Larger strategic considerations have also been postulated. Perhaps Octavian sought to secure Italy to the north east in order to prevent a march by Antony via that route, as had once been contemplated by Philip V and Mithridates, or else to seize the area in preparation for a future offensive against his fellow triumvir. Or perhaps Octavian already contemplated a broad strategic design that would push the borders of Illyricum to the Danube and forge a link with imperial defences on the Rhine.127 But military conflict with Antony was not yet imminent in 3 5; nor had any eastern ruler yet employed such a path to invade Italy. As for the eventual push to the Danube, Augustus himself ascribes that plan to the campaigns of his stepson Tiberius more than two decades later. Octavian had more immediate needs: establishment of a military reputation through punishment of tribes that had sullied Roman honour. He could thus contrast solid accomplishment with the sloth of Antony. Octavian would unfurl the Roman standards regained from the barbarian. And he would suggest even greater conquests in store for the future: victories in Illyria, it was reported, might lead to bold offensives against Dacians and Bastarnae.128 Not that Octavian actually considered such offensives at this time. But here, as elsewhere, he sedulously advanced the pose of the conqueror.
Actual accomplishments in the Illyrian War of 35 to 33 в.с. were modest. Octavian opened the fighting in 3 5 B.C. with a thrust against the Iapodes, bringing their forces to surrender, and besieging their principal city and citadel at Metulum which was soon destroyed by fire.129 Roman armies pressed on to assault Segesta (Siscia) at the confluence of the Save, blockade the city, and force it to submission. Octavian could take pride in the achievement and returned to Rome for the winter, intending to resume operations in Illyria in the following spring.130 That next season, however, saw him transfer attention to Dalmatia. Talk of advance against Dacia was evidendy given up - or never meant seriously. Octavian did not intend to go beyond the Save. Instead, he could earn further laurels by punishing the tribes that had defeated Roman armies and held Roman standards. The princeps' forces stormed the Dalmatian stronghold of Promona and destroyed Synodium at the edge of the forest where Gabinius' troops had been cut down. Early in the next year, 3 3 B.C., the chastened and desperate Dalmatians, cut off from outside supplies, yielded up themselves and the Roman standards, pledged payment of arrears in tribute, and vowed obedience to Roman power. Other tribes also offered submission, and Octavian brought the three- year Illyrian War to a conclusion.131
Territorial gains were relatively limited. But territory had not been the
On the motives, see Syme 1971 (E702) 17,157; Wilkes 1969 (£706)48-9. A healthy scepticism is expressed by Schmitthenner 1958 (c 504) 193-200.
Aug. RG 29.1, 30.1; App. III. 22; Strab. vii.5.2 (313Q. 129 App. HI. 18-21.
App. III. 22-4; Dio xLix.37.1-xLix.38-1.
App. III. 25-8; Dio XLIX.38.3-4, XLIX.43.8; Strab. vn.5.5 (315Q.
objective. Octavian had driven as far as Siscia on the Save and displayed Roman power to the Dalmatians, thus retaliating against peoples who had raided Roman territory or vanquished Roman troops in the past. What mattered was the presentation of events in Rome. Octavian spoke to the Senate and rattled off the names of nearly thirty tribes which his forces had coerced into submission, surrender and payment of tribute. He proudly set up the recovered standards in the portico of Cn. Octavius, thus linking his success to earlier republican victories. And he elevated the prestige of his family through the award of statues and the privilege of tribunician sacrosanctity for Livia and Octavia. Propaganda value, as so often, counted for more than tangible achievement.132
Another barbarian people also held Roman standards in their possession: the Bastarnae on the Lower Danube. They had captured the trophies from a defeated Roman army thirty years before. Octavian would restore Roman honour here as well. The proconsul of Macedonia, M. Licinius Crassus, marched north in 29 B.C. to engage the Bastarnae who, it was reported, had crossed the Haemus mountain range and had overrun parts of Thrace wherein dwelt allies of Rome. Crassus conducted campaigns over a two year period, driving back the Bastarnae, gaining victories over other Thracian tribes from the lower Danube, including the Moesi, the Getae and perhaps the Dacians, slaying a prince of the Bastarnae in hand to hand combat, and regaining the Roman eagles. He celebrated a well-earned triumph in 27 B.C.[351] Nothing suggests that these campaigns actually extended the boundaries of Macedonia. But the punishment of unruly tribes and the recovery of lost military emblems served to demonstrate and reinforce Roman authority.
Major advance in the region awaited a decade and a half. The provincial distributions of 27 в.с. assigned responsibility for Dalmatia and Macedonia to the Senate, two separate and independent proconsular commands. That formal situation remained unchanged through the 20s and for some years thereafter. But the advantages of a link between these domains and a push to the Danube that would control the land route from northern Italy to the lands of the East became increasingly evident. Restive Pannonian tribes attacked Istria in 16 B.C., Thracians ravaged Macedonia, and an uprising in Dalmatia had to be quelled in the same year. The Pannonians rose again in 14 B.C., calling forth yet another ad hoc suppression.134 Augustus now made plans in earnest for subjugation.
M. Vinicius, probably proconsul of Illyricum, undertook operations in 14 b.c., but Augustus soon entrusted overall direction of the war to Agrippa with broad powers, a maius imperium, in the following year.135 The princeps obviously took the matter very seriously. After Agrippa died in 12 b.c., he appointed his stepson and new son-in-law Tiberius to the post. More than just suppression of tribal incursions was at stake here. Roman forces advanced against the peoples between the Save and the Drave, presumably the war-like Breuci. Tiberius, with the aid of the Scordisci who had already been brought under Roman authority, earned triumphal honours for a vigorous campaign against Pannonians in 12 b.c. and then continued against both Dalmatians and Pannonians in 11. The operations evidently gave Rome control of the Save valley and allowed for the initial penetration of Bosnia.[352] Parallel campaigns were conducted in Thrace where L. Piso subjected hostile tribes in three years of fighting and secured Roman mastery by 11 b.c.[353] The Augustan regime had now made a major commitment in the Balkans. The former proconsular command of Illyricum came directly under Augustus' authority, to be governed by the princeps' legates. It encompassed an area that would soon stretch from the Adriatic to the Danube.[354] Tiberius led campaigns for two more seasons in 10 and 9, reducing tribes that resisted domination, pacifying the region, and winning an ovatio. Augustus himself paid signal tribute to his stepson's achievements in the Res Gestae-, he had subjugated the previously unconquered peoples of Pannonia and extended the frontier of Illyricum to the banks of the Danube.[355]
Evidence largely fails for the next fifteen years. Those years, it may be presumed, constituted the time of real pacification, the securing of the middle Danube, and the intimidation of tribes beyond it in order to assure control of the frontier. Augustus' legate Sex. Appuleius completed coercion of the Pannonians in 8 b.c. Excursions across the Danube followed in subsequent years: L. Domitius Ahenobarbus resettled the Hermunduri as a check on the Marcomanni and even brought his troops to the far side of the Elbe; epigraphic testimony records another Augustan legate, perhaps M. Vinicius, who routed the Bastarnae and entered into relations with a number of trans-Danubian tribes; Aelius Catus transplanted 50,000 Getae from the far side of the