The princeps nevertheless refused to be deflected from his scheme. Arabia no longer seemed inviting, but Ethiopia still beckoned. Augustus' new prefect of Egypt, P. Petronius, headed the invasion in 2 5 or 24 в.с., an undertaking whose groundwork had been prepared by Aelius
Gallus. In Strabo's version, Ethiopians took the initiative, crossed the First Cataract, and attacked the towns of Syene, Philae and Elephantine, thus provoking retaliation by Petronius. There may be truth in that: the Ethiopians perhaps learned that they had been marked out as next victims, thus anticipating Rome and taking advantage of the temporary absence of Roman forces (they were with Aelius Gallus in Arabia). Petronius' assault, in response, was vigorous and effective. His troops drove the Ethiopians out of the places they had seized, pushed them well back into their own territory, regained the cities and trophies captured by the Ethiopians, and penetrated all the way to Napata, chief northern city of the kingdom, which they stormed and destroyed. Only the forbidding terrain prevented further advance. This was much more than a retaliatory campaign. Petronius installed a garrison at Primis between the First and Second Cataracts, dispatched Ethiopian prisoners to Augustus as token of new conquest, and imposed tribute upon the people as sign of Roman rule.
An Ethiopian attempt to break the yoke came a year or two later, under the energetic queen Candace: an attack on the garrison at Primis which brought Petronius back swiftly from Alexandria. The second campaign re-established Roman supremacy in a hurry in zz B.C. Candace sought terms, and Petronius sent her representatives to the princeps at Samos, where he magnanimously offered a remission of tribute.10
Peaceful relations prevailed thereafter. Petronius' campaigns had secured the southern borders of Egypt, rendering that land largely invulnerable to external menace. But this was no mere defensive mission. Roman suzerainty now extended over the Dodecaschoenus, the zone between the First and Second Cataracts. And Augustus boasted in the Res Gestae of military conquest stretching to Napata: Roman power now reached almost to the great Ethiopian city of Meroe.11
Aelius Gallus' ill-fated expedition had thwarted Roman aims in Arabia Felix. But Augustus maintained interest in the Nabataean Arabs and even meddled in the internal affairs of that kingdom. Intrigue and rivalry between the Nabataeans and the realm of Herod the Great in Palestine kept the princeps repeatedly involved in hearing and judging competitive claims. Augustus briefly considered adding the Nabataeans to the dominion of Herod, but decided instead to confirm Aretas IV on the throne c. 8 в.с. After the death of Herod in 4 B.C., however, Rome may actually have annexed Nabataea for a short time, subjecting it to direct rule before relinquishing it again to Aretas. The latter act can be
10 Strab. xvn.1.5 3-4(819-210); Dio li.5.4-6; Pliny, HN vi.i81; see Jameson 1968 (£939)72-6, 79-82; Torok 1988 (e 976) 275-9. O" the name P. Petronius, see Bagnall 1985 (e 889). Additional bibliography in Burstein 1988 (c 258) 16—20, who argues that the tribute was first imposed by Cornelius Gallus and that Augustus' remission of it represented abandonment of his aggressive policies in the region. 11 Aug. RG 26.
associated with a military expedition by C. Caesar, grandson of the princeps, in a.d. i, who fought a campaign in or near Arabia, out of which perhaps came the reinstatement of Aretas as Roman client king over the Nabataeans.12 Augustus kept in touch with affairs of the Near East - and made certain to manifest Roman authority in the area.
ii. asia minor
The Greek East had been a mainstay for Antony. But the battle of Actium, followed in the next year by the suicides of Antony and Cleopatra, tipped the balance decisively. Rulers and dynasts in the hellenistic world faced a crisis. Earlier support for Antony, once a source of authority, now became a perilous liability. The new shape of the East would be at the command of Octavian, a fact that prompted hasty shifts of allegiance and spread alarm among the leadership.
Octavian, however, knew better than to conduct a wholesale overturn of the old order. Men of experience and established influence could be valuable instruments in preserving stability in the Greek world. They served to illustrate the conqueror's clemency, to deliver a comforting sense of continuity, and to transmit the advantages of loyalty to the new regime.13
Octavian confirmed the ex-Antonian Polemo in place in Pontus. The king subsequently gained formal recognition as friend and ally of Rome.14 He had to yield up Armenia Minor, but only because Octavian wished to award it to another ex-Antonian, Artavasdes of Armenia.15 Polemo collaborated loyally and faithfully with the Augustan regime. When rebellion broke out in the Bosporan kingdom, headed by an obscure usurper named Scribonius, Agrippa, who oversaw Rome's eastern interests in Syria, commissioned Polemo to restore the situation in 14 b.c. Polemo carried out the task, though it required Agrippa's forces to intimidate the rebels. The Pontic dynast, with Augustus' approval, went on to marry Dynamis, widow both of Scribonius and the previous Bosporan king, and to add the Bosporan realm to his own holdings.16 The combination of royal houses and kingdoms evidently appealed to Augustus: it permitted him to hold the allegiance of a broad area under a tested client prince. As it happened, the marriage soon foundered. Dynamis regained control of her dominion on the Bosporus, Polemo selected a new bride, Pythodoris from Tralles, and hostilities resumed between the kingdoms. Polemo fell in battle while endeavour-
12 Pliny, HN 11.168, vi.160; Strab. xvi.4.21 (779Q, with the discussion of Bowersock 1983 (e 990) 5 3-6; cf. Romer 1979 (c 301) 204-8; Sidebotham 1986 (c 310) 130-3. On the Nabataean kingdom in this period, see Negev 1978 (c 292) 549-69. Gaius' martial accomplishments are celebrated in 1LS, 140, lines 9-12; EJ2 69. 13 See Levick's account below, ch. 14a.
14 Strab. xn.8.16 (578Q; Dio Liii.25.1. is Dio Liv.9.2. 16 Dio liv.24.4-6 ing to regain the Bosporan realm in 8 B.C., and his wife Pythodoris inherited power in Pontus.[295] Augustus remained aloof from the contest, hoping to encourage stability without intervention. Dynamis obtained recognition as friend and ally of the Roman people. The princeps preferred to endorse continuing regimes rather than to undermine or destabilize them. Dynastic ties unravelled between Pontus and the Bosporan kingdom, but gained new strength between Pontus and Cappadocia when Polemo's widow Pythodoris wed Archelaus of Cappa- docia, thus linking the two kingdoms.[296] That arrangement too was doubtless orchestrated by Augustus, thereby to bind together the royal houses of Anatolia as surrogates for Roman suzerainty.
Archelaus, beneficiary of Antony, kept his throne through the favour of Caesar Octavianus. Indeed, he would soon increase his holdings with Roman encouragement. Archelaus obtained Cilicia Tracheia, parts of the coast, and Armenia Minor by 20 в.с., a move to build a more solid shield against Parthia.19 The king experienced less success with his subjects, some of whom lodged an accusation against him in Rome - to no avail.[297] And at some point Augustus was induced to install an overseer in Cappadocia.[298] Nevertheless, Archelaus' connexions and machinations kept him on his throne through the reign of Augustus.[299]