Soviet retribution punished not only suspected collaborators but also their families, whose only hope was to prove to a tribunal that they had aided the Soviet forces or resisted in some way. Otherwise, those living in the dwelling at the time of the alleged crime, or collaborative act, were subject to deportation for a period of five years.29
Later in life Molotov was asked why, since the 1930s, the regime had adopted the practice of “isolating” (which is to say, deporting) the family members of those who were “repressed.” He thought the reasons were self-evident. If steps had not been taken, he said, these people “would have fostered complaints and contributed to a general demoralization. Those are facts.”30
It was in keeping with such an approach that Beria wrote to Stalin on August 18, 1944, about the small Caucasus spa towns Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Zheleznovodsk, and Essentuki in the Stavropol district. Still living there, he said, were “the families of active German collaborators and traitors who have been convicted or voluntarily departed with the Nazi occupiers.” He wanted permission for the NKVD “to purge these cities by relocating 850 family members.” All would be sent to Novosibirsk by the beginning of September. Given this kind of thinking and procedure, it would mean that the number of people who became caught up in the Soviet retribution was likely far greater than usually reported.31
REPATRIATING SOVIET POWS AND CIVILIANS
The ruthlessness of Soviet retribution in all aspects of life was evident in Stalin’s attitude toward officers of the Red Army who had “allowed” themselves to be taken prisoner. He branded them as traitors, and according to the notorious Order 00270, generals and other officials, including those in the NKVD, were subject to the death penalty. Even their relatives could be imprisoned, and Stalin made no exception when it came to his own family. When his son Yakov was captured, his wife was arrested; she was released two years later, only after Stalin was satisfied that his son had not betrayed the motherland.32
The Germans treated Soviet POWs worse than animals, and an appalling 3.3 million “died in captivity,” while others were exploited until the war ended.33 In addition, when invaders arrived, they forced or recruited millions of Soviet civilian workers for jobs in the Third Reich. As of August 1944, there were 2.1 million such Ostarbeiter, or eastern workers (out of a grand total of 5.7 million from all over Europe) on site inside Germany.34 For Stalin, these workers were as treacherous as Red Army soldiers who had “allowed themselves” to be encircled and captured.
Of great symbolic importance was the mythic figure of General Andrei A. Vlasov, a highly decorated Red Army commander: a veteran officer serving since the civil war, holder of the prestigious Order of Lenin, and a member of the Communist Party. Captured by the Wehrmacht in July 1942, he soon revealed his anti-Stalinist sentiments, and some Germans hoped to use him to spearhead a Russian liberation movement. The top Nazi brass had their doubts, though by early 1945 they allowed Vlasov to form two divisions mostly from Soviet POWs. The Red Army captured him near Prague on May 12 with some of his troops and sent him to Moscow. On August 2, 1946, newspapers announced that he and eleven others had been found guilty of espionage and terrorist activity and executed. In Soviet parlance, accusing someone of being a Vlasovite was even worse than calling them a fascist.35
Soviet citizens fighting for Hitler, however, constituted a larger problem than just the two divisions of Vlasovites, a fact that became evident to the Western Allies after the Normandy landings in mid-1944. As they began capturing more prisoners, some were identified as “Russians” who had served in the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS, or other branches. Indeed, many “foreigners” (Ausländer) fought in some capacity on Germany’s side, but it is impossible to say exactly how many, since inflated numbers are often given. As a rule, however, Hitler and Himmler did not welcome Slavs in the ranks. Most non-Germans in the Wehrmacht came from Western Europe—such as the Netherlands and Belgium, Alsace and Lorraine, or the Baltic states.36
According to the Geneva Conventions, the uniforms soldiers wore at the time of their capture determined the country to which they should be repatriated. Britain thought otherwise, and already on July 17, 1944, the War Cabinet decided, at Moscow’s request, that it would send back all Soviet citizens captured as German soldiers, even if such POWs faced severe treatment or execution.37 Foreign Secretary Eden reinforced the point in an August memorandum to Churchill, in which he noted that the men were caught firing on Allied troops, so there was no room for sentimentality. When Churchill and Eden traveled to Moscow in October to discuss the postwar settlement, they also worked out the notorious “percentages deal” on spheres of influence. After dinner at the British embassy, Stalin unexpectedly mentioned Soviet prisoners (in German uniform) who were in British camps. He wanted them back, and Eden, while agreeing, used the moment to ask for help to facilitate the return of British POWs found in German camps. The Kremlin Boss was pleased to do so, and to assuage any British pangs of conscience, he said that even though some of those Soviets might be “rascals,” they would not be harshly treated.38 In fact, they were doomed.
In Britain, when Soviet POWs learned they were to be repatriated, some despaired, and a few took their own lives. In the months ahead, suicide would become a common response. All resistance and protests were ignored, and by October 31, only weeks after Churchill and Eden returned from Moscow, the first transport left Britain for Murmansk. In total during the war, 10,000 of these soldiers traveled back on British ships to an uncertain future in the USSR.39
In the United States, partly because it wanted to follow the Geneva Conventions, the fate of Soviet citizens who had fought for Hitler was more complex. German prisoners taken in North Africa, and later in the landings in France, were sent to the United States. By year’s end American camps already held 400,000 German POWs, around one percent of whom were regarded as “Russian.”40
The American and British military missions in Moscow approached the Red Army General Staff on June 11, 1944, to discuss the POWs but received little cooperation. The Americans went ahead and gave their “Russian” prisoners the clumsy label “German prisoners of Soviet origin.”41 The United States adopted the procedure of asking all POWs what citizenship they claimed and did so without informing them of possible consequences. By December, Secretary of State Hull formalized this “claimant policy.”42
In the early autumn, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, began to raise questions about these “Russian” prisoners, once stories about them had appeared in the press. The ambassador told the State Department that such POWs had not really fought for the Wehrmacht. He maintained that they had worked behind the lines as drivers or doctors or had been coerced into going along. The assumption underlying this official position was that no one raised in the Soviet Union could possibly oppose Stalin and Communism. The Americans found it convenient to accept this fiction.
Even though General Eisenhower would have preferred that such POWs volunteer to be repatriated, he was prepared to follow the British example. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, and President Roosevelt was also persuaded. By December 1944 the Americans began sending POWs back to the Soviet Union. Included were also persons described as having “Slavic names who disclaim Soviet nationality.” For example, in early 1945 a group of 1,100 were turned over to Soviet authorities on the west coast for a return voyage to the motherland that they did not want.43 Thus well before the Yalta Conference (February 1945), the Western Allies were returning Soviet prisoners in German uniform to the USSR.