At this point, the various oil countries began to threaten even a form of nationalization — ‘participation’, i.e. a share of the oil resources previously covered by concessions. The companies resisted but were not supported by their own governments — the time for gunboats, or even covert operations of the type that had overthrown Mossadegh, was past, and the Americans relied on the Shah. In fact Libya went ahead with nationalization: Hammer was thrown out. It was upon this tense scene that the Israeli-Arab war (Yom Kippur) of October 1973 broke out.
Nasser himself had died in 1970. His successor, Anwar Sadat, was deeply cunning (and during the Second World War had had a minor role as a German spy against the British). It was now obvious that the Middle Eastern oil producers had a very strong case for raising the oil price. In real money, as against paper dollars, they were getting much less than before, and world demand was pushing hard against capacity. Nasser himself had left Egypt in a calamitous condition. He had detached it from the Western world, led it into a disastrous war with Israel in 1967 (with lesser campaigning thereafter) and, with ‘Arab socialism’, driven out the creative minority of Greeks and many of the Coptic Christians who had allowed trade to flourish. He had also taken up a Soviet alliance, and there were 20,000 Soviet citizens, including advisers, in the country; these advisers were often very robust in saying what they thought of Egyptian ways. In July 1972 Sadat had them expelled, though he continued the close relationship with Moscow. But how could he escape from it? If the USA supported Israel, then, given public opinion in the Arab world (which appeared to believe that everything wrong was the Jews’ fault), there was no chance. He must make the Americans force the Israelis to negotiate seriously as to a settlement of Arab-Israeli problems. How? The answer seemed to be, a war. Won, it would end the existence of Israel. Not won, but sufficiently alarming, it would force some movement. Maybe, talking to Kissinger, he realized that he had an equally devious possible partner. The game was in effect to use Soviet help to make any further Soviet connection unnecessary, and solve the Palestinian problem that bedevilled Israel’s relations with Egypt and so deprived Egypt of the link that she needed in order to become a rival to Iran. In the winter of 1972-3 Sadat came up with a scheme for a surprise attack on Israel, in concert with Syria, and told no-one except King Faisal in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudis had by now become the oil producer of reserve — that is, if they produced more of their potential, oil prices would fall, and if not, not. Earlier, that ‘switch’ position had been America’s. Faisal also approved of Sadat, whereas Nasser had been a threat to the monarchies — not a man to support. Religion, the sacred position of Mecca, the ancient glories of the caliphate, in many quarters a vainglorious belief that Arab civilization, so long despised as useless, would triumphantly return, white horses included, to down the infidel and particularly the Jewish enemy (Mohammed’s first target 1,400 years before, as it happened) — all of it really about those paper dollars. In mid-September 1973 OPEC met in Vienna and advanced a new deal with the oil companies, which were to lose their property substantially: an ultimatum followed. Then on 6 October the oil companies nervously offered a price rise of 15 per cent at Vienna; and OPEC demanded 100 per cent. That very day, Egyptian and Syrian troops had launched their surprise attack on the Israeli lines.
The Yom Kippur war had its origins in 1967, when Nasser had been humiliatingly defeated essentially in the first hours of that war. Before it Israel had seemed more or less indefensible, along the 1949 armistice line, but in 1967, with the West Bank and the Sinai, her territory had been rounded off and even Jerusalem was safe from Jordanian artillery. Meanwhile the Arabs had fought among themselves and King Hussein of Jordan only just survived attacks by the Syrians and Palestinians, who regarded him as a traitor: in 1967, thanks to having been let down by allies, he lost half his kingdom. But the 1967 war itself had twisted origins. There was, in the first place, Nasser’s extraordinary vainglory. The Suez affair had counted as a tremendous victory, a defeat for the traditional imperialist powers, Great Britain and France. That had been followed by Algerian independence from France in 1962, another triumph that Nasser was supposed to have inspired.
In 1960 he set himself up as leader of all Arabs, disposing of rivals or Western associates, if need be by murder. In 1960, accepting Soviet help, he had gone over to ‘socialism’, complete with concentration camps and a Five Year Plan, and took over land and businesses: he tried to corral the ulema. What kept the regime together was external aggrandizement as Nasser tried to take over the Yemen; there was constant vainglorious anti-Israeli rhetoric. Soviet arms and money gave him the wherewithaclass="underline" between 1954 and 1970 Egypt, Syria and Iraq received more than half of Soviet military assistance and Egypt alone got significant amounts of ground and air weapons. In 1967 he was caught on his own rhetoric: the Soviet Union provoked him into a war with Israel, suggesting that the Israelis were preparing an attack, and Nasser could hardly resist. A week before the war, at the end of May 1967, he trumpeted:
We are confronting Israel and the West as well — the West which created Israel and which despised us Arabs… They had no regard whatsoever for our feelings, our hopes in life or our rights… We are now ready to confront Israel… If the Western powers… ridicule and despise us, we Arabs must teach them to respect us.
This blustering led to a fiasco, the Six Day War, which, on 5 June, the Israelis won in about three hours, destroying 309 of 340 serviceable combat aircraft, including all the long-range Tu-16 bombers, twenty-seven Il-28 medium-range ones, twenty-seven Su-7 fighter bombers and 135 MiG fighters. Nasser’s successor, Sadat, had learned a lesson or two when, in October 1973, he launched the next round.
Here was to be another humiliation, or at least a serious reverse, for the Atlantic system. This time it was the Israelis’ turn to be vainglorious. The Egyptians struck in the midst of Israeli triumphalism. There had been a grandiose parade to mark the country’s twenty-fifth anniversary on 15 May 1973 and hardly anyone took the threats of the new Egyptian ruler, Sadat, seriously: the Suez Canal was guarded by prodigious fortifications. The Egyptian army now appointed educated men as officers, some of whom learned Hebrew; soon after the great defeat a Soviet delegation came to offer reconstruction, which took place in six months. Low-level warring went on, as did the usual failed peace processes; but Sadat now at least saw that he should take up links with the Americans, and in July 1972 asked the Soviet advisers to go. What Sadat really wanted was the involvement of the Americans, who could force Israel towards a deal. However, he needed some sort of victory in advance, and reckoned from the plain evidence in Vietnam that the USA would be pliable. Meanwhile, he could rely on some degree of Soviet support: the USSR was not going to let Egypt go. Port facilities would allow for transfer of resources from Russia, which sent the latest technology; and in any case the Russians were well into Syria, Egypt’s ally. In March 1973 shipment of SCUD missiles (with a range of 180 miles) began. Sadat then conspired with Hafiz Assad in Syria, with whom he had nothing in common, and got finance from the Saudis; with the Soviet help, he did bring off the initial victory, and became the ‘Hero of the Crossing’.