34. Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, II: 17 (Oct. 10, 1939).
35. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (Leningrad-province state security, July 13, 1939); Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 150–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 405, l. 200: Beria, no earlier than July 10, 1939).
36. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 7 (citing PRO FO 371 23648, N3199). The British general might have been trying to induce London to help the Finns.
37. Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 42; Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 229. On Latvia, see Dr. Alfred B ī lmanis: Latvian Russian Relations, 192–8; Polpredy soobshchaiut, 75–86 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 12, d. 119a, l. 3–8, 9–17); Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 184; Izvestiia, Oct. 6, 1939.
38. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 201–3; Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 116–7.
39. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1235, l. 99); Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 160–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 30, l. 225–6). On the formulation of Soviet demands, see Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 119–21.
40. Raskol’nikov, “Otkrytoe pis’mo Stalinu” (Aug. 17, 1939). He died Sept. 12. See also Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo, II: 420–53; and Magerovsky, “The People’s Commissariat,” II: 342–3. Speculation on the cause of Raskolnikov’s death—poisoning, nervous breakdown—is inconclusive. Konstantinov, F. F. Ilin-Raskol’nikov, 153; “Smert’ Raskol’nikov,” Vorozhdenie, September, 29, 1939; Barmine, One Who Survived, 21; Ehrenburg, Memoirs, 469. Raskolnikov evidently did lose his mind. N. P. V., “Sumashestvie Raskol’nikova: beseda s A.G. Barminym,” Poslednie novosti, Aug. 28, 1939; I. M., “Raskol’nikov soshel s uma,” Vorozhdenie, Sept. 1, 1939.
41. Raskolnikov added: “He does not like people who have their own opinion, and with his usual nastiness drives them away.” Medvedev, Let History Judge, 592.
42. Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 88–9 (quoting Lascelles’s and Lawrence Collier’s minutes on a report from Helsinki, Oct. 8, 1939). For the argument about Finland being a pawn in British strategy, see Pritt, Must the War Spread? (Pritt was expelled from the Labour Party, partly as a result of his pro-Soviet views in the Soviet-Finnish War.) On Britain’s possible lack of inside information concerning the Helsinki government, see Sotskov, Pribaltika i geopolitika, 64–5 (Oct. 16, 1939).
43. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 167–9 (Maisky, Oct. 7, 1939); Maisky, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 28–31 (Oct. 6, 1939); Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 232. Churchill continued this line in further discussions with Maisky: DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 2 (Nov. 13, 1939). See also Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 95 (citing FO 371/23683/N6384: British War cabinet, Nov. 16, 1939). Back in the Russian civil war, the lengthy Helsinki-London plotting had come to naught, opposed by the British cabinet, the Finnish parliament, and newly independent border states wary of collaboration with the Russian nationalist Whites. Ruotsila, “Churchill-Mannerheim Collaboration.”
44. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 196 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 76, l. 12). Mobilization was complete by a second report, on Oct. 13 (199: l. 16).
45. Izvestiia, Oct. 11, 1939; SSSR i Litva, I: 205–46; Polpredy soobshchaiut, 94–144; Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 193.
46. Zonin, Admiral L. M. Galler, 309.
47. DPV SSSR, XXII/ii: 178 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 297, d. 2053, l. 197).
48. Stalin had received Molotov and Derevyansky that afternoon, just prior to meeting the Finns: Na prieme, 276.
49. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 4); Tanner, Winter War, 25 (who claims his account of Stalin’s presentation is based on the Finnish interpreter’s notes). Paasikivi had been born Johan Gustaf Hellsten and Finnicized his name at age fifteen, in 1885, after he had been orphaned.
50. The Beria report was dated Oct. 12, 1939. Vrang had become a celebrity in Moscow diplomatic circles as a result of the circumstance that in a Soviet espionage film, the actor who played the role of the main bad guy, a foreign military attaché, happened to be a dead ringer for the Swede. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091, citing U. A. Käkönen, Sotilasasiamiehenä Moskovassa 1939 (Helsinki, 1966), 62; Norberg, “Det militära hotet.”
51. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 162–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 393, l. 122–4: Oct. 12, 1939), 163–4 (op. 6, d. 31, l. 117–9, Oct. 12), 164–5 (d. 31, l. 122–4: Oct. 13), 165–6 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 393, l. 122–4), 166–7 (l. 147–9: Oct. 14, 1939); Volkogonov Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1. See also Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091–2. One clandestine Soviet source in Helsinki, Cay Sundström, a pro-Communist Social Democrat in the Finnish parliament (his NKVD code name was “the Count”), complained to the NKVD that when the parliamentary foreign-affairs committee discussed Soviet demands in his presence, other members told the rapporteur to stop speaking. He informed Moscow that Erkko had stated there was no need for any concessions to the Soviet Union because Finland could count on the support of Britain, the United States, and Sweden. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions”; Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 163–4 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 117-9: Oct. 12); Volkogonov Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1 (identifying the source as Sundström); Sinitsyn, Rezident svidel’stvuet, 21. See also Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” 119.
52. Stalin received Molotov for fifteen minutes prior to meeting the Finns: Na prieme, 276.
53. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 474.
54. Upton, Finland, 29–30 (quoting J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 45–6); Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 114–8; Tanner, Winter War, 27–8; Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 1–2). Apparently, the Soviet side made no formal record of the talks: Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 237–8.
55. Stalin also suspected that a coup could bring an avowedly fascist regime to power in Helsinki. The NKVD in Leningrad characterized the Cayander-Tanner government in Helsinki as proto-fascist. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (July 13, 1939).
56. Tanner, Winter War, 30.
57. A Soviet military intelligence on Finnish civilian evacuations from frontline areas was dated Oct. 14, 1939; the evacuations would be pronounced complete seven days later. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 199–200 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 76, l. 17), 200 (l. 20).