The instruction to Molotov was to find out how much money the Americans were prepared to give and to make sure that there would be no interference in the internal affairs of recipients.28 At the first session he wondered aloud what was in the American plan—supposing “it” was largely finished. Bevin and Bidault confessed that all they knew was what they had read in Marshall’s speech. It gave no specifics and asked only that the Europeans put forward a joint plan. Bevin and Bidault likely had spoken with U.S. officials, and they all may well have hoped to stop Communism, but that was beside the point. The “plan” was not yet even a work in progress, and the Soviets could have hammered out a deal.
Stalin had it in his power to stop the drift toward Cold War then and there. Contrary to what some historians have suggested, he had choices. All he had to do was be prepared to say how the money would be spent. The all-powerful Stalin had no worries about political objections back home. The hindrances stopping him were entirely of his own creation. He was unable to imagine revealing economic “secrets” that, incidentally, democracies routinely publish.
By the second day, Molotov had time to consult with the Kremlin and came out strongly against any coordinated plan. He suggested again that they compile a list of each country’s needs and find out how much the United States would pay and whether Congress would approve it. Bevin and Bidault repeated that the plan had to be coordinated. It soon became obvious to all present that Molotov was “dragging his feet.”29
When they convened on Monday, June 30, he again condemned the concept of a joint plan and added that the British and French were contemplating a new organization to intervene in “subordinated states.” The discussion made no progress, and by July 2 Molotov did little more than warn that, if they proceeded, they would “split Europe into two groups of states.” With that he marched out.30
The East-West division that Molotov described had developed since the war, largely because of the steps taken by the Soviet Union. After the war, Western Europe was in no position to do anything, and in the United States the overwhelming urge was a retreat to isolationism. By rejecting the Marshall Plan, the Soviets in effect flung open the doors to the Cold War.
Historians are rightly reluctant to apportion “war guilt.” We should not conclude, however, that both sides were equally responsible for the Cold War.31 Marshall was dealing with an economic problem in a Europe devastated by war and famine. The aid that the United States offered was available to all nations, independently of their political commitments. Granted, the American planners hoped to lure Soviet satellites and to loosen Moscow’s grip on them, while Stalin was just as determined to resist. He wanted a Communist transformation of Europe that would eventually extend to other lands.32
Marshall was fighting poverty, while Stalin was faced with a choice between the impoverishment of his own people, the pursuit of his political agenda, and no doubt also Soviet security interests as he defined them. Western Europeans did not share his vision of the future, as became apparent in the early postwar period, when France and Italy, despite widespread misery, were already saying no to Communist pressure. Stalin could see that wherever he looked in Western Europe, his hopes for a Red future could not stand up to the will of the people, as demonstrated in fair elections, and it would certainly be doomed if there were economic recovery. He opted for his political mission and gave thumbs down to American aid.
It was overwhelmingly Stalin’s actions that led to the Cold War. The Moscow dictator was willing to bide his time and to let Western Europe stagnate and fester. If the United States had turned away, those who condemn it for offering the Marshall Plan would blame it—and rightly so—for doing nothing to put an end to the suffering and starvation in war-torn Europe.33
Years later when Molotov looked back, he was completely unrepentant. His only argument was the spurious one that if some Western writers were saying that he made a mistake in rejecting the American aid, then he must have done the right thing. Still blinded by his ideology, he insisted that “the imperialists” were out to turn all of Europe into something like dependent colonies.34
The British and French forged ahead with the Conference on European Reconstruction that began in Paris on July 12, 1947. They invited twenty-two countries, including all those in Eastern Europe and Turkey, but not the USSR. Spain was excluded because of its fascist government. Germany was represented by its occupying powers. Fourteen Western countries accepted the invitation, and together they created a new Conference for European Economic Cooperation and took the first step toward a European community. Notwithstanding numerous complications and sincere concerns, in the end they reached an agreement.
Their two-volume General Report was published on September 22. The Truman administration then faced the daunting task of getting the very costly package called the European Recovery Program (ERP) through a Republican-dominated Congress. In his congressional testimony in January 1948, Marshall estimated the total expenditure at between $15.1 and $17.8 billion, of which $6.8 billion would be needed for the first fifteen months. The United States would provide outright grants for European countries to buy the essentials needed to get their factories and farms up and running.
The secretary of state went on the road to sell the ERP. Frankly, it helped his cause that the Communists at that time were asserting themselves in Eastern Europe and that in February 1948 there was a coup in Czechoslovakia. It all added such urgency to passing the bill that many Republicans came out in favor of it, most notably Senator Arthur Vandenberg. He said to those who would cut the cost of the package: “There is no sense throwing a fifteen-foot rope to a man drowning twenty feet from shore.” President Truman signed the bill on April 1, 1948, and in its first fiscal year it would absorb more than 10 percent of the federal budget.35
Secretary Marshall hoped to avoid having the ERP appear as if it were just a measure to stop Communism. That impression emerged anyway during the long legislative process, which was overtaken by emotions whipped up by fears about the Communists at home and events in Europe.
Since that time, debates have raged about the economic impact of the ERP, and some historians have insisted that its miraculous effects have been wildly exaggerated.36 A more sober evaluation suggests that the ERP made it possible for Europe to solve the catch-22 problem it faced: it had to export in order to pay for imports, but it could not produce anything to export until it imported materials and machinery.37 The aim of the ERP, to get Europe back on its feet in four years, was reached because, once the vicious circle had been broken, Europe already had the prerequisites for sustained economic growth.
There was American altruism in the plan and also economic interest. Then, again, when is altruism never mixed with self-interest? It does nobody any good to have trading partners who are desperate and starving. We should also recall that the American economy in the postwar period was at full employment, and domestic demand could have been further stimulated without the investments attached to foreign aid. Nor was it in the interest of the U.S. government to have misery become a permanent condition in Europe or anywhere else. Stalin could explain this behavior only with the theory that the Americans were out to “enslave” them all.