THE EXPANSION OF THE EMPIRE UNDER AUGUSTUS
ERICH S. GRUEN
The contemporaries of Augustus delivered high praise for conquest and empire. The poet of the Aeneid has Jupiter forecast a Roman rule that will know no bounds of time or space, and Anchises' pronouncement from the underworld previews Augustus extending imperial power to the most remote peoples of the world. Livy characterizes his city as caput orbis terrarum and its people as princeps orbis terrarum populus. Horace asserts that the maiestas of the imperium stretches from one end of the world to the other.1
The phrases echo sentiments and expressions of the Roman Republic. Militarism marked much of its history. And the exploits of the conqueror were envied, honoured and celebrated. Those precedents stimulated and helped shape the character of the Augustan years. Wars dominate the era, victories were repeatedly gained (or claimed), and the humbling of external foes became a prime catchword of the regime.
The successes of Augustus abroad suggest a drive to consolidate the empire, to create a united dominion under Roman rule.2 The princeps, it can be argued, conceived a broad-gauged military strategy, based on economy of force, which, through a combination of mobile troops and loyal dependencies, provided both for internal security and frontier stability.3
Theoretical formulations in retrospect, however, fail to catch the dynamics of a volatile situation. And they slight the diversity of geographical, political, diplomatic and cultural considerations that faced Augustus in the vast expanse of the Roman world. One need not assume that the princeps had a structured blueprint for empire. Nor did his actions adhere to a uniform pattern imposed on all sectors of the imperium Komanum. Different circumstances in different areas provoked a variety of responses, sometimes cautious, sometimes bold, occasionally calculated, often extemporaneous. Augustus was less concerned with a systematic plan for world dominion than with a systematic construct of his image as world conqueror.
Virg. Лея. 1.278-9; Livy, xxi.30.10, xxiv.)8.8; Hor. Carm. iv.13.13-16.
Cf. Kienast 1982 (c 136) 366-70, 406-20. 3 Luttwak 1976 (a 37) 13-50.
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i. egypt, ethiopia and arabia
The deaths of Antony and Cleopatra left Octavian as master of Egypt. He would not permit that land to slip from his grasp again. Its wealth and resources in the hands of a rival would constitute a serious menace, and its role as a granary could be critical. Egypt became a province in 30 B.C., but no ordinary province. Octavian took full responsibility for governance. He appointed an equestrian prefect to administer the nation, and allowed no Roman senator or high-ranking eques even to visit it without his authorization. The princeps reckoned Egypt a place apart and kept close surveillance over its affairs.4
The prefect of Egypt supervised collection of revenue in the highly centralized fiscal system, exercised judicial duties, and commanded the three legions and auxiliary troops stationed in the country.5 The forces seem adequate for the preservation of security and the entrenchment of Roman control.
Yet Octavian did not content himself with the acquisition of Egypt. His first appointee as praefectus Aegypti, C. Cornelius Gallus, both poet and military man, pressed for expansion from the start. He quelled revolts in Heroonpolis, east of the Delta, and in the Thebaid. That was an appropriate and expected part of the job. But Gallus had no intention of stopping there. He took his forces southward, beyond the First Cataract of the Nile, where, so he claimed, neither Roman nor Egyptian arms had ever penetrated before. Gallus received representatives of the king of Ethiopia, accepted the king under his protection, and installed a dynast to rule over Triacontaschoenus, evidently as buffer zone between the realms of Egypt and Ethiopia. All this had been accomplished by the spring of 29 B.C. when Gallus erected a trilingual inscription in Latin, Greek and hieroglyphics to celebrate his exploits.6 The prefect's penchant for self-display eventually proved fatal. He had images of himself set up all over Egypt and a record of his achievements inscribed even on the pyramids. Such hybris, combined with a host of other alleged misdeeds, brought about Gallus' recall, renuntiatio amicitiae by Augustus, accusation, conviction and suicide perhaps in 26 в.с.7 But nothing in the charges raised objections to Gallus' pushing Roman authority beyond the First Cataract and obtaining the homage of Ethiopian princes. Augustus may have frowned on his prefect's over-zealousness in taking personal credit for Roman expansion — but he did not disavow the
Tac. Ann. 11.59; Hist, i.ii; Dio li.17.1-5. See the recent treatments, with bibliography, by Geraci 1983 (e 924) 128-46 and 1988 (E926), who rightly questions the common idea that Augustus treated Egypt as a 'private preserve'. It was considered as one among Rome's revenue producing provinces; Veil. Pat. 11.39.2; Strab. xvn.1.12 (797C); Tac. Ann. xv.36; Huzar 1988 (c 277) 370-9.
On his position, see Geraci «983 (E924) 163-76; Huzar 1988 (c 277) 352-62; and below, ch. 14b.
ILS 8994, 8995; Strab. xvii.i.] 5 (819Q. 7 Dio Lin.23.j-7; Suet. Aug. 66.
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egypt, ethiopia and arabia
expansionism. Installation of a client prince and acceptance of the Ethiopian ruler under Roman protection appealed to the pride — and probably stemmed from the policy — of Augustus.
The intentions of the princeps emerge with greater clarity in the actions of the next prefect, Aelius Gallus. First-class testimony survives from the pen of his friend and confidant Strabo. Augustus instructed his prefect to investigate the peoples and topography of Ethiopia and to explore the situation in Arabia. The plan formed a prelude to Gallus' invasion of Arabia Felix, the land of the Sabaeans in the north-west corner of the Arabian peninsula. The economic advantages did not escape Augustus' notice: the Sabaeans were key suppliers or middlemen in the lucrative commerce of spices, gems and perfumes from the East. Gallus' invasion may have had in view some Roman involvement in that traffic. But the move forms part of a larger pattern. Roman power was to extend into both Arabia and Ethiopia and the Sabaeans would be the first step. Augustus expected to coerce them into alliance, or to add to his reputation as conqueror.[293]
As it happened, Aelius Gallus' venture proved calamitous, and the plan abortive. Numerous vessels were wrecked in a long and unnecessary voyage from Arsinoe in 26 or 25 в.с. Worse followed when the troops marched into the interior of Arabia from Leuke Kome, a six month trek to Marib, major city of the Sabaeans. There were victories, or alleged victories, along the way, but also disease and death. And the siege of Marib ended in failure: lack of water dictated the abandonment of the whole campaign. The humiliated Roman legions returned through the desert, recrossed the Red Sea and made their way back to Alexandria. Interested sources did their best to obscure the ignominy. The Res Gestae of Augustus speaks only of advance into Arabia, to the land of the Sabaeans and the town of Marib. Not a word about the outcome. And Strabo, though he does not conceal the failures, places the blame on the treacherous Nabataean minister Syllaeus who purportedly misdirected and sabotaged the Roman enterprise.[294] The fault, however, lay with Aelius Gallus, or perhaps with Augustus.