Inflation had two sides, an internal one to do with government behaviour, and an external one, to do with the amount of money going from one country to another. The first involved endless argument about ‘cuts’ — governments just spending less, or not providing credit, or preventing banks from providing credit: there were variations on that theme, familiar in the old days as ‘open-market operations’. That was one aspect of monetarism, and in the early eighties the internal manufacturing of inflation did matter a very great deal in an England that had simply been irresponsibly governed: the government deficit of 1970, nil, had reached £10bn in 1975, and it was probably no great wonder that, as questionable banks and property speculators and toilers in the local government bran-tubs flourished, the trade unions also could see no reason why their members should be excluded. There had been much talk of the ‘Swedish model’, in which the trade unions co-operated in wage policies that suited national needs, and the temptation to follow that model was considerable. The French Left, taking over under the Communist-supported Mitterrand, tried yet another of its ‘singing tomorrows’, and found that the original Swedish example was crashing. Here, with a small population in a vast country containing raw materials — especially newspaper- and even medicine-making timber — that the world prized, was a chance for socialism in one country if ever there was one. This was all the more so as the country had avoided wars; there is even an argument that had Sweden not traded with Germany, the world wars would have ended two years before they did.
However, the ‘Swedish model’ had observers gasping: rich, well-organized, some world-class products and also a very elaborate welfare system. There was very high taxation — even, in one notorious case of a writer who was hit for capital gains and income tax on a bestseller, 108 per cent (one of the system’s architects, Pierre Vinde, later deputy secretary-general of the OECD, operated it with humour: this writer asked him on a plane journey to Colombia, did he not appreciate the damage that such tax rates did. He said, yes, of course, but he enjoyed the screams of pain from the smug bourgeoisie). There was no poverty, on the other hand, and egalitarianism had gone so far that use of the polite, unfamiliar form of the word ‘you’, a feature of all continental languages, was abolished. There was an underside: 70,000 Lapps were sterilized, on the grounds that they were not worthy of reproduction, a practice continued into the 1970s. But the ‘Swedish model’ was not what the outside world thought it to be. The Lutheran Church (which organized the first strikes) had pushed for a corporate solution to labour problems: employers, State, unions. This had been very successful in the 1930s. But it then encountered problems: women entered the labour market, got divorced, and argued for an elaborate system of social welfare, which indeed developed, with very high taxes to match. The system coasted on for a while, and the great Swedish concerns exported as before, but it was on notice. The currency ran down, inflation mounted, and the country, most prosperous of places in the sixties, drifted down to seventeenth on the list by 1980; some trade unions deserted the system. The great architect of Swedish social democracy, Olof Palme, lost an election, and his party lost another one, more convincingly, a decade later. Palme himself was murdered, probably by a Kurd. As Andrew Brown writes, ‘You might say that he devoted his career… to ensuring that no Swede would ever need to experience the American combination of material poverty and boundless optimism, and that he succeeded so completely that… he left a country where no-one was poor and no-one had room for optimism.’ Finland was a more interesting place, her leaders considerably less keen on preaching morality to the rest of the world, as Swedes tended to do. At any rate, the ‘Swedish model’ was no longer of interest.
Versions of the internal inflationary problem had happened before, and there was even a sort of Ur-version of a cure. France had attempted this, with ‘austerity’ programmes that did not quite succeed until de Gaulle came in. Italy had carried it out in the later 1940s, in the teeth of a Communist Party. But the origin in modern times went back to Germany, after the First World War, when, at the end of 1923, a cross-party government just set up a new currency altogether, wiping out the national debt, rewarding people who had property, and expropriating the savings or earnings of people still dealing in the old currency. The programme meant a year or two of extreme discomfort, as the government cut back its spending, and although the established trade unions accepted it, it also meant unemployment for the hundreds of thousands, and latterly millions, who not only were not protected by them, but were actively excluded, because they offered cheap competition. In 1948 the Germans had pushed through a similar reform, but had had to do so under Allied occupation, and at a time when trade union power was greatly weakened by the millions of refugees willing to work for very low wages. Such reforms indeed amounted to a brutal business, but the rewards for the pain were clear enough, a year or so down the line. At bottom, that was what the monetarists in London and Washington were doing, and in 1981 there were indeed fears that civil peace might break down altogether.
Where the monetarists faced difficulties, which were never really resolved, was in the external aspect of inflation. In conditions of free trade and money movement, inflation could be imported. The German Bundesbank, with the lessons of 1923 and 1948 well within living memory, was naturally concerned to keep inflation down, and was independent, in so far as any central bank can be independent. On occasion it had arguments with governments, and on the whole it won them. However, whatever the Bundesbank did, it could not stop foreigners buying Marks, and increasing the domestic money supply; Germany, too, suffered inflation in the 1970s, though at a considerably lower rate than did England. Now, the British had acquired, of all oddities, a petro-currency. Oil had been found in the North Sea, and the rise in oil prices meant that it was worth exploiting, expensive and difficult as this clearly was. Foreign money therefore poured into the pound, and to London came Arabs, acquiring property. How did all of this affect the British money supply, and what should be done about it? The answer had to be in international co-operation among the first-rank countries, the G6 or, with Canada, G7. And since that in turn depended on monetary policy in each of these, they had to march in step. In the end, the contest of internal and external monetarism was won by the external side’s managers, when the price of the dollar was brought down very hard at the Plaza Agreement of 1985. There is a case to be made that that was the end of the Reagan-Thatcher experiment: thereafter it was back to business as usual. But in 1979 a determined effort was indeed made.
International co-operation was essential. The reform would have to come from Washington, and from Washington it duly came, though with some prodding from the German central banker Otmar Emminger. Paul Volcker, an austere and in private life heroic figure, was now presiding over the management of American public finance, and he was converted to monetarism, in effect by Emminger. On 6 October Volcker woke him up, at a meeting of the IMF in Belgrade, to say that American interest rates would be put up as far as necessary to stop the dollar slide. Carter, by now, was simply furniture, and the unheard of dollar interest rate, of almost 20 per cent, was introduced. That pushed the dollar up to over 3.3 Marks in the years 1980-85. This had very great international complications, some of them near disastrous: Latin America, debt-ridden, with interest to be paid out of native paper but in dollar terms, was in tremendous difficulty. The world’s exports even fell by 11.2 per cent in the years 1980-83, and overall there was no growth at all in the world economy. Such was the dark international context for Margaret Thatcher’s accession in May 1979. Reagan’s United States could somehow absorb interest rates at this level, because of a unique feature of the civilization: Americans moved, and expected to, from parts of the country that did not work to parts of the country that did. Besides, the bankruptcy laws were far easier than in England, and bankruptcy was almost par for the course. Foreign money moved to the USA in any case.