Prior to D-Day, the coastal defenses were usually at a routine alert level. For a typical infantry division, only about a third of its troops were actually assigned positions in the coastal defenses, with the artillery and support personnel stationed away from the coast. In theory, all troops assigned to the coastal defenses were supposed to be permanently stationed within the strongpoints. In reality, most of the sites except for high-priority areas such as Pas-de-Calais were far behind schedule in constructing sufficient personnel bunkers for the entire garrison. As a result, troops in the infantry battalions allotted to the coast defenses were often garrisoned a short distance from the strongpoints depending on the availability of houses or public buildings that had been requisitioned for barracks. Only a portion of the infantry battalions were assigned to guard duty along the coast at any one time. A typical platoon strongpoint (Wiederstandnest), which would be allotted about 30–40 troops at full alert, would typically have personnel bunkers to accommodate only about half this force, or about 20 men, on a routine basis for guard duties. These personnel bunkers were cramped, poorly ventilated, cold and dank. As the possibility for the Allied invasion increased, alerts increased as well. After April 1944, strongpoints tended to be manned at higher levels and, by late May 1944, most strongpoints along the English Channel were on full alert.
The French Schneider 105mm K331(f) gun was used with at least 37 batteries in the Atlantic Wall defenses in a modified version with a partial armored shield to help cover the embrasure opening. This example is in an H650 casemate, part of HKB Azeville of 2./HKAR 1261, on the Cotentin Peninsula. (NARA)
This 75mm enfilade casemate on the Cotentin coast north of Utah Beach has been camouflaged to resemble a house by erecting a false roof over the structure. This particular casemate was built into an anti-tank wall built to prevent easy access off the relatively flat beach, a common type of obstacle on the Atlantic Wall. (NARA)
In general, the strongpoints were guarded from the defensive positions since they were positioned to overlook the beach. Foot patrols would be conducted at night, but in a restricted pattern due to the extensive use of minefields. In the strongpoints, officers were supposed to dress according to combat conditions, meaning no distinctive insignia or accoutrements such as map cases; in practice this was often ignored until alerts were issued in the spring of 1944.
The work routine changed abruptly in early 1944 due to the need to accelerate construction, Rommel’s insistence on additional shore defenses and the growing difficulty of obtaining labor to conduct construction projects. As a result, most infantry divisions were assigned to conduct their own construction work, usually at the expense of tactical training. Memoirs by German troops from this period recall grueling days of work along the coast implanting beach obstacles, digging trenches, assisting in construction work and improving site camouflage. As mentioned earlier, in 1943 the static divisions underwent a dilution program, substituting roughly one battalion in three with Ost battalions of Soviet prisoners-of-war. In practice, most German commanders were skeptical of the combat value of these troops and, where possible, the battalions were spread out among German units to ensure their dependability.
Army coastal artillery battalions were generally recruited from older age classes not suitable for front-line service and the officers were usually former reserve officers from World War I recalled to duty. These units devoted more time to training than in typical infantry units assigned to coast defense since the rule was that personnel had to be familiar with at least two types of artillery piece. In addition, redundant training was also standard, for example infantry training for guard duty and site defense combined with training as a signals operator; forward observer training as well as unit supply clerk training. This was done both to allow the unit to function even in the event of combat casualties and because the coastal batteries tended to operate below normal tables with minimal personnel.
R621 Gruppenstand
The R621 personnel bunker was the single most common type of bunker on the Atlantic Wall with over 1,000 built along the French coast along with the related R501 type. The R621 was designed for a single “group,” meaning 10 soldiers. Construction of this type began in January 1943 and each example required 485m³ of concrete, 23 tonnes of steel reinforcing bar and 3.7 tonnes of other steel. The design was Standard B with walls 2m thick. On flat ground, the bunker was buried flush with the ground, with access to the front entryways via a trench in front of the bunker. Along the coast, it was a common practice to build the bunker into the reverse side of coastal dunes with the front away from the sea. In such a case, a berm or wall was constructed to protect the doors from direct fire. Like most German personnel shelters, the R621 was designed to be gas-proof with a closed ventilation system and associated filters.
Access to the bunker was through a pair of entryways, each guarded by a firing slit from the interior chamber. The entryways both led through armored doors into a center gas lock intended for the soldiers to decontaminate themselves before entering the main room through another armored door. The main room was rather small, 5.8 by 3.5m, and contained three rows of suspended cots three high along the rear wall. Accommodation was spartan, usually a table and chair in the center, a small wood stove, and some form of storage for the troop’s weapons and equipment. The R621 usually included a tobruk firing pit at one end with access from the exterior. There were a number of modifications of this design including the R621a with a pair of tobruk firing pits on either end. The R621 was part of a family of similar personnel shelters, the related R622 Doppelgruppenstand being nearly identical in appearance except that it was large enough for two adjacent rooms to accommodate two groups (20 men). The R621 can be distinguished from the R622 in that it usually had four circular ventilation covers between the two entryways while the R622 had six. These two types of bunkers made up nearly a third of all bombproof fortifications built for the army along the Atlantic Wall. (Artwork by Chris Taylor)
The R621 personnel bunker has a tobruk machine-gun pit on one side for observation and defense. This particular type of bunker was the most common type along the Atlantic Wall in France with over 1,000 built including the related R501. This one is part of StP Düsseldorf on the eastern slope of Cap Blanc-Nez, overlooking Sangatte and the Eurotunnel to the right. (Author’s collection)
The perspective of a German soldier manning an observation bunker facing an Atlantic beach from a bunker in the Fifteenth Army east of Dunkirk. The beach obstacles are a mixture of wooden Hemmbalk and tetrahedrons. (NAC P116749 Ken Bell)
In general, the naval coastal batteries enjoyed a somewhat better personnel situation than the army, especially in the years prior to 1943. However, the Kriegsmarine was subjected to the same personnel difficulties after 1943 and, as a result, the average age of the gunnery personnel along the Atlantic Wall continued to increase. In addition, personnel shortages led to the imposition of emergency war strength tables to the batteries, meaning ten percent under the nominal tables. While this didn’t adversely affect the gun teams, it reduced the ability of the coastal batteries to conduct site defense and frequently forced the navy gun batteries to ask for the assistance of neighboring army units to help conduct defense of the battery strongpoints. As a result, some naval coastal battery strongpoints had a mixture of navy and army personnel. In spite of these problems, the coastal batteries tended to have far better troops than other naval defense units along the Atlantic Wall such as the harbor companies, alarm companies or marine battalions. The naval coastal batteries had higher priority than many army defenses on the Atlantic Wall and so tended to have a more complete complement of personnel bunkers, adequate to house the entire battery. Each battery had a strength of 60–90 troops depending on the type and number of guns.