By July 36 Octavian was able to launch a triple-pronged attack on Sextus in Sicily. He would attack from the north and Statilius Taurus from the east; Lepidus would attack the western coast. The plan was good. The campaign itself was to show how difficult Sextus would find it to stretch his forces to meet several threats. But Octavian's forces were beset by storms; so many ships were lost that there were thoughts of delaying the campaign to 35. At first only Lepidus managed to land in strength, and he laid Sextus' lieutenant L. Plinius Rufus under siege in
Lilybaeum. In the east there were naval battles, with first Agrippa successful off Mylae, then Sextus defeating Octavian himself off Tauro- menium. Sextus' victory was more emphatic than Agrippa's, but at least Octavian established bridgeheads both by Cape Tyndaris and near Tauromenium: Sextus' resistance on land was surprisingly half-hearted, particularly at Tauromenium.167 Octavian soon had twenty-one legions on the island,168 besides Lepidus' army; Sextus had only ten.169 He was soon hemmed into the island's north-east corner, a triangle bounded by Mylae and Tauromenium, and Mylae itself fell soon afterwards. And now even Lepidus himself was approaching, rather tardily. His part in the whole campaign is indeed enigmatically lackadaisicaclass="underline" it is odd that he did not move eastwards earlier - that was clearly where he was needed, and perhaps expected.170 The sequel was to show him dissatisfied with his subordinate role. Was he perhaps content to let Octavian and Sextus weaken one another in the east, hoping by a last minute arrival to claim the authority he felt he deserved? The events of 44/3 had shown his capacity to bide his time before a decisive change of front.171 If Octavian distrusted him, it was not without reason.172
Sextus' last hope was to pit everything on a battle at sea. Perhaps unwisely, Octavian accepted battle (there was possibly even a formal challenge and acceptance, agreeing time, place and numbers):173 but the risk came off. The battle was fought off Naulochus (3 September 36), with 300 ships on either side. Agrippa, not Octavian, took command. By now brawn rather than skill was dominant in naval warfare, and Agrippa's heavier ships and more sophisticated grappling equipment carried the day. Only seventeen of Sextus' ships escaped. Sextus himself fled: his only slender hope lay with Antony in the East.
His land forces came over to Octavian with little demur. Plinius Rufus had moved eastwards to Messana, presumably following Lepidus. By now he had command of a large portion of Sextus' army, comprising eight legions.174 It was clear that they would surrender: but to whom? Agrippa and Lepidus appeared before the city: Agrippa insisted that they wait for Octavian, but Lepidus overrode him. His forces indeed linked with those of Plinius, and together they sacked Messina. Lepidus now seemed in control of the combined force, some twenty-two legions. He had not been so powerful for years. Now if ever was the time to assert
147 App. BCiv. v.i 10.457-9, Gabba 1970 (в 5 5) adloc.
168 App. BCiv. v.i 16.481; Brunt 1971 (a 9) 498. 169 Brunt 1971 (a 9) 499-500.
170 App. BCiv. v.io}.427 with Gabba 1970 (в 55) ad loc. 171 Cf. САН ix2 471, 482.4.
Dio xlix. 8.3-4 even suggests that Lepidus was in secret league with Sextus, and that Octavian suspected as much (cf. xlix. 1.4). That is implausible, and probably influenced both by Octavian's propaganda and by Dio's tendency to guess at motivation; but some distrust is possible enough.
App. BCiv. v.i 16.489 with Gabba 1970 (в j 5) ad loc.; cf. Gabba 1977 (C94).
App. BCiv. v. 122.505 with Gabba 1970(8 55) ad loc.
himself, to show how unfairly he had been excluded from all those diplomatic dealings at Brundisium, Misenum and Tarentum. He laid claim to all Sicily, though he magnanimously offered to exchange Sicily and Africa for all his former portion, Narbonensis and Nearer and Further Spain.175 At first Octavian's friends remonstrated gently, then Octavian himself more fiercely; Lepidus was adamant. The legions were unamused. But the delusion could not last. Octavian entered his camp, almost unaccompanied — though there was a sizeable force of cavalry just outside. The troops at least knew where the balance of power lay: with only a little scuffling, they joined Octavian. Lepidus was allowed to keep his property and his life, and he even remained pontifex maximus. But Octavian stripped him of membership of the triumvirate and his provincial command.176 There were no thoughts of consulting Antony first. Octavian took over Africa and Sicily into his own domain. Lepidus retired into exile and anonymity.
That effectively concluded the elimination of Sextus and Lepidus. Antony and Octavian remained; and Antony was beginning to look a little tattered.
IX. 35-33 B.C.
Politics now looked simpler: the reckoning would surely come, and we might expect Antony and Octavian to spend the next few years in preparation. But it was not quite like that. Octavian, it is true, seems to have seen the future clearly enough. He soon intensified his battle to win Italian public opinion, with fierce propaganda against Cleopatra and Antony; he may even have been in contact with Antony's enemy Artavasdes of Armenia (unless that charge is simply a fiction of Antony's propaganda);177 and he was soon battle-hardening his troops in Illyri- cum, suggestively close to the dividing-line with Antony's dominion. But Antony was slow to respond. He may have talked of joining Octavian in an Illyrian campaign178 — in self-defence, that would have been no bad ploy, if it were practicable: but really his focus lay on the East - indeed, on the Jar East, and for several years he was preoccupied with vengeance on the perfidious Armenian king Artavasdes. Of course an Armenian success would do something to mend the shame of the Parthian debacle, but in Roman eyes Armenia lacked the glamour of Parthia; a new Alexander should be more glorious than that, and Armenia could only be the beginning; but a clearer-sighted man would have realized that now Parthia itself was a lost cause. With Octavian preparing in the West, there simply would not be time for the years a
"5 Cf. САН ix2 4g6. 176 MRR II 400.
177 Dio xux.14.6. 178 App. BCiv. v.132.549.
second Parthian invasion would demand. Yet in 3 } nearly all Antony's legions were still in the extreme east of his domain; only then, very slowly, did they begin the long march west. War with Octavian was scarcely foremost in Antony's mind. Perhaps he was peaceable, content by now to share the world; perhaps he was simply naive. But it is clear which of the two was seeking the breach, and which had his thoughts elsewhere.