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449. Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Memoir Literature,” 268-269.

450. Marshall I. Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika (New York: Norton, 1991), 128-136.

451. Gregory Grossman, “Sub-Rosa Privatization and Marketization in the USSR,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 507, (January 1990): 49.

 

Notes for Chapter 6

452. Graeme Gill, The Collapse of a Single-party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 78.

453. Stanislav Menshikov, Catastrophe or Catharsis? The Soviet Economy Today (London: Inter-Verso, 1990), 41.

454. Roy Medvedev, Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 47.

455. Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: With an Epilogue on Gorbachev (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990), 235.

456. Seumus Milne, “Catastroika has not only been a disaster for Russia: a decade on, enthusiasm for the Soviet collapse looks misplaced.” The Guardian (London), 16 August 2001.

457. John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 94.

458. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 193.

459. Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-91(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), 502.

460. Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2000), 135.

461. Chernyaev, 299.

462. Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: the Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 24. Volkov confirms that the bogus “co-ops,” created by the ill-named 1988 Law on Cooperatives, led to explosive growth in private business enterprise and corresponding growth in violent business protection rackets. In 1992, with Yeltsin in power, the less well-known Law on Private Protection and Detective Activity actually legalized private protection rackets and ”for several years formally sanctioned many of the activities already pursued by racketeering gangs….”

463. Hough, 503.

464. Hough, 260.

465. Robert Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumphs and His Failure (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 409.

466. Hough, 249.

467. William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 439.

468. Chernyaev, 255.

469. Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 475.

470. Peter Schweizer, Victory! The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 14.

471. Odom, 474.

472. Hough, 432.

473. Hough, 502.

474. Pekka Sutela, Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 5. Outside the Soviet Union, bourgeois economists stated bluntly that “socialist reform” economics aimed to incorporate capitalist elements into socialism until capitalism was fully restored. According to Sutela, “Seeing the inefficiency and indeed impossibility of such an [orthodox Communist, i.e., largely publicly owned and centrally planned] economic model, early reformers relaxed some of the orthodox assumptions and tended to see the capitalist corporation as their model. Further along the road, more and more characteristics of capitalism were added to the normative image of efficient socialism until—by the late eighties—a transition to genuine capitalism was advocated and also practiced in such countries as Hungary and Poland.” Dr. Sutela, a Soviet affairs specialist, worked for the Bank of Finland.

475. Chernyaev, 257.

476. Gill, 95.

477. Marshall I. Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 193.

478. Brown, 184

479. Gill, 68.

480. Chernyaev, 173.

481. Gill, 74.

482. Chernyaev, 175.

483. Chernyaev, 179.

484. Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 91-93.

485. Vitali I. Vorotnikov, Mi Verdad: Notas y Reflexiones del Diario de Trabajo de un Miembro del Buro Politico del PCUS (Havana: Casa Editorial Abril, 1995), 486.

486. Gill, 78.

487. Gill, 79.

488. Gill, 79.

489. Dunlop, 79.

490. David M. Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution from Above (New York: Routledge, 1997), 102.

491. Dunlop, 81.

492. Dunlop, 79-81.

493. Dunlop, 106-7.

494. Kotz and Weir, 139.

495. Ligachev, 347.

496. Dunlop, 82.

497. Dunlop, 51.

498. Gill, 94-95.

499. Gill, 104.

500. Gill, 104.

501. Ligachev, 89.

502. P. N. Fedoseyev, ed., What Is Democratic Socialism? (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), 127.

503. Gill, 115.

504. Gill, 115

505. Gill, 117.

506. Gill, 135.

507. Ligachev, 368.

508. Ligachev, 177-179.

509. Gill, 144.

510. Vorotnikov, 486.

511. Chernyaev, 189.

512. Chernyaev, 189.

513. Ligachev, xxiii.

514. Chernyaev, 270.

515. Ligachev, 44.

516. Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 258.

517. Boldin, 282.

518. Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminaclass="underline" Russia’s New Mafiya (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 311.

519. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: the Soviet Collapse 1970-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ix.

520. Medvedev, 47.

521. Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus, eds., The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 75.

522. Dunlop, 72.

523. Dunlop, 80.

524. Kaiser, 378.

525. Hough, 416.

526. George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 170.

527. Boris Kargarlitsky, Restoration in Russia: Why Capitalism Failed (London: Verso, 1995), 83.

528. Goldman, 128.

529. Hough, 208.

530. Ligachev, 339.

531. Kotz and Weir, 80.

532. Hough, 343.

533. William Moskoff, Hard Times: Impoverishment and Protest in the Perestroika Years. The Soviet Union 1985-91 (Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 28.

534. Moskoff, 43, 46.

535. Moskoff, 59.

536. Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System (Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 22.

537. Hough, 359.

538. Kaiser, 378.

539. Abel Aganbegyan, The Economic Challenge of Perestroika (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988; Inside Perestroika: the Future of the Soviet Economy (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

540. Michael Alexeev and William Pyle, “A Note on Measuring the Unofficial Economy in the former Soviet Republics,” William Davidson Institute Working Papers, University of Michigan Business School, no. 436, table #6, (July 2001): 19. The table is presented here as presented by Alexeev and Pyle. It seems doubtful, however, that their method yields estimates accurate to a tenth of a percentage point. We believe the estimates should be understood merely as a reasonable indicator of the order of magnitude of the second economy in each republic and a reasonable indicator of its growth rate. Thus, in Estonia and Uzbekistan, the exceptional cases, the slight decline in share should be interpreted as an indicator of little or no change in the second economy’s role in the total economy of those republics in the period under review.

541. Roy Medvedev, Post Soviet Russia (New York: Columbia, 2000), 170-171.

542. Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State, Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 116.

543. Handelman, 56.

544. Handelman, 71.

545. Hough, 130.

546. Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, eds., The Great Market Debate in Soviet Economics, An Anthology (Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), ix.