Cf. p. 5 3 and n. 287.
DioL.4.4-5 with Reinhold 1988 (в i jo);cf. Livy, 1.3 2.4 with Ogilvie 196) (в ad be.; Rich 1976 (a 81) 56-7, ioj-6; Wiedemann 1986 (f 237).
rf/v aAAr/v tЈovoiav vaaav, Dio L.4.3 with Reinhold 1988(8 150) ad be.; cf. Plut. Ant. 60.1.
Antony certainly was declared a bottis at some point (App. BCiv. iv.4 j. 193, cf. iv.38.161; Suet. Aug. 17.2): probably later in 32 or in early 31 rather than after Actium, as Fadinger 1969(842) 2435 2 argues.
Cf. Dio l.11-13; Oros. vi. 19.6-7; Strab. viii.4.1-4 (359Q; Veil. Pat. 11.84.1, Plut. Ant. 67.5; Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 60. 256 Dio L.7.1-2.
In military terms Antony still looked ahead. He had been unable to recruit in Italy, but not all orientals were weaklings, and his forces were probably the larger, possibly 100,000 infantry against Octavian's 80,000. The cavalry was equally matched, but Antony's fleet of 500 men-of-war was more numerous than Octavian's and - almost as important — his were the larger ships.[149] The way naval battles were now fought, bulk was likely to count; certainly, it had counted at Naulochus. Antony's side was also the wealthier. Octavian's exactions had doubtless done something to replenish his treasury, but he could still hardly compete: for one thing, he had already had to give his troops a precautionary donative.[150]Last of all, there was Antony himself, still surely more effective a general than Octavian despite those Illyrian victories. Antony knew how little those meant. True, he must have heard impressive things of Agrippa, who was still virtually untried when last Antony was in the West; he might prove a worthier adversary. But, everything considered, Antony still looked to be the winner.
It was clear what his strategy should be. Invading Italy was not an option, for sound military reasons.[151] Antony would have to wait for Octavian to come to him, just as Pompey had waited in 49—48; and, again like Pompey, he would hope to harass Octavian's fleet during the crossing, when the ships would be terribly cumbersome, with cavalry, legionaries and baggage on board. Even if they could land, they might find it hard to support themselves if Antony could maintain his expected superiority at sea. The lesson of 48 was again there to be learnt, when Caesar had certainly found it very difficult to establish himself with sufficient numbers of troops.[152] It might still be disconcerting that Pompey had finally lost, and then in the next civil war the eastern side had lost again; but Antony could still reflect that Pompey should really have won at Dyrrhachium, while Brutus and Cassius had fought their battle too far east.[153] The eastern side should strategically be the stronger. Sulla was the more telling precedent.
Once again, it all went wrong.[154] The danger in Antony's position was simply the necessity to divide his army and fleet among so many harbours. These various forces could reasonably be expected to reinforce one another if threatened; besides, the main force at Actium could be expected to harry any invasion fleet as it sailed down the Adriatic, if any target further south were chosen for its landing. But Agrippa was too quick. Surprisingly early in the } i season, he struck with an advance force and took Methone, then launched surprise attacks elsewhere on the coast, even as far north as Corcyra. Meanwhile Octavian himself managed to cross, surprisingly unimpeded, to the mainland north of Corcyra; within a few days he had reached Actium, and occupied the tactical strongpoint in the area, the hill of Mikalitzi. Soon Octavian had linked his camp by earthworks to the harbour of Gomaros. We do not even hear of any resistance, which is astounding. Perhaps there were operations which our sources omit, perhaps the Actium land-force had been called away to meet one of Agrippa's sudden threats elsewhere. Anyway, the first tricks had fallen to Octavian, and they turned out to be decisive.
Antony soon arrived himself from Patrae, and pitched camp near Punta on the southern coast of the bay. Octavian naturally tried to bring him to battle before he could concentrate the rest of his fleet or army; Antony naturally declined. When his troops arrived from their various stations, Antony established a new camp on the northern side of the straits, near Preveza. Only the plain of Nicopolis now separated the two armies, but it was Octavian who refused a land-battle. Antony tried strenuously to cut Octavian off from the river Louros in his rear, vital to his water supply, and there was clearly a series of cavalry battles in the northern plain: the most substantial was won by Statilius Taurus and the renegade Titius, by now one of Octavian's commanders. Then, once again, a contribution of Agrippa was crucial. His fleet took the island of Leucas, just south west of the mouth of the harbour; this afforded Octavian a safer anchorage than Gomaros, and made it difficult for Antony's other scattered ships to reinforce him. A little later Agrippa also took Patrae, where there were still ships, and Corinth. Antony was now under virtual blockade.
The analogy with 48 must again have been felt. This was Dyrrha- chium over again, but the roles were strangely reversed: it was now the eastern force under Antony which, like Caesar then, was cut off on the coast by a stronger army and fleet. Antony naturally thought of breaking out to the interior of Greece: that was what Caesar had done, and had gone on to win at Pharsalus. Octavian had already sent his own men into Greece and Macedonia, while Antony sent Dellius and Amyntas into Macedonia and Thrace303 - to seek mercenaries, according to our source Dio, but probably their brief was a wider one. Soon Antony himself set out to overtake them. While he was away Sosius tried to break out at sea, but was beaten by Agrippa. On his return Antony lost another cavalry battle. By now it looked very bleak. Allied kings had been killed - Bogud of Mauretania at Methone, Tarcondimotus304 with Sosius. Others were
303 Dio l. 15.4. 304 See above, p. 29.
defecting. Deiotarus Philadelphus of Paphlagonia had gone to Octavian some time since, and at some point he was joined by Rhoemetalces of Thrace;[155] now the much more valuable Amyntas went too. That was cheering to Horace,[156] and doubtless to Octavian too. Antony's position was becoming desperate. Provisions were failing: disease was rife - particularly, perhaps, malaria and dysentery, worsened by the shortage of supplies and water. Antony had no option but to withdraw all his troops to the southern bank, but that is even more waterless than the north, and the deaths went on.
Romans too were defecting. The most dispiriting was that of Domitius Ahenobarbus, already mortally ill. Dellius too, notorious for picking the right moment to change sides, realized that it was now: with him he took Antony's battle-plans. Not that they were hard to divine. The break-out to the interior was a serious option, and it seems to have been urged by the land-commander Canidius Crassus. But it would have meant abandoning the fleet; and even if the army could break out to Thessaly, even if Octavian obliged by offering battle there rather than relying on attrition, Antony's army was so wasted by disease that it would barely be able to fight. Realistically, the battle had to be fought at sea. Later romantic fiction would represent this as a crazed decision, influenced by Cleopatra:[157] but that is absurd. Antony had already done all he could on land; only now, in late summer, did he decide that a naval battle was the only option left.[158]