogeneous community of like-minded nations with a set of shared values and undisputed leadership provided by the United States. Yet, with the addition of Russia from 2014, this group has gained a particularly combative great power.
The “new normal” of competition and even confrontation will last years. It might end sooner if the Russian Federation breaks down under the pressure of rivalry, like the Russian Empire did in the midst of World War I. The West would then have to deal with the consequences of another major collapse following that of the Soviet Union twenty-five years ago. There is no guarantee that it would be as relatively orderly and peaceful as the dismantlement of the USSR.
The competition might last longer if Russia is lucky enough to avoid a cataclysmic scenario but still lacks the will to begin improving its economy and overall governance. Then the West would be dealing with a country which would be simultaneously declining economically yet still able to marshal sufficient resources in the military sector to ensure its own security and pursue an active foreign policy, defying US global dominance.
In the seemingly unlikely but not totally impossible scenario of Russia using its confrontation with the world’s most powerful country to diversify and modernize its economy, overhaul and upgrade its scientific and technological base, and radically improve governance at all levels – particularly by means of prizing competence and reducing corruption – it may become an even more formidable competitor with the West. In other words, a successfully modernized Russia would not again seek to join the West but, rather, press it harder to protect its interests and promote its own worldview. Whatever Russia’s future, the conflict with the West is helping shape it.
Conclusion: How Conflict with the West Impacts on Russia
Over the centuries, Russia’s relations with the West have been a combination of a desire to emulate the more advanced nations of Europe, and to learn from them, and an effort to preserve its own identity and provide security vis-à-vis Europe’s hegemonic powers – and, more recently, the United States and its NATO allies. For periods of time, Russia dominated much of Central and Eastern Europe and was both the policeman of the continent and the hegemonic oppressor of other countries’ freedom. The end of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented attempt by post-imperial Russia to join the West, become an integral part of it, and be accepted as a major Western power, second only, but not subservient to the United States. This one of-a-kind adventure, however, has ended in failure.
Russia shares the blame for the way this has ended. The Kremlin has blundered its way into the disaster in Ukraine: first by believing that Ukraine could be integrated into the Eurasian Union project, then by mistaking the Maidan for a US-hatched plot, and finally by embarking on the “Novorossia” misadventure. It has recklessly gambled with the goodwill of the Europeans, above all the Germans, bought at a very high price at the end of the Cold War and carefully sustained for a quarter-century after that. Putin’s misreading of the German reaction to Crimea was stunning. Finally, Moscow’s rupture with the West put it in an awkward position of overreliance on China, an unsentimental would-be superpower that, like the United States, does not regard Russia as its equal. Such “Realpolitik” does not serve the Russian national interest at all.
The present confrontation between Russia and the West is just two years old, but the rift is getting deeper by the week. This confrontation is highly asymmetrical. In all relevant areas, the power of the United States, not to speak of the West as a whole, exceeds that of Russia by the widest margin. The Kremlin genuinely fears US-designed, US-sponsored and US-directed “color revolutions.” The Russian security community fears Western spying and its penetration of Russian officialdom and elites. The General Staff is concerned about the movement of NATO infrastructure toward Russia’s borders, the US ballistic missile defenses, and strategic non-nuclear systems.
Many of these fears are groundless or over-blown. NATO has certainly refocused on Russia and is now busy organizing new defenses. A nuclear superpower like Russia, however, has every reason to be confident about the power and effectiveness of its ultimate deterrent. Surprise invasions and decapitating strikes against Russia are prohibitively risky, and neutralizing its nuclear systems by means of ballistic missile defense will be out of the question for several decades to come. Similarly, a non-nuclear strike against Russia’s strategic assets can never achieve adequate success to protect the attacker against Moscow’s retaliation.
Thus, Russia has no serious reason to fear the West. Contrary to some popular inventions, the United States has no intention of breaking the Russian Federation into pieces and taking over the “juicier” parts. Western Europeans generally harbor no ill will toward Russia. Japan will not seek the return of the South Kuril Islands by force, and Canada will not attack Russian possessions in the Arctic. Poland, the Baltic States and Romania will remain frankly hostile and Britain and Sweden highly skeptical toward it, but none of these countries can mount a credible threat. Erdoğan’s Turkey, of course, is a country to watch, but Russia has a range of assets to prevent or contain the threat of a direct collision.
Russia, however, cannot afford to take the present confrontation/alienation lightly. Moscow’s breakout from the post-Cold War order carries a high price, to be paid over a long period of time. It cannot hope to defeat its former partners turned adversaries, but it can either use the stand-off as a challenge to improve its own ways or else succumb to it and seal its downward socio-economic and political trajectory. In the past two years, the Kremlin has been managing the situation while keeping the fundamentals of the politico-economic system intact. So far, it has shown neither a plan nor much of a desire to come up with a model that would encourage economic development and support entrepreneurship and innovation in the country.