Later reports did nothing to alleviate the tension. At 8:00 a.m. Sontag finally notified Scholtz of his defeat, concluding his dispatch by saying that he was unsure whether the 41st Division could hold its position, much less resume the advance. Army headquarters only learned of this situation an hour later—a significant lapse of time given the relative proximity of the headquarters. Ludendorff immediately sent an officer by car to investigate. His report “was not encouraging.”49
The mood of the high command was improved significantly by the first reports from 8th Army’s problem child. Hermann von François had brought his share of the battle into full swing well before dawn. The initial corps orders, issued at 7:30 p.m. on August 27, reflected an expectation of strong Russian resistance around Soldau. François assigned his air squadron the special responsibility of reconnoitering that area. “For the solution of artillery problems” he organized a force of eight heavy and fifteen light batteries, a mass of 120 guns, the largest concentration yet seen in the Tannenberg campaign. The infantry would only advance at 6:00 a.m., presumably after the Russian guns were silenced. Every available battalion from I Corps’s organic divisions, Schmettau’s Force, and the 5th Landwehr Brigade, would cooperate in the attack.
During the night, however, François’s anxieties diminished—perhaps once again with the assistance of technology. At 5:30 p.m. on August 27, an aircraft patrolling from Graudenz reported to the fortress commandant that the Russians around Soldau, far from entrenching or massing for a counterattack, were retreating south in apparent disorder. The information did not reach army headquarters until 1:35 a.m. on the 28th. The copy of the observers’s report sent to I Corps was not mentioned by François, nor did it exist in the archives by the mid-1920s. On the other hand, François acted as if he had received it. Certainly he changed his mind about needing his entire corps to overrun Soldau. Around 6:20 a.m. the corps commander ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Schäffer von Bernstein to take his own 8th Uhlans from the 1st Division plus the two cavalry squadrons of Schmettau’s Force, an improvised cyclist company formed by the 43rd Infantry, and a battery of field guns, and ride east to cut the Neidenburg road. Just how this mixed bag by itself was supposed to sever the main line of retreat of two Russian corps was left unanswered. But at 6:40 a.m. François also ordered the 2nd Division to remain in reserve instead of advancing on Soldau. In the absence of positive confirmation of enemy movements by his own scouts or aircraft, François was not going to split his force and attack in two directions at once. But if the airmen were right he would have a full and fresh division ready to march on Neidenburg in support of his mobile group.50
The German advance on Soldau in the event met little resistance. The reports had been correct. Most of the Russian had left during the night; those remaining were battered into inaction by the German artillery. The Germans halted only when air reconnaissance reported that the Russian main body was far out of reach, beyond Mlawa. By 8:00 a.m. François was confident enough to start the 2nd Division toward Neidenburg.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff initially responded to this initiative by confirming it, ordering François to occupy the town as soon as possible and send his cavalry toward Willenburg, deeper into the Russian rear. But the news of Sontag’s defeat changed minds in a hurry. At 9:10 a.m., François was told instead to divert both the 2nd Division and Schmettau’s Force northeast to deal with the supposed Russian breakthrough in the 41st Division’s sector. Army command took no chances dealing with its unruly subordinate. He was ordered to begin this movement at once, and to report as soon as he issued the orders. At 10:10 a.m. a phone message to 8th Army confirmed that the 2nd Division was on its way in the new direction.51.
As XX Corps and army headquarters continued to receive alarmist reports from Sontag’s sector,52 Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided around noon to turn the whole of I Corps not east against Neidenburg, but northeast in the direction of Lahna. This movement would both relieve the direct pressure on Sontag and bar once more the Russian lines of retreat left open by his defeat. It seemed safe enough since François had reported at 11:45 a.m. that Soldau was firmly in German hands. By this time the staff knew François too well for comfort. The new order ended with a statement that “everything depended on I Corps.” A junior officer telephoned I Corps headquarters a half-hour later with the solemn adjuration that the corps could render “the greatest possible service” to the army by carrying out its mission exactly.53
François regarded the changed orders as unsound to the point of folly, reflecting Ludendorff’s inexperience in commanding large formations. The chief of staff wanted I Corps to cover the reteat of the 41st Division and to cut off the Russian lines of withdrawal. François was convinced that both missions could best be fulfilled by advancing not on Lahna, but on Neidenburg as originally planned. The only major road to Lahna ran through thick woods, where I Corps’s maneuverability would be useless. Nor could its artillery expect to do much more there than shell trees more or less at random. With Neidenburg in German hands, however, the Russians would be trapped and presumably too concerned for their own position to pursue the 41st Division in any direction. François, never a man to let a superior’s judgment overrule his own, decided to disobey once more. He hedged his bets only by instructing Conta to halt and feed the 1st Division, in effect giving I Corps a reserve. But he issued no new orders to the rest of his troops. As long as Hermann von François was commanding, I Corps would fight its battles his own way.54
François’s behavior in this situation highlights once again the ambiguities created in practice by the German principle of “mission orders,” leadership by directive. François is a man easy to admire—from a distance. Among the military virtues initiative is the one most overrated, by soldiers and scholars alike. The general who wins the battle the wrong way when his superiors are losing it the right way appeals to the iconoclast lurking in every academic. The role organizational shortcomings play in turning military misfortune into military catastrophe has been most recently demonstrated by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch. These authors stress the role of generals in correcting organizational flaws, even at high risk.55 Yet there is another side to the question. How is it possible to direct a complicated battle when a principal subordinate with a crucial mission insists on total independence?
Hindenburg and Ludendorff had no immediate answer. But by 1:00 p.m. it was clear to them that François either had an instinct for the dynamics of this particular battle, or possessed what the French colonial army called “baraka”—fighting man’s luck. The 41st Division had been badly shaken, but the Russians were not pursuing it. On the other hand reports of success were arriving from Goltz and Morgen. These were significantly exaggerated. They did, however, convince 8th Army command that François’s attack should be executed as originally planned. At 1:30 p.m. army command assumed its hope and announced to François that the Russians were in retreat to the southeast. The I Corps was to cut off their combat formations, sweep through their rear elements, and disrupt their lines of communication. The 1st Division was ordered to reach Neidenburg and Muschaken and the 2nd Grünfliess by nightfall. Cavalry and cyclists were to advance to Willenberg; the main body of I Corps would resume pursuit as soon as possible the next day.56