Shortly after this, the microphones, which were being constantly monitored back at RCMP headquarters, began to pick up the telltale sounds of a sweeper team in operation. RCMP had tentatively identified their arrival in the building some days before, but it wasn't until they began work in the northeast corner, tapping at the walls for signs of hollowness, and running metal detectors across the ceilings, that we were sure. For twenty days they swept the rooms we had microphoned, as if they knew they were bugged. But they never found either the cables or the microphones. By Russian Embassy standards worldwide, the new building was small, but despite what must have been cramped conditions, the northeast corner remained virtually unused apart from routine consular work, even after the departure of the sweepers. Eight years later the microphone sweepers arrived in Ottawa. They went straight to the rooms where the microphones were and within an hour had found the microphone cables and thus the microphones. There were forty-two rooms in the Embassy. The sweepers searched only in the six rooms where the microphones were. They must have known where to look!
Like Operation CHOIR, something about DEW WORM troubled me.
Partly, of course, it was disappointment. The operation had been an outstanding technical success, but the months of patient preparations had yielded no intelligence whatever. Of course, at the outset of the operation the biggest gamble had been to assume, as Gouzenko had, that the Russians would rebuild their secret section in the same place as they had it in the old Embassy. But based on an analysis of the power supply to the building, it was a reasonable gamble. The fact that they had decided to resituate the secret section and screen it off was not in itself unusual. Both the British and the Americans had begun to realize, as almost certainly had the Russians, that the best way to protect an Embassy secret section from microphone attack was to construct it deep inside, preferably with its own power supply. But the certainty with which the Russian sweepers attacked the northeast corner, as if they were looking for something they knew to be there, introduced the worm of doubt into my mind.
Within a year the same thing happened, again in Canada. The Polish Government were given permission to open a consulate in Montreal. They bought an old house and began renovations. In January 1957 I flew over to Montreal to assist the RCMP install a microphone. The RCMP knew the identity of the UB (Polish Intelligence) officer and the location of his room, but the building was being completely gutted, so a wired operation was out of the question. Only a SATYR cavity microphone would do. The premises were being rewired using steel conduits for the cables, and as with the DEW WORM window frames I reckoned that the SATYR devices would be virtually impossible to detect if they were placed close to the conduits. Within a fortnight of installing the system the Poles suddenly ordered the contractor to remove the wall containing our SATYR devices and replace it with another. The RCMP did manage to retrieve one device, but the other was lost to the Poles. Later the RCMP learned from a source inside the Polish Embassy that they had been tipped off to the likely presence of microphones by the Russians. They had been one step ahead of us again.
It was not just in Canada that things like this occurred. There was also Operation MOLE in Australia. It began with a visit to London by Sir Charles Spry, the head of Australia's overseas intelligence-gathering organization, ASIO, in 1959. I received a telephone call saying that he would like to see me. Spry had once been a good-looking man, with hooded eyes and a full mustache, but responsibility and a liking for the good things in life had left him florid in appearance. Spry was appointed head of ASIO on its formation in 1949. He had previously been Director of Military Intelligence, but along with a group of like-minded officials, dubbed the "gnomes of Melbourne," he lobbied hard for the creation of a proper security intelligence-gathering agency similar to MI5. Spry ran the service with an iron fist for nineteen years, and became one of the towering figures of postwar intelligence. Only toward the end of his career, when he began to lose touch with his staff, did his grip on the organization falter.
Spry liked visiting London. He had originally served in the Indian Army on the Khyber Pass in the 1930s. The common background and shared sense of what constituted an officer and a gentleman ensured him many friends in the clubbable world of British Intelligence. But Spry was far from being an old buffer. He came straight to the point as soon as our meeting began. He told me he had recently been over in Canada and Terry Guernsey had recommended he talk to me about a microphone operation ASIO was planning against the Russians. He explained that since the well-publicized defection of the Petrovs, a husband and wife who worked together inside the cipher section of the Russian Embassy in Canberra, the Russians had broken off diplomatic relations and placed their Embassy under the control of the Swiss. But recently they had been making overtures to return and ASIO wanted to mount an operation against the Embassy before they occupied the premises. After studying the plans, I advised Spry to mount a SATYR operation, and demonstrated the device to him. The best place to install SATYR was in the wooden sash window frames, and I sent my assistant out to Australia to supervise the details. The device was successfully installed, and as a further precaution, I instructed ASIO not to activate the device for a year, in case the Russians monitored the building for microwaves in the first months of reoccupation. As with DEW WORM, Operation MOLE was a technical success, but not a single scrap of intelligence was gleaned. Every sound in the KGB resident's room, every shuffle of his papers, every scratch of his pen, was audible. But he never said a word. Operation MOLE was another failure.
The demands on MI5's slender resources were, in the 1950s, impossible to satisfy. Consequently, the pressure of work on individual officers, particularly those in A2 who had of necessity become involved in such a wide range of operations, was at times practically intolerable. Operations merged one into another. Plans, maps, briefings, technical reports crossed my desk in a paper whirl. It was often difficult at any fixed point to be sure which operations had ended and which were still deep in the midst of gestation. Intelligence-gathering, even at its best, is a thoroughly confused business. But there is always an empty space in the mind of every professional intelligence officer worth his salt reserved for scraps and fragments which for one reason or another raise unanswered questions. Operations CHOIR, DEW WORM, and MOLE were all stashed away in that compartment, submerged under the welter of current operations, but never quite forgotten, until years later they suddenly assumed a new significance.
The profession of intelligence is a solitary one. There is camaraderie, of course, but in the end you are alone with your secrets. You live and work at a feverish pitch of excitement, dependent always on the help of your colleagues. But you always move on, whether to a new branch or department, or to a new operation. And when you move on, you inherit new secrets which subtly divorce you from those you have worked with before. Contacts, especially with the outside world, are casual, since the largest part of yourself cannot be shared. For this reason, intelligence services are great users of people. It is built into the very nature of the profession, and everyone who joins knows it. But early in my career I encountered a man whose experience at the hands of British Intelligence suddenly stripped the veneer of national importance away from the whole business. It arose out of the work I had been doing for Brundrett's committee on resonance. I had spent a lot of time researching ways in which innocuous objects, like ashtrays or ornaments, could be modified to respond to sound waves when radiated with microwaves of a certain frequency. If a system could be perfected, it promised enormous advantages. The object itself would carry no transmitter or receiver, so detection would be virtually impossible. By 1956 we had successfully developed prototypes, and decided to attempt an operation against the Russian Embassy in London.