preparation: 32 b.c.
Domitius Ahenobarbus — not merely Antonians but peculiarly impressive ones, particularly Domitius with his record of republican political commitment and all the weight of an ancient family. Nor was he the only old republican to prefer Antony to Octavian. So did Cato's grandson, L. Calpurnius Bibulus, and there were others too.255 Not that the issue would be decided simply by the credentials of one's Roman followers. It would depend on martial strength: and Antony's army and Antony himself were infinitely more formidable a force than anything Octavian had yet confronted. In retrospect, we too readily think of Octavian as already marked out for victory. History may have been on his side, but many of the crucial factors were not. Since 37 Octavian had certainly done much to redress the odds, which till then had heavily favoured Antony: Octavian's politics had been much the shrewder, his campaigns the more triumphant; his supporters increasingly included persons of family and achievement.256 But to a measured observer those odds were still on Antony.
The pleasantries soon started. The consuls were armed with a dispatch from Antony, recounting his acta and asking for ratification — something he did not legally need,257 but knew it was tactful to seek; it may also have included some further offer to lay down the triumvirate.258 True, in January little was heard of all this; the experienced Domitius held the fasces, and thought some of the acta better suppressed. But on 1 February259 Sosius took over the fasces and launched a public attack on Octavian. Most interestingly, his motion of censure was vetoed by a tribune: the institutions of the Republic might seem alive once more. If that suggests that the motion would otherwise have passed, it is eloquent testimony for the degree of senatorial sympathy Antony still enjoyed. But the inference is precarious. The motion was an extreme step; if Sosius had doubted whether it would pass, a prearranged veto would have been a shrewd device.
For the moment, Octavian himself was sensibly absent from the city. But a few weeks later he responded with a show of force in the Senate: he was surrounded by an armed guard, and, whatever his legal status, he took his seat on a chair of state between the consuls. Rome was accustomed to violent displays, but this was not the sort of tradition that Octavian wished to be seen reviving; still, it was immediately effective, for the consuls fled to Antony. Many senators, possibly several
255 Syme 1959 (a 93) 222, 239, 266—70, 282; Syme 1986 (a 95) 206-7, 264.
г» Syme 1939 (a 93) 234-42.
All the triumviral acts had already been ratified in advance: cf. above, p. 20 with n.80.
Cf. p. 41 and n. 210.
49
Cf. Gray 1975 (c 102) 17; Reinhold 1988 (в i jo) on Dio L.2.3. For the alternative view, that Sosius launched an attack on 1 January, cf. Fadinger 1969 (в 42) 19; n.i.
hundred,[142] accompanied them. Antony organized them into a 'counter- senate', reflecting his claim that the constitution was on his side. In the presence of the consuls, driven out by arrant force, the claim was not ridiculous. But their flight left Italy an open field for the completion of Octavian's propaganda, and his final transformation of a selfish war into a national crusade. It was a travesty, of course. The consuls might after all have been more useful in Rome itself, providing a visible reminder that there was more to Antony's side than eastern effeminacy.
They found Antony in Ephesus,[143] organizing the transport of his troops to Greece. It was a massive task. His army was eventually more than 100,000 strong, at least as large as for the Parthian campaign.[144] He had clearly been recruiting in the East, presumably both native orientals and resident Italians.[145] His fleet numbered 800, nearly 300 of them transports;[146] but that was surely not enough to carry the whole army, and they must have crossed the Aegean in several waves. Shortly Antony and his staff moved to Samos. As usual on campaign, there was time to kilclass="underline" Cleopatra and Antony characteristically did so in style. The festivities became famous.[147] They also, of course, afforded a further diet for Octavian to feed his public.
Antony also faced a more serious choice. It still seemed likely that the campaign would start before the end of 32. Should Cleopatra stay for it, or should she return to Egypt? Domitius Ahenobarbus and others urged Antony to send her away, Canidius Crassus said she should remain — so the story went, and probably it was more than a story, for Domitius had just been in Rome and knew what Octavian was making of Cleopatra there. Other experienced politicians, including Plancus, clearly took the same view. Equally Canidius, soon to command the land-army, would naturally stress the importance of Cleopatra's military aid — at least 200 ships (presumably including crews), and vast financial support as well.[148]It was not at all an easy choice, for there was also the question of the troops' and allies' morale. Just as Octavian encouraged Italians to see the war as a crusade against the East, so many easterners surely saw it as a chance to avenge themselves on Rome.267 Such men would fight for their queen, not for a Roman general. Cleopatra had to stay.
By early summer the slow western journey had reached Athens.268 The time was coming for decisiveness, and Antony sent a note of divorce to Octavia. Perhaps he had little choice. When war came, it was inconceivable that Octavia could remain his wife, demurely tending the house and family of a public enemy (for such he would very likely be declared). Octavian had, it seems, been publicly urging his sister to divorce her lecherous and unfaithful husband for some time;269 Octavia would hardly continue to refuse. At Athens the prospect was already the subject for public jokes.270 One could already foresee the grave and sorrowful speech where Octavia announced her decision — a moving and elegant culmination for her brother's propaganda. Far better for Antony to initiate the matter himself; far better to get it over with now.
Octavia had to be dismissed, Cleopatra had to stay. Both steps made sense; but both were hard decisions, which fuelled Octavian's attacks and alienated valuable Italian support. In earlier days, with Pompey and with Brutus and Cassius, the better cause had managed to draw on eastern support without losing its solid Roman respectability. This was different. Even to Antony's most valued captains, Octavian's derision might seem to have a core of truth. The womenfolk symbolized something deeper. Antony didlook more like a champion of the East, an uncomfortable figurehead. Opinions might differ on what to do about it. The most influential figure was Domitius, by now it seems leader of a sort of 'Roman party'.271 He confined himself to public rudeness to Cleopatra:272 that was harmless enough. Others were more decisive. Plancus was Antony's most senior consular;273 Titius, Plancus' nephew and the slayer of Sextus, was consul designate.274 It was about now275 that both fled to Octavian, who was doubtless delighted: with every Roman who transferred allegiance, especially men as distinguished as this, the lines of East and West became more plain. Still, Plancus and Titius as yet had no followers, or none of which we hear. Antony's men might be troubled, but most stayed firm.
Plancus derided Antony in the Senate; not everyone was impressed,276 and a more sensational ploy was needed. The two renegades suggested that Antony's will, which rested with the Vestal Virgins, might repay study. It was illegal, as it happened, to open the will of a living man; no matter — Octavian opened it, alone and unsupervised.277 Its provisions were extraordinary: when Antony died he was to be buried in Alexandria; Caesarion was recognized as Caesar's son (though it is hard to say why this quite fitted in Antony's will); vast gifts were to be made to the children borne by Cleopatra to Antony. It was all exactly what Octavian might have wished for. Why, he might almost have written it himself. Perhaps indeed he did, at least in part:278 the Vestals would not know the will's contents, and Octavian could claim what he wished. And he was skilful enough to allege provisions which Antony, eager to retain his eastern support, would find as uncomfortable to deny as to admit.