Danube to Thrace, where they took on the name of Moesians; and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus successfully drove Dacians and Sarmatians back from the vicinity of the Danube, thus to solidify further Rome's hold on the river.[356] A legionary command was installed in Moesia during these years.[357] Augustus boasts hyperbolically of smashing the Dacians and compelling them to submit to Roman orders, a claim echoed but modified by Strabo.[358] The situation seemed secure.
But that confidence proved to be premature. In a.d. 6 Tiberius assembled troops for a decisive thrust against the Marcomannic leader Maroboduus in Bohemia. The Roman imperator summoned recruits from the ostensibly compliant Illyrians for the purpose. The assemblage itself, however, gave the indigenous forces a sense of their own strength and numbers. National pride came to the surface, intensified by resentment at harsh exactions of tribute by Roman officials and the fierce spirit of a new generation of Illyrian warriors. Bato, a chieftain of the Daesitiates in central Bosnia, took the lead in whipping up hostility. And the rising of the Daesitiates was soon matched by rebellion of the Breuci in Pannonia, headed by Pinnes and another Bato. Thus erupted the great Pannonian revolt which would endure from a.d. 6 to 9 and nearly shake the empire to its foundations. Suetonius labelled it, without much exaggeration, the most serious external threat to Rome since the war with Hannibal.[359]
The rebels assaulted legionary detachments and massacred Roman merchants. The Breuci headed for the key Roman garrison at Sirmium and would have taken it but for the timely arrival of A. Caecina Severus, legate of Moesia who turned back the Pannonian threat while suffering heavy losses. Tiberius immediately cancelled operations against Maroboduus and dispatched the Illyrian legate M. Valerius Messalla to secure the other critical Roman fortress at Siscia which guarded the route to north-eastern Italy. The rebel forces in Pannonia and Dalmatia had been slow to combine efforts; otherwise, the entire Roman position in Illyricum might have collapsed. As it was, the insurgents controlled most of the territory from the Save to the Adriatic and had gathered forces, so it is reported, of 200,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. Caecina Severus returned to his own provincia of Moesia to protect it against incursions of Dacians and Sarmatians. Sirmium was still vulnerable, and
Tiberius could not afford to move far or fast from his base at Siscia. Grave anxieties gripped Rome. Augustus, now severely alarmed, ordered extraordinary levies, impressed veterans back into service, imposed new taxes, called upon the patriotic instincts of senators and equites, and enrolled freedmen into the ranks as reinforcements for the army of Illyricum. The princeps sent recruits with Velleius Paterculus who would then gain an eyewitness's view of the war for his future history, dispatched additional troops with a trusted member of his own household, young Germanicus the nephew of Tiberius, and even moved his personal entourage to Ariminum where he could keep in closer touch with developments.[360]
Rebuilding of the Roman position began in earnest in a.d. 7. Reinforcements from Italy brought Tiberius' army up to five legions. M. Plautius Silvanus led two legions from the east and joined forces with Caecina's army of Moesia. Both commanders, together with the Thra- cian cavalry under Rhoemetalces, now headed west to link with Tiberius. They survived near calamity at the Volcaean Marshes, an ambush by troops under the combined leadership of the two Batos. Old- fashioned discipline, as Velleius describes it, repaired ranks that were broken, stemmed panic, and turned defeat into victory.[361] By the winter of a.d. 7/8 an immense assemblage of ten legions had converged at Siscia, swollen further by seventy auxiliary cohorts, fourteen cavalry units, and no fewer than 10,000 veterans recalled to the colours from Italy - the largest military concourse since the civil wars. Yet the giant gathering once effected, Tiberius almost immediately dissolved it again, escorting the reinforcements from Moesia and the east back to Sirmium.[362] A perplexing decision. Perhaps the assemblage had been Augustus' idea, the product of impatience and anxiety, without consultation of Tiberius.147 More likely, it was a tactic of intimidation: such a concentration of power could overawe the resistance of rebels.
The manoeuvre achieved its end. In the following year, without further show of force, the Pannonians offered full surrender and received terms. A final flurry occurred late in the year, when the Dalmatian chieftain Bato captured and killed his treacherous Breucian namesake and rekindled revolt among the Pannonians. But the Roman garrison at Sirmium under Silvanus crushed the uprising and restored order. The Save valley was once again safely in Roman hands.148
Dalmatia remained to be reduced in a.d. 9. Tiberius returned to Rome in the winter, but three commanders held responsibility for completing the reconquest: M. Lepidus, left as legate in Siscia, Silvanus at Sirmium and Germanicus on the Dalmatian coast itself. But the combination proved inadequate. The inexperienced Germanicus made little headway, and Augustus sent back Tiberius himself to resume command. That decision sealed the fate of Dalmatia. Lepidus forced his way through hostile territory to join with Tiberius. And the redoutable Bato, though eluding capture and resisting siege, finally came to terms - and was spared by the admiring Tiberius.149
Four bloody years had been consumed in suppressing this mighty challenge to Roman authority.150 Military success, as usual, would be translated into political distinction. Augustus exploited the victory to bestow honours on his family. Germanicus made public announcement of the result. The princeps and his stepson both celebrated triumphs in a.d. 10 and received triumphal arches in Pannonia, as well as other distinctions. Germanicus gained triumphal insignia and praetorian rank. And even Tiberius' son Drusus, though he played no part in the war, obtained the right to attend the Senate and to hold praetorian status as soon as he reached the quaestorship.151 The geopolitical consequences, however, were greater still. The process of consolidation and organization lay in the future. But conquest was complete. Roman power extended to the middle Danube, a critical link in the connexion that now ran from northern Italy through the Balkans to the provinces of the East. At some time after a.d. 8 the princeps set in place the two great military commands that would become the new provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia.152 It was a solid and enduring achievement.
ix. germany
The confrontation of Rome and Germany created high drama in the time of Augustus - and heated debate in the modern era. What were the objectives of Rome's crossing the Rhine, how far did she intend to go, and how firm a hold did she expect to exercise? The penetration of Germany was no isolated event. It must be considered in close conjunction with Roman presence in Gaul.
Caesar had conquered Gaul but had not fully pacified it. Octavian took the matter in hand, an item of the first priority in consolidation of the western empire. In the early 30s в.с. he commissioned his most trusted collaborator, M. Agrippa, to campaign against rebellious peoples in Aquitania in the south west and against tribes in the north
1,9 Dio lvi.11—16; Veil. Pat. 11.115.1-4. See the analysis of Koestermann 1953 (c 281) 368-76; Wilkes 1965 (E70J) 111—25■