While defining the degree of secrecy of information in the area of scientific research, including the development of armaments, you can extend the explanations mentioned above to the List of the Major Information of state secrecy approved by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated December 3, 1980, in Resolution N 1121-387 and in particular by Paragraph 2 of Clause 83 and Clause 85 of this list; it was expedient to use the clarifications which are indicated above. For a more detailed interpretation of the terms and notions mentioned in the List of the Major Information of state secrecy, it is necessary to look for it from those who compiled in 1980, the MB RF.
Annex 48
Secret
Copy N 2
6/01341/April 5, 1993
To Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov,
Head of the General Staff Headquarters
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case, in which Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, a former employee at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), is accused of committing a crime stipulated by Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.
It was established during the investigation, that in 1992 Mirzayanov disclosed information to the mass media that constitutes a state secret, about the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary system based on it being created at GRNIIOKhT by order of the Ministry of Defense. In connection with this please inform us if the General Staff Headquarters of the VSRF [Armed Forces of the Russian Federation] has any information about any negative consequences to the defense capability of Russia created by Mirzayanov’s actions indicated above.
Head of the Department
Major General
S.D. Balashov
Annex 49
Secret
Copy N. 1
General Headquarters
of the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation
To Major General S.D. Balashov,
Head of the Investigation Department
at the Ministry of Security
of the Russian Federation
April 29, 1993
N 312/10/053
In response to N 6 01341 of April 5, 1993
The Ministry of Defense has considered your request for information about any kind of negative consequences for the defense capability of Russia that resulted from V. Mirzayanov’s disclosure of information that constitutes a state secret.
In his publications and interviews V. Mirzayanov discloses information about the results of our research and development work in the field of chemical weapons, which is currently not prohibited by any of the existing international agreements.
Additionally, in V. Mirzayanov’s publications information is presented in such detail, which is not stipulated either by the multilateral Convention for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or in the bilateral agreements on chemical weapons between Russia and the U.S. After the international agreements mentioned above come into effect, each state-participant will be required only to report “the location, character and general sphere of activity” of the sites for the development [of chemical weapons].
In this way, not one of the other countries which developed (and continue at the present time in the absence of international bans) the development of new kinds of chemical weapons will declare any such detailed information about the results of their research and development in this area, including the names of specific substances and their properties based on the results of testing.
V. Mirzayanov published ahead of the time agreed, information about the sites where chemical weapons were developed and described the nature of their activity, (In other countries this has been kept a secret up to the present time, and the question being discussed is what sites were “mainly” involved in the development and must be declared after the Convention enters into force) and he also revealed information in such detail that is not stipulated in the terms of the Convention – a comparison of the toxic characteristics and battle properties of the samples developed, the sites of their development, the accumulation of experimental batches and tests, and conventional names of these new substances and the overall development programs [italicized by me—V.M.]. The published information caused a negative reaction from the U.S. during the bilateral negotiations for banning chemical weapons in Geneva. This is confirmed by the fact that the American delegation accused Russia of failing to provide information at the first stage of the Wyoming Memorandum on chemical weapons, about the alleged development production and storage of a significant quantity of chemical agents (CA) in Russia, as were mentioned in Vil Mirzayanov’s publications, although there are no such stockpiles of such chemical agents. At the same negotiations the American side (referring to V. Mirzayanov’s indicated publications) took steps to introduce additional commitments, according to which Russia should unilaterally disclose the results of its research and development work in the field of chemical weapons. Additionally, these publications created a precedent for requesting similar commitments from Russia within the framework of the multilateral Convention, while other countries that keep such information a secret will declare only very general information regarding the nature of their activities on the development of chemical weapons after the Convention enters into force. These publications caused real political harm to Russia and undermined its authority in the international arena. A false impression was created that Russia allegedly doesn’t comply with existing commitments in the area of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Thus, V. Mirzayanov’s publications are currently causing military damage by unilaterally disclosing information about the results of our research and development work in the field of chemical weapons in such detail, which is not stipulated for other countries within the framework of future disclosures after the Convention for the Prohibiting of Chemical Weapons and other international agreements in this area enter into force. Additionally, a precedent was created for other countries to raise demands for Russia after the Convention enters into effect, to unilaterally give even more detailed information about the full names and detailed properties of the samples that were developed, which could be used by the states of the “third world” to meet their ends and facilitate the spread of chemical weapons.
Head of the General Staff,
Colonel General
M. Kolesnikov
Annex 50
Secret
Copy N 2
To V.P. Ivanov,
Chairman of the RF Committee for