Mao asked the Main Master (glavnyi khozyain), as he often called Stalin, to recommend an editor who was educated in Marxism to help him prepare his articles and speeches for publication and to keep “any theoretical mistakes from creeping in.” In the heady world of Communist ideology, this small gesture represented a bow of recognition to Stalin’s dominance.7
On February 14, 1950, the two signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. The USSR granted a loan of $300 million and in return asked to retain exclusive access to the “industrial, financial, and commercial” activities in the huge provinces of Manchuria and Xinjiang. The Kremlin insisted, moreover, that Soviet citizens in China be exempted from local law. Those terms bothered Mao, who for years had said that such demands were the essence of imperialism.8
Also at this time other Asian leaders sought out Stalin’s support. Kim Il Sung wrote to him proposing a military effort to unite North and South Korea, and in March 1949 he traveled to Moscow.9 However, at that very moment the Soviet Union was involved in the increasingly embarrassing Berlin Blockade, so that Stalin was certain to be cool about supporting an adventure in Korea. When Kim proposed an invasion, the Boss advised against it, saying it would be a violation of the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the question of the 38th parallel. Although the talks were mainly about economic aid, Stalin was also curious about the military forces on the ground in North and South Korea, with the imminent departure of the last American troops. In May, Kim visited Mao, who also said that attacking the South would give a bad impression politically. China would not be able to help because at that time it was still trying to win its own war with the Nationalists.10
Kim Il Sung was a living example of center-periphery relations in the Soviet empire, whereby the periphery to some extent drives the decision making at the center. On January 17, 1950, and back in Pyongyang, he met with Soviet ambassador T. F. Shtykov and Chinese representatives. He mentioned issues that he knew would be reported to Moscow and would play on Stalin’s great weakness: his need to be seen as the unrivaled leader of the Communist world. Kim said that China’s revolution had just succeeded and that Korea was next. Of course he could not undertake such a mission if the Soviet leader were opposed to it. Kim called himself “a communist, a disciplined person,” for whom an order from Stalin was law.11
In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh had done so well that on January 30, 1950, the USSR formally recognized the new government in Hanoi.12 Ho knew Moscow from the 1920s and was now flown there to meet up with the victorious Mao, who was at the time in the Soviet capital, and they traveled home together. Although Stalin was prepared to make polite gestures to Vietnam, and might have been inclined to do more, he was reluctant to provide the military and other aid requested by Ho. As he had already told Chinese comrades visiting in the summer of 1949, he wanted “to leave the leadership role in the revolutionary movements in Asia” to them. Nevertheless, “he claimed the right to determine the shape of the People’s Republic of China’s relations with the United States and the West.”13
The international Communist movement appeared to be making some headway, in spite of the stalemate in Germany, and Stalin now judged that the timing was right to pick up the pace in Korea. On the same day in January 1950 that the USSR recognized Vietnam, the Kremlin Boss sent more encouraging words to Kim Il Sung in Korea. Stalin said that “such a large matter in regard to South Korea”—that is, its invasion—required a “large preparation.” Nevertheless, he was “ready to help him in this matter” and would be pleased to receive him for further discussions. That invitation was in fact an agreement to back North Korea’s ambitious plans.14 Even though Mao was in Moscow, Stalin said nothing to him about this key decision, evidently still not trusting the Chinese leader to follow his lead. Stalin had already twice refused Mao’s request, made most recently during his visit to Moscow in late 1949, for Soviet support for an invasion of Taiwan to unite China. After that the Kremlin leader likely assumed that Mao would not go along with the Soviet decision to back North Korea’s plans unless presented with certain facts on the ground.15
Kim was in Moscow from March 30 to April 25, 1950. He sounded more certain than ever that the United States would not interfere because, he now thought, he had good reason to hope that the two Communist giants would back the North. He boasted that tens of thousands of sympathizers would arise in the South and side with the invaders. Stalin allowed himself to be convinced by these thin arguments.16 The main reason he reconsidered giving Kim the green light in Korea was, he said, the recent success of the Chinese revolution and its new alliance with the USSR. This development also had an important psychological effect, for it “proved the strength of the Asian revolutionaries, and showed the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West, in America.”
He told Kim, however, that the USSR “was not ready to get involved in Korean affairs directly, especially if Americans did venture to send troops.” The two leaders went over the strategy of the attack in detail, with Stalin emphasizing the need for speed. Kim’s bold prediction was that “the war will be won in three days.” The “Americans won’t have time to prepare,” and by the time they realized what was happening, he said with assurance, “all the Korean people will be enthusiastically supporting the new government.”17
Kim then flew straight to Beijing and met with Mao on May 15. Again the Chinese leader was concerned that the Americans might intervene, but he went along partly because Stalin was on board. On his return home, Kim had discussions with Soviet ambassador Shtykov. On May 29 they agreed that the attack would take place June 8–10. Shtykov as usual notified the Kremlin to be certain he was cleared, and Stalin gave his immediate approval. North Korea, after a delay of just over two weeks, launched the invasion.18
STALIN AND THE KOREAN WAR
On Sunday, June 25, 1950, John Muccio, the U.S. ambassador in Seoul, reported that, as of six A.M. that day, North Korean infantry, tanks, and amphibious units had crossed the 38th parallel in an “all out offensive.” The message, received in Washington on Saturday, June 24, at 9:26 P.M., set off a flurry of activity.19 Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in consultation with President Truman, decided on the basis of that message to present a resolution to the UN Security Council. A note from U.S. ambassador Alan Kirk in Moscow arrived at 9:59 A.M. on June 25; he stated flatly that the invasion was a “clear-cut Soviet challenge” and threat “to our leadership of the free world against Soviet Communist aggression” and should be given a “firm answer.”20
The UN Security Council condemned the breach of the peace and called on the North Koreans to withdraw. The resolution was adopted by a vote of nine in favor and one abstention (Yugoslavia). Notably absent was the USSR, for with its veto it could have stopped this process dead in its tracks. However, since January the Soviets had been boycotting the UN to protest the nonrecognition of China.