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Octavian exercised caution from the outset with Parthia. Dynastic rivalry, as so often, plagued the Parthian ruling houses. Even before Actium Phraates IV and the pretender to his throne Tiridates both sought to enlist Octavian's assistance in their respective causes. Octavian wisely refrained from taking action. After Actium, when Phraates expelled his rival, Tiridates sought refuge in the Roman province of Syria. Octavian permitted him to reside there, a useful card to play in diplomatic games with Parthia, while also maintaining amicable rela­tions with Phraates at an official level.51 In similar fashion, he declined the request of the Armenian ruler Artaxias to restore his brothers, held as hostages in Rome. They too would serve as insurance and potential counter-weight. And he installed the Mede Artavasdes as king of Armenia Minor, thus to provide further check on any Armenian aspirations.52

A reserved cordiality toward Parthia continued through the next decade. In the mid 20s Tiridates left Syria and made his way to Augustus, having in tow the young son of Phraates IV, whom he had managed to kidnap. Phraates sent envoys to the emperor, asking for the surrender of Tiridates and the release of his son. Tiridates, in turn, advertised himself as philorhomaios and promised unswerving loyalty as client king if Rome should put him on the Parthian throne. Augustus again delivered an even-handed decision. He would neither turn over the rebel for punishment nor promote his designs on Parthia. Tiridates remained in Rome, his wants amply provided for, and his ambitions circumscribed by Augustus' needs. Phraates got his son back — a magnanimous gesture

On Antony and Parthia, see above, ch. i.

Dio li.18.2-3. 52 Dio li.16.2, Liv.9.2; Strab. xii.3.29 (55 5C); Magie 1950 (e 853) 443.

by Augustus - but no more. Amicable relations held, so long as the princeps could make the decisions.53

Restraint and quiet diplomacy kept the peace during the 20s. Other matters occupied Augustus' attendon: the working out of constitutional arrangements and the entrenchment of Rome's position in the West. But the princeps did not rest content with the status quo in the East. Parthia's retention of standards and captives taken from Roman armies remained an open sore and an implicit denial of Rome's omnipotence. The year 20 B.C. proved to be the year of reckoning. Augustus travelled personally to the East, adjudicated disputes, made territorial dispositions and setded internal quarrels in cities of Greece, Asia Minor and Syria. He further exhibited the authority of the suzerain by reassigning lands to dynasts in Cilicia, Emesa, Judaea, Commagene and Armenia Minor.[309] The princeps' presence in the Near East may have provided the occasion for upheaval in Armenia. The citizenry, or a significant portion thereof, rose against Artaxias II, protege of the Parthian monarch, and requested a new ruler, namely Artaxias' brother Tigranes, then resident in Rome. Augustus, who had given refuge to the brothers for just such a contingency, readily complied. The emperor directed his stepson Tiberius to install Tigranes at the head of a Roman army. Mobilization alone sufficed. The Arme­nians assassinated Artaxias, and Tiberius could deliver Tigranes to a vacant throne without use of force.[310] Presentation of the event in Rome, however, simulated military victory. The coinage blared slogans of Armenia capta or Armenia recepta.[311]

In the East Augustus affected war but practised diplomacy. The celebrated arrangement with Phraates IV in 20 b.c. cannot be disasso­ciated from the princeps' presence in Syria and the settlement in Armenia. Phraates yielded up at last the standards and captives held for a generation as Parthian prizes, thereby allowing Augustus to claim credit for wiping out a long-standing stain on Roman honour.57 Negotiations had brought about that result. Phraates evidently received assurances of non-interference in his own realm (the pretender Tiridates is not heard from again), while Parthia acknowledged the Roman interest in Arme­nia. The king allegedly supplied hostages to Rome as well. An informal accord arose from the bargaining, perhaps even an overt acceptance that the Euphrates would serve as boundary between the zones of

influence.[312] But here again Augustus proclaimed victory, conquest and martial supremacy for consumption at home. The Res Gestae declared that he had 'compelled' the Parthians to surrender trophies and beg for Roman friendship. The Senate offered to vote a triumph, and a triumphal arch was erected in the Forum. Numismatic representations repeatedly called attention to signis receptis. And the central scene of the cuirass on the Prime Porta statue depicted the transfer of the standards.[313] Augustus made the most of his diplomatic success. A compact of mutual advantage and mutual agreement took on the glow of military mastery.

A sign of continuing cordiality between Rome and Parthia came in 10 в.с. Phraates IV sent four sons to live in Rome. The gesture did not signify deference or subordination, as sometimes portrayed; rather, it provided a means whereby the Parthian king could defuse opposition at home and stabilize his hold on the throne. Augustus was pleased to comply. He could both grant a favour to Phraates and take possession of potentially valuable instruments of diplomacy.[314]

Relations between the empires remained smooth and undisturbed for nearly two decades after Phraates relinquished the standards. Trouble arose, as so often, in the client state and buffer region of Armenia. The death of Augustus' appointee Tigranes II c. 7 в.с. ushered in a turmoil of which our sources preserve only a few confused fragments. A struggle for the throne evidently gripped Armenia, pitting Tiridates III against - another Roman nominee Artavasdes, and prompting the princeps to dispatch Tiberius to settle affairs. But Tiberius, for motives that remain forever hidden, abandoned his commission and took up residence in Rhodes. Rome's influence over subsequent events in Armenia suffered sharp decline.[315]

The situation in Parthia soon complicated matters, dealing Roman interests a further blow. Phraates IV perished, perhaps murdered, in 2 B.C., and his successor Phraates V (or Phraataces) took the occasion to meddle in Armenia.[316] Augustus could not permit Rome's prestige in the East to suffer further deterioration. His own prestige at home was at

stake. The princeps then staged a public demonstration to reassure the citizenry that Roman power would again make itself felt, undiminished, in the lands of the East. Augustus' grandson (and adopted son and heir) Gaius took command of troops to head for the Euphrates, intimidate Parthia, and settle accounts in Armenia. The young prince received a handsome send-off. Elaborate pageantry marked the occasion, with talk in the air of conquest, vengeance against Parthia, new triumphs and spoils for the imperial house, and expansion of the Roman empire.63

Augustus' intentions, in fact, were rather more modest. But public perception, as ever, counted. Gaius took an extensive detour, to Arabia and elsewhere, in part to add to his distinctions, primarily to show the flag.[317] News of his achievements and of his arrival in Syria had the desired effect. Tigranes III of Armenia sent a conciliatory message to the princeps, seeking Roman endorsement for his claims on the throne, and received a friendly response. Phraataces also prepared to negotiate. His letter to Rome probed for an accommodation, but simultaneously requested the return of his brothers, now under the princeps' protection. Augustus fired off a sharp reply, demanding that Parthia refrain from interference in Armenia and leaving off the royal title in his address, a deliberate affront — not a slight on Parthian sovereignty but on Phraataces' legitimacy. The king responded in kind: his letter addressed the princeps merely as Caesar and identified himself as 'King of Kings'. The exchange of messages plainly directed itself to a domestic constitu­ency — on both sides. The whole sequence of events supplied more show than substance. No fighting was necessary, not even a hostile confron­tation. The encounter, when it came, was amicable and fruitful. It too had been carefully programmed in advance. In a.d. 2 Gaius and Phraataces, each with impressive and equal entourage, met on an island in the Euphrates. Mutual pledges and a recognition of formal equality ensued. The king dined with Gaius on Rome's side of the river and then Phraataces hosted a banquet on the Parthian side. The scene was well orchestrated. Phraataces now officially acknowledged Rome's interests in Armenia and dropped his request for restoration of his brothers. Augustus, in effect, consented to leave Phraataces undisturbed, renewed amicitia, and implicitly designated the Euphrates as a frontier between spheres of influence. But his retention of the Parthian princes left the critical diplomatic leverage in his hands.[318]