213. I documenti diplomatici Italiani, 8th ser., 13 vols. (Rome: Libreria dello Sstato, 1952–), XIII: 164–5. DGFP, series D, VII: 285–6 (Mussolini to Hitler, Aug. 25, 1939); Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 160–1 (Aug. 25, 1939); Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 128–9 (Aug. 25, 1939); Ciano, Diary, 264–5.
214. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 215. Italy had already informed Germany, in general terms, on May 31, 1939, that it would not be ready for war before 1943. In June 1939, Chamberlain told the committee of imperial defence that “the Italians would be on the lookout for any excuse to keep out of the war.” DGFP, series D, VI: 617–20; Overy, “Strategic Intelligence,” 470 (citing PRO CAB 2/8: Minutes of CID meeting, June 22, 1939, 6).
215. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 36 (citing NA, PREM 1/331a: Strang to Cadogan, Aug. 26, 1939, 1; Halifax Papers, A4.4103/10 (i): Birger Dahlerus, 11; and Le Livre jaune francais: documents diplmatiques 1938–1939 [Paris, 1939]), 312 (Coulondre to Bonnet, Aug. 25, 1939).
216. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 215; Hofer, Die Entstehung des Zwieiten Weltkriegs, 276.
217. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 60 (Aug. 27 and 29, 1939).
218. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy,” 215–6; DGFP, series D, VII: 405–7 (Ribbentrop to Bernardo Attolico, Aug. 29, 1939). Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador to London, reported that Chamberlain was concerned that the Poles be “reasonable” vis-à-vis Hitler’s demands. FRUS, 1939, I: 392 (Kennedy telegram, Aug. 30, 1939).
219. De Felice, Mussolini, II: 670.
220. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 581 (German account); Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 12. Ribbentrop had first told Stalin of the joke making the rounds in Berlin that “Stalin will join the Anti-Comintern Pact.” Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 75.
221. Hillgruber, Die Zerstörung Europas, 212. The expression to play “va banque” (translated here as “go for broke”), from baccarat, connotes wagering an amount equal to that held by the banker of the game.
222. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VII: 85–6 (Aug. 31, 1939). On Sept. 1, Hitler launched a tirade at Dahlerus to the effect that he was prepared to fight Britain for a decade if forced to do so. Dahlerus, Der letze Versuch, 130–1. On Aug. 28, 1939, Clare Hollingworth, a British correspondent traveling by car from Katowice to Gleiwitz, had glimpsed the vast German arsenal in the valley poised to attack and broken the news. Daily Telegraph, Aug. 29, 1939.
223. Dederichs, Heydrich, 89; Schellenberg, Schellenberg Memoirs, 68–70. On the bomber: Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe, 231; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 513–4.
224. DBFP, 3rd series, VII: 501 (Halifax to Phipps, Sept. 1, 1939), doc. 504 (Henderson Sept. 2, 1939).
225. French Yellow Book, 307 (François-Poncet in Rome to Bonnet, Aug. 31, 1939).
226. Dietrich, The Hitler I Knew, 47; Schmidt, Statist, 464; Eberle and Uhl, Hitler Book, 47–8.
227. Back on Aug. 22, 1929, in a secret speech to his military brass, Hitler had restated his original grand strategy preference for attacking the Western powers first, explained his reversal of that sequence, declared his intention to strike Poland even if the Western Powers upheld their vows to act, and concluded that his sole concern was that the Schweinhund Chamberlain would find a way to cheat him out of war, just as the PM had at Munich. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 610–1, 643n80. See also Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers”; and Meyer, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, 184.
228. The prospect of Poland’s destruction and the “emancipation” of the ethnic German minority there beguiled the Wehrmacht brass as well, despite the latter’s concern about preparedness for a general conflict. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 654; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 321–2; Maiolo, “Armaments Competition,” 286–307.
229. Poland possessed only a provisional study for a western front, conducted in 1936. Prażmowska, Britain, Poland, 90–2, citing Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wajnie światowej, 3 vols. (London: Instytut Historyczny im. gen. Sikorskiego, 1951–86), I/i: 117–22, 209 (General Stachiewicz); Kirchmayer, 1939 i 1944 Kilka Zagadnień Polskich, 46–9; Colonel Jaklicz, typescript at the Polish Institute and the Sikorski Museum, London, 33, 121–2.
230. DGFP, series D, VII: 540–1; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 600; Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 86, 90.
231. Zaloga and Madej, Polish Campaign, 145–9; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 304–29.
232. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy in 1939”; May, Strange Victory, 93; Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, 18. On Sept. 5, Halder recorded in his diary of Poland: “enemy practically beaten.” (Halder Diaries, I: 53.) In fact, Polish forces emerged victorious in a major engagement with Wehrmacht forces in southeastern Poland.
233. Bédarida, La Strategic sécrete, 95.
234. AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 7, d. 68, l. 3–4, 5–6; God krizisa, II: 359–60; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 6–7; Na prieme, 270–1. Accompanying Shkvartsev to Berlin was Vladimir Pavlov, sent as the new first secretary of the embassy; a new NKVD station chief, Amayak Kobulov; and a new military attaché, Maxim Purkayev (“Marble”). Shkvartsev had been received in the Little Corner on Aug. 19 (only with Molotov), and on Sept. 1 (again with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Pavlov, Purkayev, Kobulov, and Dekanozov). Shkvarstev would be present in the Molotov’s office on Sept. 28 during Ribbentrop’s second visit. In late December 1940, Pavlov would be transferred to Moscow as head of the Central European desk at the foreign affairs commissariat—at age twenty-five—overseeing Germany, Hungary, and former Czechoslovakia (under German occupation).
235. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 55.
236. Konstantin Simonov, then a writer at Red Star, would recall viewing the German invasion as an attack of the strong against the weak and not wanting to see a German victory. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pololeniia, 309. See also Prishvin, Dnevniki, X: 276.
237. Semiriaga, “17 sentiabria 1939 g.”; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 25–6 (AVP RF, f. 011, op. 4, pap. 24, d. 5, l. 29: Molotov-Grzybowski, Sept. 5, 1939).
238. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 91, 100.
239. Shaposhnikov had crossed out the order’s date in red pen and written in Sept. 14. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 59–63 (TsAMO, f. 148a, op. 3763, d. 69, l. 1–3, 4–6); Mel’tiukhov, Sovetsko-pol’skie voiny (2004), 435–47.
240. “The distrust on my side toward Stalin,” Hitler would observe to Mussolini on Oct. 28, 1940, “is matched by Stalin’s distrust toward me.” Langer, Undeclared War, 136 (no citation). According to Zhukov, Zhdanov, too, said it was impossible to trust Hitler. Simonov, “Zametki k biogfraii G. K. Zhukova,” 49.