At the outset of the campaign Antony's fleet had outnumbered Octavian's, but Agrippa had destroyed some of his squadrons, while others had been unable to force their way through to join the Actium fleet. And there was a manning problem as well, for death and desertion had reduced Antony's numbers considerably. By now he had no hope at all of matching Octavian's numbers: otherwise, indeed, he would have forced on the sea-battle earlier. He eventually put to sea with perhaps 200 or 250 ships, while Octavian had 400 or more.[159] Antony simply burnt the remainder of his ships: better that than to allow them to fall into Octavian's hands.
Antony's chances of victory were evidently very poor. The most he could realistically hope for was to break out with as many ships and men as possible, and this seems to have been in his mind from the beginning: he shipped his treasure-chest, for instance, an extraordinary thing to do unless he was planning flight; he also gave orders to carry sails, which was most unusual for an ancient battle. He could keep his mind a little open, perhaps: he knew he could not break out without a fight, sea- battles were often unpredictable, and if things went surprisingly well then of course he would try to fight it out to the end. The weather might even be rough - it had been for the last few days before the battle - and that might add some further unpredictability: his galleons might better survive a buffeting than Octavian's slightly lighter ships. Still, the chance of a break-out in force was always the more likely option. He may not have told too many of his own troops: it would of course be highly damaging to morale, for most of them would have to be left to the victor's mercy. One need not doubt their surprise and dismay when, in mid-battle, they realized the truth.310 But his own mind must have been clear enough. He must also have known that the break-out was not going to be easy. Outflanking Octavian's superior numbers would be impossible, and the only way was to drive a wedge through the centre. Even if that could be done, a flight southwards involved a technical difficulty. The island of Leucas juts out just south of Actium, and with prevailing winds from the west and north west it would be hard to clear it under sail.311 The best hope was to join the battle as far out to sea as he could (Octavian would in fact be unlikely to resist this, for he too would want open waters to exploit his superior numbers and manoeuvrability); and if possible to delay it till the afternoon, when the wind typically veers from west to west-north-west.
That indeed is exactly what happened. On the morning of 2 September 31, Antony's fleet took up its station outside the harbour mouth. Cleopatra's squadron of sixty ships rested behind his centre, ready (it seems) for a concentrated strike on any weak point in Octavian's line - a sort of maritime Panzer-tactic, in fact. Octavian's much longer line moved to hem them in. Then, most eerily, for hours nothing happened. Antony was waiting for afternoon; Octavian would be content to wait much longer, for it was Antony, not he, who needed to break the blockade by battle. Around midday there was at last some movement of both fleets to seaward; but still, no real action. The first decisive move came in early afternoon, for both northern wings — Antony's right and Octavian's left under Agrippa — began to drift further north. It is not clear who started it. Perhaps it was Agrippa, as our principal source Plutarch suggests: now that both fleets were in more open sea, he could reasonably begin an outflanking move. More likely it was Antony, trying to entice Octavian into leaving a critical gap in the centre of his line. Anyway, gaps began to open, at least in Antony's line and perhaps
3,0 Memorably described by Plut. Ant. 66.6-8. зп Carter 1970 (c 51) 215-27.
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in Octavian's too. Cleopatra's squadron seized the moment: she hoisted sail and bore down on the enemy. It is hard to say which side was the more startled. The squadron forced its way through, perhaps surprisingly easily;312 Antony himself moved from his massive flagship to a quinquereme and followed. So did others, but perhaps not very many. It is hard to think that even a hundred ships escaped; these had some legionaries on board, perhaps one hundred apiece — but the bulk of the fleet, and over three-quarters of the army, remained.
Once Antony and Cleopatra had sailed away, the rest of their fleet saw little point in the battle. Some galleons made their way back to the harbour in a peculiarly undignified way, backing water in a halting crablike movement to port.313 There was perhaps a little fighting, but nothing very fierce. The whole battle produced only 5,000 casualties, an amazingly small number by the standards of a sea-battle. Octavian did his best to make it a little more spectacular: a few ships were fired;314 and he took the ostentatious precaution of spending the night on board ship.
But it was hard to disguise the truth. The Battle of Actium was a very lame affair. Such as it was, Antony and Cleopatra arguably won it: at least, they achieved all they could reasonably have hoped. But they had so decisively lost the campaign that the success made little difference. There was some talk of the surviving army saving itself on land, and some forlornly set out for Macedonia;315 but it was all highly unrealistic. They soon went over to Octavian, who gave generous terms.316 The Battle of Actium delayed the end for a year; nothing more.
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Antony had concentrated almost, but not quite, all of his legions for the Actium campaign. The exception was a force of four legions under L. Pinarius Scarpus in Cyrene, left probably to protect Egypt from political disorder, for like most of the Ptolemies Cleopatra had many internal enemies. Anyway, they were now Antony's only hope, and the remains of his fleet crossed not to Alexandria but to Paraetonium, the nearest port to Pinarius' force. But, all too predictably, the hope proved ill founded: Pinarius swiftly declared for Octavian; and the dispirited Antony returned to Alexandria. Cleopatra had already been there for
312 Or so Plut. Ant. 66. j-6 suggests: that is not necessarily reliable (cf. Pelling 1988 (в 158) on Ant. 6 j-6), but the low casualty figures do suggest that there was no fierce fighting.
3,3 Hot. Epod. ix. 19-10, 'hostiliumque navium portu latentIpuppes sinistrorsum citae', a striking epigram. These were probably the remains of Antony's right, whose northern movement would have left them uncomfortably far from the harbour mouth. Cf. Pelling 1986 (c 186).
314 Augustan poets made the most of this. It was the best they could do. Cf. Hor. Carm. i.J7-1}, 'vix una sospes navis ab ignibus ...'; and Virg. Aen. viii.694— 5; then Dio l.34, whose battle- description is as usual wholly unreliable. 315 Dio li.1.4; cf. Plut. Ant. 67.8.
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316 Plut. Ant. 68.2-5, with Pelling 1988 (в 138) ad lot.-, Keppie 1983 (e 65) 79-80.
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some time, acting decisively. Many of the suspected nobles were murdered, and Artavasdes too was hauled from his captivity and executed. She also plundered extensively to gather money for the armies: hopelessly enough, for by now no money was likely to retain their loyalty.
Depressing news continued to arrive throughout the winter. The intelligent princes Antony had encouraged in Asia Minor were alert enough to know they should change sides. Amyntas had already gone at Actium, and Herod of Judaea shortly followed his example.317 So did lesser men, for instance the sons of Tarcondimotus of Cilicia;318 we do not hear when Archelaus and Polemo declared for Octavian, but that too was probably soon during the winter.319 Octavian himself had spent some time in Samos and Ephesus after the end of the Actium campaign, and was beset by embassies, for instance from Rhosus and probably Mylasa;320 for the cities too recognized who was their master now. By the end of 31 Octavian had effectively taken over Asia Minor, with his own man Q. Didius as governor of Syria. The loyalty Antony had always inspired still paid some slight dividends, for some gladiators were so determined to join him that they fought their way from Cyzicus through Galatia and Cilicia to Syria.321 But that was the only good news, and that was not much.