The arrangement in a.d. 2 ought to have settled matters. But
Ov. ArsAm. 1.177 86,1.20i-iz;cf. Dioi.v.ioa.3; Hollis 1977 (в 86)65-73; Syme 1978 (в 179) 8—i i. Gaius' appointment is recorded also by Tac. Ann. 11.4; Dio lv.10.18-19; Veil. Pat. 11.101.1.
Cf. Romer 1978 (c 300) 187-202, 1979 (c 301) 203-8.
Dio lv. 10.20—i, lv.ioa.4; Veil. Pat. 11.101.1-3. Among modern discussions, see e.g., Ziegler 1964 (c 327) 5 3-6; Chaumont 1976 (a i 5) 77-80; Romer 1979 (c 301) 203-4, 208-10; Pani 1972 (c 295) 45-6; Cimma 1976 (d 120) 324-8.
Armenian affairs followed their own path, regardless of agreements between Rome and Parthia. Tigranes III died, probably in a.d 3, setting off a chain of events no longer recoverable in detail or in precise sequence. Gaius installed a new ruler, the Mede Ariobarzanes, thus to reiterate Rome's role in the indirect governance of that client kingdom. But Armenian nationalist sentiment resisted once more, and upheaval followed in which Gaius himself suffered a wound that would prove fatal. Two or three more changes of rulers came in Armenia during the lifetime of Augustus. The princeps claimed credit for the appointments, but the real extent of his influence cannot be ascertained. Internal struggles for power in that land reduced it for a time to anarchy.[319]
Comparable struggles for the throne occurred in Parthia during the final decade of Augustus' reign. The princeps neither promoted nor abetted them, but he did profit from them. In the midst of this turmoil, c. a.d. 6, a delegation of Parthian leaders arrived in Rome to seek release of Vonones, one of the sons of Phraates IV who had resided in Rome for the past decade and a half, in order to install him as Parthian ruler. The prospect appealed to Augustus who sent off Vonones with handsome gifts - as if setting his own appointee on the throne of Parthia.[320]Augustus welcomed the opportunity to have an indirect hand in ordering Parthian affairs - or at least to appear to be doing so. In fact, the Roman connexions and upbringing proved to be more a liability than an asset for Vonones. The Parthians themselves eventually found him unacceptable, summoned Artabanus of the Arsacid line to the throne, and expelled Vonones in a.d. 12. Augustus, who had played only a passive role in the installation of Vonones, took no steps to support him. It was not part of Rome's policy to provoke Parthia; rather she aimed to maintain her interests in Armenia and to keep Parthian influence on the far side of the Euphrates. Those aims could even be seen as advanced by the flight of Vonones: he made his way to Armenia and there took the throne made vacant by recent upheavals. So, the Parthian prince, raised in Rome, now held the crown in Armenia.[321] Such was the situation, quite acceptable from the Roman vantage-point, at the death of Augustus. The reliance on diplomacy, with occasional brandishing but only rare exercise of force, continued as standard policy throughout most of the Julio-Claudian era.
The pattern of the emperor's policy in that region maintained consistency throughout. He pursued the twin goals of hegemony via client rulers in Armenia and amicable reladons, including mutually acknowledged spheres of influence, with Parthia.69 The behaviour was marked by restraint, but the public posture was one of aggressiveness. So Augustus presented endorsement of a client king as capture of Armenia, recovery of the standards as Parthian submission, and the assignment of Gaius as an imperialist venture. The princeps knew the limits of Rome's effective authority in the East and kept within them. But keeping up appearances was no less important than keeping within limits. Augustus projected the image of a conqueror who extended Roman sovereignty to the East.
V. SPAIN
The reputation of the princeps also played a major part in determining the extension of imperial power to north-west Spain. That region, home of the fierce Cantabrians and Asturians, remained outside Rome's control, despite more than two centuries of Roman presence in the Iberian peninsula. Augustus led his forces in person, the last dme he was to do so. The matter was evidently deemed to be of high importance.
The campaigns proved long and arduous, as so often in Spain. Augustus headed the effort in one year only, 26 B.C., but resistance continued at intervals until 19 B.C., perhaps even beyond. The princeps was determined to subjugate the area.
Strategic motives do not account for the thrust. Roman commanders regularly claimed triumphs in Spain - six of them had been awarded in the decade just prior to Augustus' invasion itself. Raids by the Cantabrians upon neighbouring tribes might have supplied a pretext. But hardly enough to warrant the emperor's own presence at the head of the army. Nor do economic motives provide an answer. Spanish mines and other resources had long been exploited by Rome; the wealth of the north west was an afterthought rather than an incentive.70 Our sources offer little by way of explanation: Cantabrian harassment of neighbours, Augustus' intent to regulate affairs in Spain, or simply irritation that after 200 years a corner of the peninsula still held itself independent of Roman rule.71 Concrete goals take second place here; propaganda counted for more.
The provinces of Spain (Baetica was soon to be removed) were among the overseas territories assigned to Augustus at the beginning of the year
" Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 322—41, sees a more menacing posture by Augustus toward Parthia. 70 Cf. Flor. 11.33.60.
71 On the triumphs, see Fasti Triumph, for the years 36, 34,33,32, 28, and 26; Il/a/xm p. 57o;cf. also Oio li.20.5; ILS 893. Raids by Cantabrians: Flor. 11.33.47; regulation of affairs: Oio lin.22.5; subjugation of independent peoples: Oros. vi.21.1. For discussions of these motives, see Schmitt- henner 1962 (c 303) 43-33; Santos Yanguas 1982 (e 237) 7-10, with further literature.