The division was surrounded by Russian troops. Vietz station on the south-eastern edge of the town was in enemy hands. Blumberg was also occupied by the Russians. Two enemy infantry regiments were at Gross Cammin. Communication with Küstrin was severed. Re-supply was only possible by air. His decision was to leave.
The orders handed out by the divisional chief of staff for my unit and that of Second-Lieutenant Clemens were not possible of execution or would entail heavy losses. I therefore rose to protest and suggested that we should first disengage ourselves from the attacking enemy so that the immovable heavy weapons and especially our infantry could get out of the difficult terrain and deep snow.
As the general declared to the chief of staff that this was also his opinion, the following radio message arrived from headquarters 9th Army: ‘Report situation and intentions. Hold Vietz.’
Major-General Kegler promptly rescinded his orders for the division’s withdrawal.
Back in my position and after speaking to my left-hand neighbour, both of us fearful of having pointless high casualties among our recruits, I decided to convince the divisional commander that he should stick to his plan to withdraw, and that in any case I would decide according to my conscience. I returned to Vietz.
I had to overcome the resistance of the staff officers to get through to the general. Major-General Kegler was astounded but open to my arguments:
1. Once an order had been given it must be adhered to in order to keep up the morale of the troops.
2. The Army Headquarters’ radio message ‘Report situation and intentions’ unusually left open the decision. If this was not so, the message would have read: ‘Report situation. Hold Vietz.’ While it was expected that the Army would correctly use tactical language and especially stressed ‘Report situation’, it meant that it was holding open the opportunity for us to decide for ourselves in this special situation, and our decision was ‘Withdraw’.
3. There had also been instances in this war in which troops had withdrawn against orders in recognition of their hopeless situation, had upheld the morale of their troops and the officers had received high decorations.
4. The decisive argument, General, is in accordance with one’s own conscience. The responsible officer must, if common sense is to prevail, understand that slavish obedience in a hopeless situation only condemns him to a senseless bloodbath, which he should spare his men.
These arguments, especially the last, visibly moved Major-General Kegler. He then went briefly into an adjoining room. When he returned, he was white in the face. He asked me where I had lost my right arm, praised the discipline and commitment of my youngsters and also my objections at the conference a few hours ago. Finally the following dialogue ensued:
‘Do you think that you can withdraw the division in good order in this situation?’
‘Yes, if I have your support in doing so.’
‘Then I hereby beg you to undertake it on my staff.’
I immediately sent all the staff officers to the units, where they with the sector commanders were to stop the units and individuals retreating and incorporate them into the local defence.
Then I prepared to retake Vietz station with a platoon of my infantry and a Königstiger and while doing so a runner brought me a letter from the general. It read: ‘I have given up command of the division. Kegler, Major-General.’
I then asked a colonel to take over command of the division as a matter of seniority, which he accepted under the condition that I assumed tactical control.
The withdrawal of the division was made ready and all sector commanders summoned to an order group in Vietz at 1500 hours.
After stabilising the situation in the town I made a reconnaissance in the amphibious jeep with the SS-sergeant-major and one of my recruits, using Major-General Kegler’s map. I discovered that:
1. The road to Küstrin was not blocked by the Russians.
2. There were no Russians in Gross Cammin, the nearest enemy movement being in the northerly neighbouring village of Batzlow.
I stuck to the original plan. A radio message was sent to Küstrin fortress about the division’s withdrawal. The order to withdraw was given at 1500 hours and went without problems. When I later went into Vietz with the amphibious jeep to check the enemy situation, the first enemy scouts were already feeling their way forward.[10]
At dawn on 4 February the remains of the ‘Woldenberg’ Division began crossing the anti-tank ditch that blocked the Landsberger Chaussee at the eastern end of Küstrin. They had already come to within 10 kilometres of the town the previous day but had waited for darkness to get through the area occupied by Soviet forces.
General Busse had sent a young liaison officer to meet them, but without any instructions for Major-General Kegler. When the latter arrived in Küstrin he was promptly given orders to report to the standing court martial in Torgau, thus becoming one of the last to leave Küstrin by the normal road. As the witnesses to the events leading up to Kegler’s court martial were now trapped in Küstrin, evidence had to be obtained from them by telephone. Kegler was reduced to the ranks and sentenced to death. He then had to wait ten days for his execution before he was told that it would be delayed until after the war, providing he fought at the front as a simple soldier. He was severely wounded in April, but survived the war.[11]
Lieutenant Schröter concluded his account:
During the night of the 4th February I reached Küstrin on Reichsstrasse 1 as the first of the remainder of the division. The German guard on the town perimeter, the crew of an 88mm gun, were irresponsibly careless.
I reported to the chief of staff at fortress headquarters, Major Witte. When I told him about the lack of security on Reichsstrasse 1 and that I wanted to take it over with my own intact infantry, he regarded this as mutiny and interference in other people’s business. ‘Your general has already been taken by the Judge Advocate and you “mutineers” can expect a similar fate.’ I then handed over the remains of the division to the fortress commandant’s chief of staff.
The heavy weapons and the infantry crossed the Warthe and Oder bridges and were attached to the Küstrin garrison. While I was checking in the arriving elements of the division, a runner brought me the following orders from Major Witte. ‘You and your division are to clear Russian breaches in Warnick suburb.’
I could not fulfil this order, but in several days of house to house fighting I was able to prevent further penetration by the enemy. After several days SS-Captain Machers took over the sector with myself as adjutant.
Shortly afterwards I received orders to leave Küstrin on the nightly convoy and to report to the Motor Sport School in Wriesen, where I was liaison officer to Colonel Danke, chief of staff of CIst Corps. So ended my short encounter with the ‘Woldenberg’ Division.[12]
In the cool light of dawn on 1 February Soviet tanks and SPGs felt their way forwards from the north to the Neustadt defences, getting a good view over much of the town from the high ground. The clearly visible industrial sites, such as the Oder-Hütte foundry and the town gasworks, became the targets for a short barrage. One gasometer was set on fire and the electricity supply failed when a main cable or transformer was hit. This was the first effective use of the artillery.
That afternoon a Soviet assault team made a surprise attack along the Warthe on the Cellulose Factory, which was right on the river, halfway between Drewitz and the Neustadt. Not yet ten years old, it was the only strongly constructed building in this area and became valued as a strongpoint by both sides. Like other such places, it was occupied by a Volkssturm platoon consisting principally of workmen and a Hungarian company, but it was relatively undermanned. The Hungarian soldiers, fed up with fighting so far from their homeland, threw down their weapons, and the Volkssturm were overrun. The Volkssturm survivors, having no uniforms and wearing only an armband, were then shot as ‘partisans’. (From then on the other Volkssturm units in the town were provided with uniforms.)