Details of the insurrection can here be omitted. A young warrior from the ruling house of the Cherusci, Arminius, inspired and headed the rebels. They lulled Varus into complacency, then lured him into an ambush. In the vicinity of the Teutoburg Forest in September, a.d. 9 Varus lost his life and Rome lost three legions, a disaster unparalleled in the Augustan years.199
The news shocked and dispirited the princeps. Augustus reportedly let his hair and beard grow for months as a sign of mourning, and more than once broke into the celebrated lament 'Varus, give me back my legions!'200 Those histrionics buttress the common view that Varus' defeat marked the major turhing point in Augustus' German policy: the plan to pacify all of Germany to the Elbe was given up and the empire's borders were withdrawn to the Rhine.201 It might be more revealing, however, to point to the continuities than to stress the caesura. Augustus made no public move to surrender Germany. Quite the contrary. The princeps forthwith dispatched Tiberius, fresh from his victory in the Pannonian War, to resume command of forces on the Rhine. Indeed those troops were soon built up with reinforcements from elsewhere to reach a total of eight legions, a far larger army than had been gathered in that region before. Augustus would not give even a suggestion of retreat. Tiberius reconfirmed allegiance in Gaul, distributed armies and fortified garrisons.202 The veteran commander knew better than to venture much beyond the Rhine in a.d. 10 and 11. He restricted himself to cautious raids and demonstrations. But the demonstrations themselves were important. In the presentation of Velleius Paterculus, they were vigorous offensive manoeuvres and aggressive warfare - and that is doubtless the impression that Augustus wished to deliver.203 Evidence fails on the years a.d. 12 and 13, but Roman troops clearly did not huddle behind a Rhine frontier. Forces remained in or were sent to the land of the Chauci.204 And Augustus appointed young Germanicus, who had served with Tiberius on the Rhine in a.d. i i , to supreme command in the region in a.d. 13. This was no mere holding action. Germanicus would lead vigorous offensive campaigns into the interior of Germany. Tacitus pinpointed the motive with accuracy: war on the Germans derived less
,9e Tac. Am. 1.59.
1И Veil. Pat. II.118.1—119.5; Dio Lvi.18.4-22.2; Tac. Am. 1.(7-61; Suet. Aug. 25; Tib. 17. The account of Florus, 11.jo.j2-8, is unreliable. On the site of the battle, see Koestermann 1957 (c 282) 441-j. On Arminius, see Timpe 1970(0 j 19) 11-49; Dyson 1971 (л 25) 25 j-8. Tacitus'description of Arminius as liberator Germaniat (Am. 11.88) does not imply that Rome had previously annexed the land as a province. 200 Suet. Aug. 2J.2; Oros. vi.21.27. 201 Cf. Flor. 11.jo.j9.
ш Veil. Pat. 11.120.1; Dio LV1.2j.2-4. The eight Rhine legions are listed in Tac. Ann. 1.j7.
203 Veil. Pat. 11.120.1-2,11.121.1; Lvi.24.6, Lv1.25.2-j; Suet. Tib. 18. 204 Tac. Ann. i.j8.
from desire to extend the empire or to achieve tangible gain than to wipe out the disgrace of Varus' defeat.205 The princeps would not allow that calamity to stain Rome's reputation.
The campaigns of Germanicus after the death of Augustus belong to a later discussion. Suffice it here to point out that those campaigns in a.d. 15 and 16 follow a long familiar pattern rather than mark a conspicuous break with the past. They exemplify once again the repeated discrepancy between achievement and advertisement. Germanicus engaged naval and land forces, brought armies across the Weser, claimed major victories - and accomplished very little.206 Despite, or rather in consequence of, that fact, he enjoyed lavish honours. Germanicus celebrated a handsome triumph and his legates received ornamenta triumpbalia. The triumph specified as defeated tribes the Cherusci, Chatti, Angrivarii, and all other peoples dwelling west of the Elbe — assertions that went well beyond tangible reality.207 When Tiberius recalled Germanicus in a.d. 16, the young general expressed disappointment, and claims were made that another season's campaigning would have brought the war to an end.208 Whatever the plausibility of those claims, they were bound to be made — nor did Tiberius dispute them. Rome halted offensive operations across the Rhine. But she also let it be known that she could have subjugated Germany in a year, had she wishfed.209
Definition of a general Augustan 'policy' on Germany would be difficult to formulate and probably pointless to attempt. To designate it either as 'defensive' or as 'imperialistic' risks oversimplification.210 And it would be erroneous to consider Roman actions in Germany as following a static plan.
Initial thrusts across the Rhine in the early Augustan years stemmed from the need to police and pacify Gaul. Rome experimented with both diplomacy and warfare, intimidating hostile tribes or winning the allegiance of some to neutralize others. A shocking defeat suffered by Lollius provoked sterner measures, not to satisfy imperialist urgings but to restore imperial prestige. Legions were brought up to the Rhine and forts installed at key sites along the river. Augustus himself returned to Gaul to implement administrative changes and dramatize the import-
Tac. Ann. 1.3.6; cf. Veil. Pat. 11.123.1. The motive is confirmed by Strab. vn.1.4 (291-2C).
On Germanicus'campaigns, see Koestermann 1957 (c 282); cf. the analysis by Telschow 1975 (c 315) 148-82.
Tac. Ann. i.j j.i, 1.72.i, 11.41.2-4; Strab. vn.1.4 (291Q; Timpe 1968 (c 318) 41-77.
Tac. Ann. 11.26.
Strab. vii.i.4 (291C), written after Augustus' death, implies that the princeps never relinquished claims on Germany west of the Elbe.
For an extensive rehearsal of opinions through the early twentieth century, see Oldfather and Canter 191 j (c 294) 9-20, 3j-81. A more recent survey by Christ 1977 (c 260) 151-67. Add also Welwei 1986(0 323) 118-57.
ance he attached to the area. Defence of the Gallic provinces and expansion into Germany were complementary rather than contrasting policies. The princeps' stepsons, first Drusus, then Tiberius, carried Roman standards into the lands of the barbarian over the next several years, in campaigns that included impressive victories, advance to the Elbe, deportations of peoples, and the planting of garrisons at selected locations. No obvious ultimate goal had been announced or probably formulated. The successes represented more than a display of might, but rather less than the organization of a province. Altars at Cologne and on the Elbe signified German loyalty to the princeps, and Domitius' crossing of the Elbe to enlist new peoples in Roman amicitia put on show Rome's ability to influence events wherever she wished in that vast land. The garrisons in the interior implied that Roman presence would be neither brief nor superficial. But generals continued to withdraw the main body of their forces to the Rhine after almost every campaigning season. Augustus preferred to exhibit power than to put it to risk.