Even Antony's preparations, worryingly massive as they were, could be turned to account. Perhaps by early August, his force was on the west coast of Greece.279 Was he intending to invade Italy, the natural climax of such treachery to Rome?280 That was desperately unlikely, in fact. Octavian firmly held Tarentum and Brundisium, the two great harbours of southern Italy, and it would be no easy matter for Antony to transport large quantities of troops in several waves and land them on hostile beaches.281 Roman civil wars were always fought in Greece, for precisely this reason: it was natural for one side to flee to exploit the resources of the East, but then virtually impossible to force a passage back to a defended Italy.
Still, the Italian public were not strategists. They feared what they were told to fear. Evidently they needed a champion, and it could only be Octavian; but his status was still uncertain. He was no longer calling himself triumvir (Antony, incidentally, had no such compunctions);282 though it would be hard to doubt that Octavian retained his vast provincial imperium, he wanted something more, something which would clearly justify him as the defender of Rome and its traditions, and
Cf. the cutting remark of one Coponius, Veil. Pat.11.83.).
Just as, alone and unsupervised in a temple, he found equally convenient material a few years later: the truth (so he claimed) about the consular status of old Cornelius Cossus. Cf. Livy 1v.20.5-11 with Ogilvie 196; (в ijj ) ad loc. and below, ch. 2 p. 80.
Cf. e.g. Syme 1939 (a 93) 282 n.i; Crook 1957 (c 68) 36-8; contra, Johnson 1978 (c 128); Wallmann 1989 (c 243) 310—13. 279 Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 57.
Cf. Livy, Per. 132; Dio l.9.2; Veil. Pat. 11.82.4; Plut. Ant. 58.1-3 with Pelling 1988 (в 138) ad be.
Cf. Plut. Ant. 62.3; Hermocrates at Thuc. vi.34.5. The strategic position is set out masterfully by Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 57-67- 282 MRR 11 417-18, cf. RRC 545-6.
render this the most moral of civil wars. The propertied classes of Italy came to his rescue. For much of summer 3 2 he was organizing an oath to follow his personal leadership:283 it was to be taken throughout Italy, and indeed all the western provinces (that probably meant little more than the Roman citizens in each).
Of its own free will, all Italy swore allegiance to me, and demanded me as its general for the war I won at Actium; the Gallic and Spanish provinces, Africa, Sicily and Sardinia took the same oath. (Rm Gestae 25.2)
The oath did nothing to improve Octavian's legal status, but its moral implications were extraordinary. It was taken to him personally. There were a few civilian precedents,284 but the nearest analogies were in fact military, the oath taken by soldiers to their generaclass="underline" and it was appropriate that Italy and the provinces were 'demanding Octavian as their general' for the war. Besides the backing it gave Octavian, this was also one way of preparing Italy psychologically for conflict. There were doubtless others too - for instance, the Res Gestae passage goes on to speak of more than 700 senators 'serving under Octavian's colours',285 and such language probably goes back to the events themselves. Of course, there had been appeals to consensus Italiae, the united sentiment of all Italy, many times before.286 Now, as usual, the public's feelings were doubtless more complex. For one thing, Italy was growling at Octavian's new financial exactions, severe even by the standards of the last twenty years.287 And it would be naive to think that the oath was wholly voluntary. Some communities were indeed 'excused' from taking it, for instance Antony's own veteran colonies.288 Still, the claim of harmony was not mere hypocrisy. A great many senators, for instance, seem to have come over to Octavian during these final stages;289 and it seems likely that only a few of Antony's colonists exploited Octavian's dispensation.290 In 40 the veterans had refused to fight one another, but this time it would be different. At last, Italy was almost solid for Octavian.
Cf. esp. von Premerstein 1957 (a 74) and, briefly, Brunt and Moore 1967 (в 2t;)on RG 25.2; Syme 1939 (a 93) 284-92; Herrmann 1968 (c 117) 78-89; Linderski 1984 (c 164); Girardet 1990 (c 97) 345—50. The evidence for the oath's dating is set out by von Premerstein 1937 (a 74) 41; Syme 1939 (a 93) 284-5 suggests, probably rightly, that the Italian cities took the oath not simultaneously but in sequence.
Von Premerstein 1937 (a 74) 27-36; for important qualifications, Herrmann 1968 (c 117) 50-89.
RG 25.3, cf. n.260 above. The phrase is often taken to imply that all the senators accompanied Octavian on his campaign: that need not follow. 286 Syme 1939 (a 93) 285-6.
2,7 Plut. Ant. 58.2; Dio l. 10.4-5, '6-3, 20.3, liii.2.3; Pliny, HNxxxvti.io; cf. Syme 1939 (a 93) 284; Nicolet 1976 (d 104) 95; Yavetz 1969 (a i 10) 25-6.
Especially Bononia, Suet. Aug. 17.2; but it seems that even here Octavian made attempts to win them over (Dio l.6.3).
Cf. Wallmann 1976 (c 242). »0 Dio l.6.3, cf- li.4.6 with Keppie 1983 (e 65) 76.
The time for action was approaching, though the summer was wearing on, and it did not now look as if the decision would be reached this year. That was in Octavian's interests, in fact: Antony had his vast army ready, backed by all the wealth of the East; Octavian's treasury was worryingly empty.291 But Octavian's political preparations, at least, were almost complete, and in late summer he could declare war. That too should be done in the right style. War was declared on Cleopatra alone: she after all was the real enemy. And it was declared in the most Roman of fashions: Octavian disinterred, perhaps even fabricated, an ancient fetial rite — a picturesque affair of casting a spear into a symbolically hostile patch of land.292 Not of. course that Antony was ignored: he was stripped of the consulship he was to hold the next year, and also of 'the rest of his power'293 — presumably the triumvirate which he was still claiming and, on one possible view, he still held. But he was not yet declared a public enemy. The moment for that would soon come.294 For Antony would surely stand by Cleopatra: and then, would he not be a self-confessed enemy of Rome?
XI. ACTiим, 31 B.C.
During winter 32/1 Antony's force stood ready in Greece. His main fleet was in the harbour of Actium; but Greece's western coast is pitted by natural harbours, and it was best to defend them all. Pockets of ships were distributed fairly widely - in Methone, for instance, Leucas, Corcyra, Taenarum and probably Corinth.295 Antony himself wintered in Patrae, with yet another contingent of ships and men. The next summer would clearly see the critical campaign, and he could still be sanguine. True, Italy was lost, and lost more conclusively than he would have hoped; that was disappointing. But he could reasonably reflect that, once Octavian had survived the buffeting of the Perusine War, he would always have the advantage there. In Italy Octavian was the man in possession: far less adept politicians would have been able to capitalize on that. Anyway, the politics were virtually over. Antony might still go through the motions of offering to resign the triumvirate, after he had won his victory (as he now had to specify): two months later, or possibly six.296 It all hardly mattered now.