13. It was led by Major General von der Golz. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 27. Jakobson based his account on unpublished Finnish foreign ministry sources, but did not cite them. He was a sixteen-year-old schoolboy in Helsinki when the war broke out.
14. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 147 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 18, l. 32: June 19, 1939).
15. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 97; Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 114 (citing Bundesarchiv-Miliätrarchiv, N 220/19; AVP RF, f. 0135, op. 22, d. 7, l. 8–9, 12–4); Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 221 (citing Falin, Soviet Peace Efforts, doc. 352: Derevyansky, June 28, 1939; and FO 371/23648: Snow to Halifax, July 3, 1939).
16. Before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Finnish military attaché in Moscow had managed to obtain information about the secret consultations from the wife of a high-level Soviet figure, an indication of Finland’s obvious concern for its security, but, for Stalin, of something more sinister. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 47 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 172, l. 2). One of the Soviet sources in Finland was the former Kronstadt rebel leader Stepan Petrichenko, who had escaped into exile. V. P. Naumov and A. A. Kosakovskii (eds.), Kronshtadt, 1921 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 1997), 402; APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 283, l. 27, Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 27 (Yagodato Stalin).
17. Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 4.
18. Dullin, “Understanding Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy,” 179. Secret planning through May 1940 in the Black Sea fleet specified the “likely enemy” as “England, France, Romania, Turkey.” The fleet’s aviation staff were studying the routes to India, while war contingency plans included Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt as well as India—all colonies or allies of Britain.
19. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 26 (Mikoyan on Molotov); Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 390–1; Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 288.
20. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 282 (APRF, f. 45, op., 1, d. 178, l. 35, 37). “Yartsev” also donated funds to the Finnish Small Farmers Party, which agitated for “peace” with the Soviet Union.
21. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 296–309; Na prieme, 234. Zoia Voskresenskaya (b. 1907) had been sent to Finland in 1936 as an intelligence operative, operating under Intourist cover; Rybkin, the new station chief, arrived six to seven months later, without his family, and she became his deputy. Half a year later, they asked NKVD intelligence in Moscow for permission to marry, which was granted. Her account has the correct Kremlin meeting date and the fact that Molotov and Voroshilov were also there, and gives a description of his impressions of the visit, as relayed via a conversation Rybkin had with Kollontai. Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonym Irina, 150–5.
22. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 7–11; Peshcherskii, “Kak I. V. Stalina pytalsia predotvarit’ voinu s Finliandiei.” Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 88–9 (quoting Lascelles’s and Lawrence Collier’s minutes on a report from Helsinki, Oct. 8, 1939), 28 (citing FO 371/22270/N2338: Snow to Halifax, April 26, 1938).
23. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 301. Rybkin-Yartsev does not appear again in Stalin’s office logbook, but he could have been received at the dacha.
24. Tanner, Winter War, 5; Sharapov, Dve zhizni, 345–51; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 302.
25. Sudoplatov, the assassin who had leapt into the leadership rung of Soviet intelligence, surmised that Yartsev’s work was also a device to sow dissension in the Finnish leadership. Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 94, 266. Sudoplatov is off by one day on the meeting: Na prieme, 234.
26. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 163 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 297, d. 2054, l. 33: Litvinov to Derevyansky).
27. Litvinov, on March 11, told the Finnish representative that the “Soviet government did not expect such an answer.” Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 34 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 17, d. 183, l. 80–2; pap. 18, d. 198, l. 6); “The Winter War (Documents on Soviet-Finnish Relations in 1939–1940),” 53–61.
28. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 143. Litvinov complained to the Swedish envoy to Moscow that “we cannot be sure that Germany, embarking on some sort of adventurism, might not demand from Finland even temporarily the transfer of its islands, and that Finland, either voluntarily, or involuntarily would, under threat, perhaps earlier agree to accede to such a demand.” Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 34 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 198, l. 8: March 11, 1939).
29. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 63–5; Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 34 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 17, d. 183, l. 61–5). The politburo designated Stein an envoy of Litvinov (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 24, l. 120). Stein left Helsinki on April 6. On April 19—the same day Litvinov was received in the Little Corner to discuss the failure of collective security negotiations—Stein wrote a memo to Stalin arguing that Helsinki could not respond positively to Soviet proposals prior to the upcoming Finnish elections, but predicted that afterward there would be some chance of success. He was also received that day (in the company of Litvinov and Potyomkin, as well as inner regime cronies). DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 297–9 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 2, d. 11, l. 224–8), XXII/ii: 526n65; Na prieme, 257. Very soon, of course, Litvinov was removed. Stein would be transferred out of Italy on Oct. 7, 1939; he would get a teaching post at the USSR higher diplomatic school.
30. The Soviets had a plan of attack against Finland (and Estonia) already by March–April 1939, but that is what all militaries do: they plan wars, just in case. Aptekar’, Sovetsko-finskie voiny.
31. Chuev, Sto sorok, 34; Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 24.
32. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 177. Voroshilov visited the Karelian Isthmus sometime in April and ordered that combat readiness be raised and plans be developed for evacuation of women and children should war break out. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 146 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 4, d. 366, l. 134). Also in April 1939, the NKVD transport directorate produced an internal assessment of all the ports and military bases of all countries on or near the Baltic Sea. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 250.
33. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 177–80. Meretskov (Na sluzhbe, 178) claims that he was present during a conversation between Kuusinen and Stalin in late June 1939, and that Stalin expressed alarm over the situation with Finland. Neither appears in the logbooks for summer 1939. Na prieme, 646, 661. In summer 1939, the Finnish-Soviet border was largely quiet. Chugunov, Granitsa nakanune voiny, 10.