However, in one of his more foolish strategic decisions, Hitler rejected the idea of evacuating Africa and instead ordered strong armoured reinforcements, including the refurbished 10.Panzer-Division and the newly-formed s.Panzer-Abteilung 501, to be transported to Tunisia to reinforce Rommel’s retreating forces. While this decision delayed the inevitable for five months, Hitler’s decision to send more than 300 tanks (including 31 Tigers) to Tunisia when the German Panzer-Divisionen in the East were reduced to threadbare strength represented a colossal mistake. Had these forces been sent eastward, von Manstein’s ‘Backhand Blow’ counter-offensive at Kharkov in February 1943 would have been nearly doubled in strength. Guderian opposed the diversion of this much armour to North Africa, particularly the Tigers, but he was ignored. Instead, by May 1943 all these reinforcements sent to North Africa would be eliminated, costing Germany three Panzer-Divisionen and a Panzergrenadier-Division, losses that would also have to be replaced out of hide. Like Stalingrad, German losses in North Africa were 100 per cent of equipment. Only small numbers of Panzertruppen were evacuated by air.
Diversion of Armour to the Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe
While the Heer panzer units were being bled to death in Russia and were often forced to make do with obsolete weapons, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler successfully lobbied Hitler to divert an enormous amount of men and equipment to convert three of his own Waffen-SS divisions to Panzergrenadier-Divisionen. Up to this point in the war, the Waffen-SS divisions had served as motorized infantry units, each with a battery of attached assault guns, and had limited experience with armoured operations. In 1942 the SS-Wiking Division had been given a single SS-Panzer-Abteilung, which was employed in the Caucasus. Yet Himmler did not want his troops to be used merely as a support force for the Heer, and sought to build up his best divisions into a mobile strike force capable of independent operations. During the winter of 1942–43, the SS-Panzergrenadier-Divisionen Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LSSAH), Das Reich and Totenkopf were refitted in France and each received a newly-created SS-Panzer-Regiment with two full-strength battalions. At a time when half of the Heer Panzer-Divisionen only had a single under-strength Panzer-Abteilung, Himmler ensured that his troops received the best; over 317 tanks went to outfit these six SS-Panzer-Abteilungen, including brand-new Pz III and Pz IV medium tanks. Himmler even connived to get each of these three Waffen-SS divisions its only schwere-Panzer Kompanie with 10 Tiger tanks. Once completed in early 1943, these three divisions were grouped into the I.SS-Panzerkorps and began preparing to transfer back to the Eastern Front.
There is no doubt that the I.SS-Panzerkorps was a powerful strike force, but the amount of effort put into creating it was enormously detrimental to the revitalization of the Heer Panzer-Divisionen; the Germans were robbing from Peter to pay Paul. Furthermore, it is important to note that at the start of 1943 the Heer had far more experience with the use of tanks in combined arms warfare than the Waffen-SS commanders, who had no direct experience with leading large tank formations. Instead, the Waffen-SS simply appropriated experienced tankers from the Heer as needed; for example, Oberst Herbert Vahl, commander of the Panzer-Regiment 29, was transferred to take over the SS-Das Reich Division’s new SS-Panzer-Regiment. Guderian argued against lavishing resources on the creation of Waffen-SS armoured units. However, Hitler was enamoured of the idea of an armoured ‘Praetorian Guard’ and even granted Himmler permission to form three more Waffen-SS Panzergrenadier Divisions; both the first three and the next three would soon be referred to as SS-Panzer-Divisionen. In another year, Himmler would be suggesting the creation of an ‘SS-Panzer-Armee’ to Hitler. By this concession to Himmler, Hitler allowed a rivalry for resources to develop between the Waffen-SS and the Heer, which would eventually reduce the regular Panzer-Divisionen to second-rate status.
Not to be outdone by Himmler, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring lobbied to get the Luftwaffe’s Division Hermann Göring converted into a Panzer-Division; by late 1942 this plan was a reality and the division sent a regimental-size Kampfgruppe to Tunisia. In short order this unit was destroyed, but the rest of the division fitted out in Italy. Like the Waffen-SS units, Göring ensured that his new division was provided with a two-battalion Panzer-Regiment and that it only received new-build tanks. However, Göring did not get authorization for Tiger tanks for the HG Division, and instead it received its own Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung. Since the Luftwaffe had virtually no officers or troops experienced in armoured combat, Göring used his influence to pressure the Heer into transferring a number of experienced panzer crews to the new outfit. Thus, between the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe, Germany had to find the resources to create eight new Panzer-Abteilungen – a total of over 420 tanks and assault guns. Like Himmler, Göring was not satisfied with controlling a single Panzer-Division and would soon be lobbying for more – all to the detriment of the Heer Panzer-Divisionen at the front. In March 1943, Guderian visited the Hermann Göring Division and was incensed to discover that the Luftwaffe had gathered 34,000 troops into this formation. Guderian later wrote that, ‘the majority of this large number of men were leading a pleasant life in Holland. In view of our replacement problem this was intolerable, even in 1943.’{8} Nevertheless, Guderian utterly failed to prevent either the Waffen-SS or the Luftwaffe from diverting resources from his programme of revitalizing the Heer Panzer-Divisionen.
German Tactical and Doctrinal Changes
The German Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvre warfare) doctrine that had worked so well during 1940–42 was built around a combined arms team comprised of tanks, mechanized infantry, motorized engineers, self-propelled artillery and other elements, supported by abundant Luftwaffe close air support. In operational terms, the German preference for Bewegungskrieg was to conduct deliberate offensives under the most favourable circumstances – i.e. with full-strength units in fair weather. German armoured strength was to be applied to enemy weakness – an open or vulnerable flank or a poorly-guarded sector like the Ardennes – in order to achieve overwhelming combat power at the Schwerpunkt or decisive point. By focusing priority of tactical effort against a single Schwerpunkt, a decisive breakthrough could be achieved and the mechanized forces would pour into the enemy’s rear and then envelop his main body. After that, it was merely a matter of mopping up the encircled enemy in a Kessel (cauldron) battle.
While the Germans were able to achieve this standard with Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and with Fridericus, Trappenjagd and Blau in 1942, by 1943 the Germans were being forced to violate their own doctrine and conduct offensives without proper combined arms tactics and with less regard for the Schwerpunkt concept. During Operation Wintergewitter, the Stalingrad relief effort in December 1942, Hoth’s panzers had attacked with virtually no infantry and negligible air support. From that point onward, Soviet offensives would force the Germans to mount major armoured operations in winter until the end of the war – usually to save encircled units – and typically conducted as hasty attacks with understrength units. By mid-February 1943, von Manstein would be forced to conduct counter-attacks with Heer Panzer-Divisionen that had been reduced to fewer than a dozen operational tanks and this tended to become increasingly commonplace throughout much of 1943. The necessity of conducting mobile operations even in winter and under less-than-favourable circumstances led to doctrinal modifications.