A nuclear freeze also would have eliminated Moscow’s fear that it could not keep up with emerging American nuclear strategic developments. It was narrowly defeated by the steely resolve of Western leaders, above all Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who surely understood that once a freeze is signed, it for practical purposes binds Western nations far more firmly than their adversaries.
In 1983 a highly touted film about nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR, The Day After, was shown on ABC. The film was clearly aimed at pushing public sentiment towards abolition of nuclear weapons. It presented a scenario in which a crisis ensues when the Soviets blockade Berlin. The U.S. sends forces to re-open the city, and a shooting war begins. NATO forces use tactical nuclear weapons first, and Moscow responds. Then one of the sides—which is left unclear—escalates to use of strategic weapons against cities. Shortly thereafter an all-out nuclear exchange results, with countless millions killed on each side, plus vast physical devastation.
The Reagan administration feared that the movie’s graphic depictions of the horrific devastation and loss of life caused by a nuclear exchange would stampede public opinion. It requested airtime after the movie to respond to it, and ABC assented. Secretary of State George Shultz appeared, and declared nuclear war “unacceptable.” The movie did not noticeably shift public attitudes.
The Cold War triumvirate of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl held the line against the nuclear freeze movement, a critical psychological factor in preserving the Western alliance and convincing the Soviet Union that the West would not crumble from within. Earlier, however, disarmament movements had driven government policy—for the better with the ban on above ground and underwater tests, but for the worse with NATO’s unilateral scrapping of the neutron bomb.
How popular pressure will weigh in the new push for nuclear abolition remains to be seen, but whatever happens will confirm the Ninth Lesson of nuclear-age history: Popular pressure for unilateral disarmament can prevail unless Western governments explain its hidden, grave dangers. One major step is pending: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to ban all nuclear weapon testing.[49] The challenge skeptical governments must meet is to educate their publics about the risks of precipitous disarmament, which could lead to, rather than prevent, nuclear blackmail.
12.
DISARMAMENT II: SOME DISARM, OTHERS MUST BE DISARMED
You don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran.
COUNTRIES DISARM FOR THE SAME REASON THAT THEY ORIGINALLY arm: because they judge it to be in their supreme national interest. They do not disarm because America or anyone else is “setting an example.” Nor do they do so because they wish to earn the goodwill of the (largely fictive) “international community,” unless the step is tied to a specific benefit such as the lifting of economic and political sanctions (South Africa), or winning political autonomy (former Soviet republics).
About hostile nations in particular—rogues like North Korea and revolutionaries like Iran—we can say that they do not disarm if they think they can get away with not doing so. Given sufficient national security reason to retain a clandestine cache of nuclear weapons, they will retain it, even if other nations are reducing. For them, some combination of sanctions, credible threats, or military action is necessary to derail their programs. Thus the Tenth Lesson of nuclear-age history: Disarming hostile powers cannot be done by negotiations alone.
This lesson has been behind various efforts to disarm recalcitrant nascent nuclear powers by force, before they produce weapons. These efforts include Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, its 2007 raid on a partially finished Syrian nuclear reactor, and the allied coalition’s 2003 decision to invade Iraq and end any possibility of Saddam Hussein becoming head of a nuclear state. America and Israel have contemplated a preemptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, to prevent or at least delay Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons.
In considering a variety of cases of disarmament, this chapter makes clear that when leaders deem it in their country’s best interest to disarm, they will do so. But hostile powers must be disarmed by force.
Latin America
BROAD-SCALE DISARMAMENT efforts first bore fruit in Latin America. Brazil floated the first proposal for a Latin American nuclear-free zone in 1962—even before the Cuban Missile Crisis brought nuclear missiles to America’s neighbor. Just five years later, in 1967, five Latin American countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico—signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, after the part of Mexico City where the signing ceremony happened). The treaty came into force just over a year later, and by 2002 all 33 Latin American countries had signed and ratified it.[50]
The treaty prohibits the “testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” and the “receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons.” Cuba’s compliance is conditioned on reaching a satisfactory agreement with the U.S. over Guantanamo Bay—which makes its compliance essentially illusory. There is no prospect of the U.S. ceding Guantanamo any time soon, even if eventually all terror detainees are transferred elsewhere.
The United States, ever ardent for disarmament treaties, signed both protocols (supplemental agreements) to the Tlatelolco treaty. Protocol I requires outside powers retaining territories in the zone (U.S., UK, France, and the Netherlands) to adhere to the treaty and not bring nuclear weapons into the zone. Protocol II requires all declared nuclear weapons states to respect the nuclear-free status of the zone. It has been signed by all five Security Council nuclear powers (the five permanent members: U.S., UK, France, Russia, China). Israel, which is unlikely to import nuclear materials into the region, has not signed because it is not a declared nuclear power. India and Pakistan are not parties to nonproliferation treaties.[51]
The Latin American equation could be radically altered by Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez—an aspiring Fidel Castro seeking to lead all Latin American countries in revolution against American influence in the region and against governments allied with the U.S.—provided he survives his bout with cancer. Chavez desires to send uranium ore to Iran for its nuclear program. Eventually, he might seek Iran’s aid in launching a nuclear weapons program for Venezuela, in violation of Tlatelolco’s nonproliferation norms. Assuredly Chavez would follow North Korea’s example of blithely ignoring signed agreements if they interfere with his plans.
Africa: Libya and South Africa
SINCE THE mid-1970s, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi had a standing offer to purchase nuclear weapons from any seller. He was an eager supporter of terrorism against the West—worrying, among others, Reagan, who wrote in his diary in 1987, “Someone like Qaddafi could develop nuclear weapons and perhaps smuggle them into the United States.”
49
Through January 2012, 182 countries had signed and 156 had ratified the treaty. It will enter into force once 44 nuclear-energy countries that helped negotiate have ratified it. Eight countries remain on this list: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the U.S. The U.S. has signed, but not ratified, the treaty.
50
Two other notable nuclear-free-zone treaties are the Treaty of Rarotonga covering the South Pacific, which came into force in 1986; and the African Nuclear-Free Weapon Zone Treaty, which came into force in 2009.
51
Argentina did not accede to the treaty until 1994, which meant that in the spring of 1982, during the Falklands War with Britain, the Argentines had no legal grounds to object to Britain’s using nuclear submarines or other nuclear-armed platforms during the conflict. On May 2, 1982, the UK nuclear submarine