119. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 38 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 192). More broadly, see Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second Word War, 30–73; and Kirby, Concise History of Finland, 197–216.
120. Pravda, Dec. 1, 1939.
121. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 39 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1380, l. 3; f. 25888, op. 13, d. 76, l. 1).
122. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 351–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 1, d. 4, l. 75–8: Molotov to Schulenburg, Nov. 30, 1939).
123. Bor’ba Finnskoogo naroda, 11. The protocols of the first official meeting of the “government” were recorded in Russian by Kuusinen’s son. RGASPI, f. 522, op. 1, d. 46, l. 1, as cited in Baryshnikov and Baryshnikov, “Pravitel’stvo v Teriioki,” 179.
124. Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 261 (citing RGVA, f. 25888, op. 1, d. 17, l. 199: report of the Leningrad general staff); Volkogonov, “Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov,” 316. Krasnaia zvezda, Nov. 30, 1989 (A. M. Noskov); Volkogonov, “Drama of the Decisions,” 32; Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?” 100n2 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 889, l. 1–10, 15–6; d. 891, l. 1–3). See also Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?,” 100n2 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 889, l. 18–25: Dec. 26, 1939).
125. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 144–8; Spring, “Soviet Decision for War,” 217; Balashov, Prinimai nas, 43.
126. Dongarov, “Pravitel’stvo Kuusinena,” 74–5, 76–9 (facsimile).
127. A Feb. 1, 1940, “Appeal to the soldiers of the Finnish army,” issued in the name of the “People’s Government” and written by Zhdanov, initially declared that “the Soviet Union does not want anything other than a government in Finland that would not fashion intrigues with the imperialist powers threatening the security of Leningrad.” Zhdanov excised this passage in the final draft. Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?,” 100 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 891, l. 14–5).
128. Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 600 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 269, d. 134, 1. 36: autobiography of Esa Kuusinen, Aug. 1, 1940). See also Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen, 316.
129. Kuusinen, Rings of Destiny, 225, 230, 231. Aino last saw Otto in 1935.
130. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 77, l. 178–212, in Rzeshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 272–83; Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 268; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 46.
131. Na prieme, 282–94; Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 179.
132. Kuznetsov, Nakanune, 309, 328.
133. Zakharov et al., 50 let Vooruzhenykh Sil SSSR, 230; Baryshnikov, “Sovetsko-Finliandskaia voina,” 33 (citing RGVA, f. 25888, op. 14, d. 2, l. 1). Mekhlis and Kulik, both deputy defense commissars, mocked Voronov, the artillery specialist, in the presence of Meretskov when Voronov said the Soviets would be fortunate to achieve their combat aims in two to three months; they told him the war plan was for ten to twelve days. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 136. Meretskov later admitted that the forces under his command were not ready to attack. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 171, 173–4, 179, 181–2.
134. Shaposhnikov would learn of the outbreak of hostilities from the press. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moeogo pokoleniia, 442–3; Simonov, “Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia,” 79.
135. Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 133 (RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 233, l. 4: telegram to Shaposhnikov, Nov. 19, 1939); Meretskov, Serving the People, 100–1.
136. Mannerheim, Memoirs, 366. See also Tillotson, Finland at Peace and War, 121–75. During only 10 of the 105 days of the campaign was the temperature above freezing. The record low was on Jan. 16, 1940.
137. Chew, White Death; Trotter, Frozen Hell.
138. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 252.
139. Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 112.
140. Rittersporn, Anguish, 235 (citing GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 87, l. 17).
141. Davies, Popular Opinion, 100 (citing TsGAIPD SPb, f. 24, op. 2v, d. 3723, l. 62, 50).
142. Zenzinov, Vstrecha s Rossiei, 37, 138. Zenzinov’s book includes the full text of 277 out of the 376 surviving letters.
143. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 253–61 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 185, l. 454–71: Dec. 7, 1939).
144. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 115–266.
145. “The pessimist Mannerheim raised his marshal’s baton, the would-be appeaser Tanner emerged as the most resolute political leader, and workers and peasants, who had voted the Centre-Left government into power, fulfilled their duty as soldiers,” as one historian aptly remarked. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096.
146. Maisky recorded in his diary (Dec. 1): “The British reaction is rabid. The press, the radio, the cinema, Parliament—all have been mobilized.” Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 75; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 243. See also Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, 40; Carley, “‘Situation of Delicacy,’” 195–6; and Stalin’s comments to the chief of the Estonian armed forces, Dec. 11–12, 1939, as recorded by Rei, in Sotsialisticheskie revoliutsii v Estonii, 109. In Dec. 1939, Kollontai wrote from Stockholm to Molotov (a copy went to Voroshilov), calling the working situation “difficult and serious” and concluding, “I cannot fail to point out I still have no aide, and no one even to consult with, since everyone is new and they all need to be taught.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 218–20 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1202, l. 99–101ss). On the lack of experienced staff in Moscow, see Kraminov, V orbite voiny, 79.
147. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 134; Philbin, Lure of Neptune, 61, 129.
148. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 361 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22407, d. 2, l. 586), 363 (op. 22410, d. 2, l. 196: Dec. 8, 1939), 372–3 (RGASPI. F. 495, op. 74, d. 618, l. 12, 13–4, 16). See also Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XVIII (VII/i): 162.
149. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096, citing Paasikivi’s notes from the Government of Finland foreign affairs committee, Dec. 2 and 3, 1939, in O. Manninen and K. Rumpunen (eds.), Murhenäytelmän vuorosanat: Talvisodan hallituksen keskustelut (Helsinki, 2003).
150. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 230–3. Molotov refused to meet with the Swedish mediator to hear the Helsinki government’s proposed concessions; Molotov told the American mediator that the Soviets would have no dealings with the Finnish government in Helsinki, especially since Tanner (the Social Democrat) had become foreign minister. FRUS, 1939, I: 1008–9, 1014–5.
151. The NKVD leadership demanded and received an accurate picture of the Red Army. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 406–7 (Dec. 31, 1939).