The dictator’s literary ambitions became still more evident at the time of the Great Terror in 1937, when he concluded that there was a need for a handbook on the history and “lessons” of the party’s rise.43 The volume, which would serve in the postwar period as a handbook for would-be dictators elsewhere, set out “to highlight state-building—particularly Russian state-building”—and rehabilitate at least some of the tsars, like Peter the Great.44 The finished product had to have broad appeal and eventually was published as The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course. Between 1938 and 1953 no fewer than 42.8 million copies were printed.45 Although he was in effect editor in chief and went over the text innumerable times, Stalin did not claim authorship. Instead he was featured prominently, and his wise words were frequently cited—more than a dozen times for the period before 1914.46
The Short Course was meant to be a political primer for the Soviet Union, and every educated person had to pass exams based on it. No doubt the textbook helped socialize generations to the appeals of Stalinism. It was translated into sixty-seven languages and turned Communists around the world into Stalinists.47 It instilled in them his hatred for the “double-dealer” (dvurushnik), and it spelled out how constant vigilance was needed. That message was taken to heart especially in the developing countries, like China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where it was used as part of political and ideological Stalinization.48
The recently uncovered documentation shows that Stalin played a key role and wore many hats. He was the decider, the ideologist in chief, a patron and “oracle,” a father figure and “friend of the people,” but also a taskmaster, judge, and jury. As we will now see, ultimately, he became a new kind of emperor—one who issued decrees in the name of Communist ideals.49
PART III
STALIN’S COLD WAR
CHAPTER 13
New Communist Regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia
Communist dictatorships were built in two stages in Eastern Europe. In the first, running from the late war years until 1946–47, Stalin and his advisers worked with indigenous politicians who set up “national front” governments. In a second phase, “people’s republics” emerged that, notwithstanding their labels, were one-party Communist dictatorships under the rule of Moscow.1
For Stalin, an early, complex, and especially significant strategic concern was Poland. There he faced long-standing hatreds of all things Russian and popular hostility to Communism. By contrast, more people in Czechoslovakia were positively disposed to the Soviet Union and still felt the sting of betrayal over the West’s 1938 surrender to Hitler. Some support for the Czech Communist Party, which went back to the 1930s, remained. The two countries had in common their liberation by the Red Army and the Communist-backed popular fury aimed at their large German minorities. Although both countries took somewhat different paths, both ended up, like the others in Eastern Europe, more or less as Stalin wanted.
RISE OF COMMUNISM IN POLAND
The Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) was officially proclaimed on July 22, 1944, in Chełm, in the province of Lublin, just after the arrival of the Red Army. As we saw in Chapter 5, this thinly veiled Communist organization was the vehicle Stalin used to establish a regime to his liking.2 Although Poland was not even part of the notorious “percentages agreement” to which Churchill had given his assent in October, the prime minister more or less acknowledged that Poland belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin blithely told Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk of the “London Poles” not to worry: “Communism does not fit the Poles. They are too individualistic, too nationalistic. Poland’s future economy should be based on private enterprise. Poland will be a capitalistic state.”3
Already in November, intellectuals were encouraged to join new Polish-Soviet Friendship societies, the aim of which was to cultivate ties among “fraternal Slavic peoples” and to make those bonds a source of “material and cultural prosperity.”4 The organizations had the difficult task of inventing a tradition of Polish-Russian friendship.5 Out in the countryside, the PKWN and the Soviet forces were hunting down the opposition.6
In the night of December 31, 1944, the PKWN proclaimed itself the new Polish Provisional Government, which came into being the next day. The president, Bolesław Bierut, was a longtime Communist functionary who had lived in Moscow for years; the prime minister, Edvard Osóbka-Morawski, was head of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). The key figure, however, was the deputy prime minister, Władysław Gomułka, first secretary of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR or Communist Party).7 The Soviet Union formally recognized the new government almost immediately.
On April 21, 1945, Stalin took time from the Battle for Berlin to sign a “treaty of friendship” with the provisional government. It was publicized the next day, on Lenin’s birthday, and so in a way it achieved the Bolsheviks’ old dream that had been cut short in 1920 at the gates of Warsaw.8
As a gesture to Western concerns, Stalin invited members of the Polish government-in-exile, headed by Mikołajczyk, for talks that began on June 16. They were even given four of the twenty-one ministries in a “united” Provisional Government of National Unity, announced on June 28—Mikołajczyk was made a second deputy prime minister. This flimsy window dressing was enough for the United States and Great Britain to extend formal recognition to the new government on July 5.
In early 1945, with only 30,000 members in the PPR, Stalin was anxious lest the activities of the new regime spark local resistance. He told Communist leaders in no uncertain terms to avoid being overly ambitious. In response, the Polish government, backed up by the Red Army on the ground, confiscated the property of “only” 10,000 landowners and around 13,000 or so larger estates and parceled it out to curry favor. In those days, that kind of restraint apparently passed for moderation.9
The Red Army was unruly, a fact bemoaned by Soviet political officers in the field, who seemed helpless to stop the rape, pillage, and plunder, especially in the new western regions.10 In spite of it all, on balance most Poles concluded that the Reds were not as bad as the Third Reich had been.11 Moreover, army engineers chalked up positive accomplishments and helped to reconstruct cities, dams, bridges, and roads.12 In addition, there was a steady flow of Soviet advisers, and in March 1945 the Kremlin had sent an economic mission of forty or so experts to assist in restoring the infrastructure and getting the economy going again.13
Stalin invited Polish leaders to Moscow to keep them on the right path, at times once a month, and impressed them with lavish receptions. Polish party chief Gomułka was a hard-bitten character who had been arrested in the 1930s. He had escaped and been shot but had stayed in Poland to battle the Germans. For Gomułka, what stood out in his November 1945 meeting in the Kremlin was Stalin’s sovereign control and intimate knowledge of Polish politics, society, and the economy. Although the Boss was still hoping for a $6 billion loan from the United States, he was not at all worried that the Americans might be upset by the land confiscation and nationalization of industry that was going on in Poland. He encouraged the Poles to push ahead, telling them that Czech president Beneš was already doing such things.14