Serious Communists especially welcomed Gorbachev’s early treatment of ideology. Not only did Gorbachev recognize the preeminent role of ideology, but also he recognized that over the years the Party’s ideology had become ossified and formulaic, and parts diverged from reality. In particular, Gorbachev modified two ideas that had gained a new meaning under Brezhnev. The first was the idea that capitalism had entered a period of general crisis, and the second was the idea that the Soviet Union had entered the period of “developed socialism.” Earlier, Andropov had recognized the inadequacy of these concepts. He asked how it could be that under capitalism in crisis workers were living better than under developed socialism. In a similar vein, Gorbachev said, “Divergence of words from reality dramatically devalues ideological efforts.”263 While not discarding the concepts of the general crisis of capitalism and developed socialism, he changed their meaning. Gorbachev pointed out that the general crisis of capitalism did not imply that capitalism was not still growing and mastering science and technology. More importantly, Gorbachev demoted the idea of developed socialism by saying that its realization was dependent upon the acceleration of economic and social progress. Moreover, he said that the idea of developed socialism had shifted over time giving rise to unwarranted complacency. Under this idea, he said, “things were not infrequently reduced to just registering success, while many of the urgent problems…were not given due attention. Willy-nilly, this was a peculiar vindication of sluggishness in solving remaining problems. Today when the Party has proclaimed and is pursuing the policy of accelerating socio-economic development, this approach has become unacceptable.”264
Gorbachev also ushered in a style or culture of Party life that seemingly drew inspiration from both Lenin and Andropov. He called on the Party “to build a bridge to Lenin, to connect Lenin’s ideas, Lenin’s approach to the problems of those years and the issues of our own day.”265 He adopted a style of speaking forthrightly and bluntly about problems. At Party meetings, he dispensed with the practice of everyone speaking on every question and of everyone routinely praising Party leaders. He called on Communists to struggle systematically “against ostentation, arrogance, eulogies, and bootlicking.”266 He asked editors of newspapers and magazines to stop “personal adulation.”267 Gorbachev called for Communists to become political leaders and not just officials and administrators. Following his own advice, Gorbachev traveled around the country and met with workers on collective farms, factories, and markets. He invited intellectuals, cultural figures, and media representatives to the Kremlin. His public appearances with his wife, informal meetings with foreign leaders, and interviews with foreign editors and reporters signaled a modern, assertive, and open style that was long overdue and breathtakingly fresh. The American Communist correspondent, Mike Davidow, who was stationed in Moscow, said, “Gorbachev’s first days and months were electrifying. His speeches and person-to-person talks with Leningrad workers put the first cracks in the ice of stagnation.”268
Gorbachev’s early initiatives evoked nearly universal approval. In the West, Communist Parties, the peace movement, liberal politicians, and common citizens hailed his call for new thinking about peace. Gus Hall, head of the Communist Party of the United States, praised the Soviet leader’s “new thinking” for having reduced anti-Sovietism, lessened world tensions, and shrunk the danger of nuclear war.269 At home, enthusiastic crowds greeted Gorbachev’s visits to markets and workplaces. In 1985, Soviet citizens sent 40,000 letters a month to the Kremlin, and in following year 60,000 a month, most of which supported what Gorbachev was saying and doing.270 Even though Gorbachev removed many people from their positions in the Party and ministries, his support remained solid. In the face of new demands, some griping and inertia in the bureaucracy inevitably occurred, but no organized opposition. Even Yegor Ligachev and Boris Yeltsin, who would become Gorbachev’s leading critics on the left and the right, fully supported perestroika. Before 1987, when Gorbachev alluded to the opponents of reform, he was largely engaging in a pre-emptive strike rather than responding to any real threat.
The widespread support for Gorbachev was quite under-standable. He was addressing problems that were perceived as central to the Soviet system by academic researchers, Party professionals, and the man and woman on the street. His moves on disarmament began to address the economic drain of the arms race. His replacement of cadre, exposure of corruption, and calls for greater openness and criticism attacked the political stagnation that had become so pervasive.
If Gorbachev initially followed a reform path that resembled Andropov’s, he eventually would adopt a different path—adopting market solutions and private property, weakening the Communist Party, abandoning international solidarity, and making unilateral concessions to the West. When and why did Gorbachev change his course? Neither question is easy to answer. When the move began is difficult to specify because the rhetoric and the policies of reform sometimes moved in contradictory directions at once. Still, as we shall see, some clear signs of a move against socialism became evident within the first two years of Gorbachev’s tenure, though it would not become dominant until after January 1987. Why Gorbachev changed is also hard to answer because fathoming anyone’s motives is problematic. Consequently, the best we can provide is a plausible explanation.
Before examining the first signs of change, let us suggest three hypotheses as to why this shift occurred. We will argue that the first two hypotheses are flawed and that only the third provides a plausible explanation. The first hypothesis is that Gorbachev was always a social democrat or a Communist with capitalist sympathies and that his early Andropov-sounding rhetoric and policies just represented political gamesmanship to keep his opponents off balance until he had the strength and opportunity to push his real agenda. The second hypothesis is that Gorbachev turned to market-oriented and Party-weakening reforms because the Andropov-type reforms proved ineffective. In other words, Gorbachev turned to capitalist economic ideas because improving the economy within the boundaries of Soviet socialism proved too difficult. He began weakening the Party because he saw the Party as an obstacle to far-reaching economic reforms.
The third hypothesis, the one advanced here, is that Gorbachev turned away from socialism and toward capitalism because he lacked the strength and sense of purpose to withstand the anti-socialist interests unleashed by the reform process. These interests had developed for years in those parts of the society and the Party enmeshed in illegal, private economic activity, but they had remained more or less dormant until the upheaval of reform. The second economy had exacerbated the chronic problems of Soviet society, had eroded confidence in socialism and the Communist Party, and had created a sizable, confident and growing social base of would-be capitalists. Hence, even before 1985, the second economy had created conditions favorable to anti-socialist and pro-capitalist ideas and policies. Gorbachev’s early reforms galvanized this sector’s demands for “freedom” and legitimacy. Theoretically weak, inexperienced, impulsive, and ambitious, Gorbachev vacillated and then capitulated. His desire for quick, painless, short-term success and for the adulation and political security this would bring led him to throw his lot with the growing stratum of bureaucrats and petty entrepreneurs tied to the second economy and their defenders and sympathizers among the intelligentsia.
Many who hate Gorbachev for destroying socialism, as well as some who applaud him for doing so, find the first hypothesis appealing. To be sure, some evidence supported the idea that Gorbachev had social democratic sympathies even before he became General Secretary. For example, two of his friends before 1985 were Alexander Yakovlev and Edward Shevardnadze, two of the most extreme social democratic elements in his administration. Other evidence suggested that Gorbachev held private objectives that went beyond his public views. Yakovlev said that as early as the fall of 1985, Gorbachev expressed secret sympathy with the idea of dividing the Communist Party in two but warned that such a move was premature. The present state of knowledge makes it impossible to say with absolute certainty that Gorbachev was not dissembling when, for example, he declared his fealty to Lenin and socialism. Even more information might not reveal Gorbachev’s true thoughts and motivations, which are always difficult to know of anyone.