Campaigns began in earnest in 17 or 16 в.с. when P. Silius Nerva, proconsul of Illyricum, subdued two Alpine tribes, the Camunni and the Vennii, the first at least and perhaps both in the region between Como and Lake Garda.106 Roman sources, of course, held the enemy respon-
App. III. 17; Dio XLIX.34.2, xlix.38.3, Lin.25.2-5; Strab. iv.6.7 (205-6Q.
Wells 1972 (e 601) 40-6; Fcei-Stolba 1976 (e 616) 350-5.
Dio liv. 20. i. Debate continues over the identity and location of the Vennii. If they are identified with the Vennonetes of the upper Rhine, then Silius' assaults were quite wide-ranging; cf. van Berchem 1968 (£605)4-7; Wells 1972 (e 601)63-6. But the matter remains uncertain; Overbeck 1976 (e 633) 665-8; Kienast 1982 (c 136) 295; Waasdorp 1982/3 (e 639) 39-40.
sible for provoking the conflict. More probably, it represents a stage in Augustus' drive to bring the Alpine regions under Roman dominion. It can hardly be coincidence that a two pronged assault followed in the next year of 15 B.C., headed by the princeps' stepsons. Tiberius marched eastwards from Gaul, Drusus northwards through the Brenner and Reschenscheideck passes to the valley of the Inn. Blame was once again fastened upon the foe: Dio describes the Raeti of the central Alps as savages who plundered Gaul and northern Italy, preyed upon travellers, and murdered all male captives, even unborn babies divined to be male.[336] But the Roman purpose went beyond retaliation. Silius' campaign had served as prelude; Drusus and Tiberius then carried out a systematic design, moving into Raetia from two directions and with various columns emerging at different points simultaneously.[337] Augustus determined to clear out hostile elements in the central Alps and to extend Roman control throughout the Alpine regions. The brothers achieved their goals, subduing the formidable Raeti and Vindelici of eastern Switzerland, the Tyrol and southern Bavaria.[338] Roman dominion in the Alps would be secure.
The victories of Augustus' stepsons were followed in 14 в.с. by subjugation of the Ligurians and annexation of the Maritime Alps.[339]The native dynast Cottius gained recognition as praejectus to rule over the Cottian Alps in Roman interest.[340] Occupation of strategic sites in the lands of the Raeti and Vindelici came in subsequent years. Augustus stationed two legions in the area and appointed an equestrian prefect to make Raetia an administrative unit of the empire, thus bringing under control all the major passes of the central Alps and allowing Roman influence to stretch through the Voralpenland to the Danube. Strabo attests to peaceful acquiescence by the once savage tribes in Roman rule and taxation a generation later.[341]
The Alpine campaigns in 16 and 15 B.C. included fighting against peoples further east, branches of the Norici, inhabitants of the regnum Noricum that linked Raetia to Pannonia.[342] That fighting later served as pretext for Дотап occupation of Noricum. At what point the region became formally annexed remains in dispute. But a Roman presence in the land under Augustus and as consequence of the Alpine conquests admits of little doubt. Noricum, a generally peaceful acquisition, supplied a vital communication between the forces in Raetia and the army of Illyricum.[343] Roman influence now spread all along the middle Danube.
What prompted pacification of the Alps? A long-range imperialist plan is often conjectured: the Alpine campaigns merely set the stage for major offensives against Germany, the expansion of Roman power across both the Rhine and the Danube to effect the subjugation of that land all the way to the Elbe.[344] Perhaps. But that ambitious scheme need not have been in prospect at the time of the Alpine conquests. Other motives sufficed. The opening of the Great St Bernard and the route through Helvetia gave swifter access from Italy to the Rhine and thus greater protection to Gaul. Reduction of Raetia and occupation of Noricum provided essential links between legions on the Rhine and the armies of Illyricum.[345] The Upper Danube as yet contained no fortresses, a zone of influence, not a fixed frontier.[346] Ease of communications rather than the prospect of further expansion may have been the immediate stimulus.
Concrete objectives coincided with political motives and public relations. Augustus utilized the Alpine campaigns to hone the talents and advance the claims of his stepsons. The advertisement of victory came in varied forms and reached a wide constituency. Horace sang of the exploits in two carmina, celebrating Drusus' routs of Alpine tribes and Tiberius' decisive conquest of the Raeti.[347] The Consolatio ad Liviam, composed later in the reign of Augustus, also extolled the accomplishments of the brothers and the thorough defeat of the barbarians.119 A monument was erected to commemorate these events, the Tropaeum Alpium, installed at La Turbie in the Maritime Alps and listing no fewer than forty-five tribes brought under subjection by the princeps.120 And Augustus boasts in the Res Gestae that he had pacified the Alps all the way from the Adriatic to the Tuscan Sea — adding the questionable corollary that every campaign had been legitimate and justified.121 The princeps, as ever, cultivated the image of the successful and rightful conqueror.
VIII. THE BALKANS
Strategy and politics combined to motivate Roman action in Illyricum. Octavian recognized the region's importance at an early stage and led the campaigns in person during the triumviral period. That proved to be just a prelude. Major expansion took place between 13 and 9 b.C., and then the imposition of a new and more permanent arrangement after suppression of the Pannonian revolt in a.d. 9. Augustus prepared the ground for two provinces, Dalmatia and Pannonia, extended Roman control to the Danube, and secured the land route between northern Italy and the Balkans.
The result had not been forecast from the outset. Octavian's thrust into Illyricum from 35 to 33 в.с. had more specific ends in view. He looked to his own needs - and to those of his soldiers. The rugged lands across the Adriatic would provide good training and discipline, a hardening of the sinews that might otherwise grow soft with idleness.[348]Weapons would now be trained on the barbarian, a conspicuous turning away from the civil strife that exhausted and demoralized the troops. They could look forward to enrichment from the spoils of the enemy, so Octavian alleged. Campaigns against foes of the empire would restore morale to the forces and allow their commander to claim leadership in the national interest instead of a factional struggle.[349] The memoirs of the princeps expounded at length on the Ulyrian adventure, reproduced in part by the historian Appian a century and a half later. They provided due justification for the war: Illyrians had periodically plundered Italy, they had damaged the cause of Iulius Caesar, had destroyed the armies of Gabinius and Vatinius in the 40s, and held the captured standards of Roman legions — enough reason for retaliation and restoration of national honour.[350] A harsher assessment comes from the pen of Cassius Dio, drawing on a tradition outside Augustus' memoirs. Dio notes correctly that no Illyrian provocation prompted the war: Octavian lacked legitimate complaint and sought pretext to give practice to his legions against a foe whose resistance was likely to be ineffective.125
Neither the cynical judgment nor the self-serving explanation gets to the heart of the matter. Octavian needed to enhance his military reputation, an effort to match the accomplishments of his partner and rival Antony. It is no accident that Octavian took conspicuous personal risks and twice suffered injury in Illyricum. Those badges of courage could be useful. And upon completion of the contest he delivered a speech to the Senate making pointed contrast between Antony's idleness and his own vigorous liberating of Italy from incursions by savage peoples.126