Tiberius' appointment to Germany in a.d. 4 signalled the restored confidence of the princeps in his newly adopted son and gave him the opportunity to add further laurels to his reputation. The campaigns were more notable for enhancement of prestige than for solid accomplishment. Conquest of the Marcomanni would have provided something solid but had to be abandoned for pressing needs elsewhere. As substitute came a movement toward more systematic application of judicial and financial authority by the new legate Varus. But the changes engendered reaction and calamity. Augustus had to adjust accordingly. If he could not replace Varus' three legions, he could shift forces from elsewhere in the empire to the Rhine. His appointment of Tiberius and Germanicus in the years that followed the Varian disaster served to controvert any suggestion of Roman weakness. And their campaigns proposed to show that Rome could resurrect her influence in Germany whenever circumstances required it.
Despite shifts in behaviour and action, continuities prevailed: the emphasis on Rome's international authority and her ascendancy over all rivals. That emphasis emerges in the swift retaliation after each challenge, the timely appearance of the princeps and his stepsons, the establishment of garrisons, the promotion of the imperial cult, the expeditions (however brief and temporary) to the Elbe, triumphal honours and imperial salutations repeatedly awarded, the display of Roman magisterial symbols, the introduction of administrative regulations, and the drive to compensate publicly for every setback. Reference to Germany in the Res Gestae suitably completes the picture. Augustus ignores precision for propaganda: he includes Germany with Gaul and
Spain as evidence for his pacification of Europe from Gades to the Elbe.211
X. IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY
Assessment of Augustus' imperial policy has long divided scholars. Was he a relentless expansionist or a prudent leader who set bounds to the empire? Did he conduct aggressive imperialism or a defensive policy? Was he military conqueror or bringer of peace?
Pax Augusta has become the conventional characterization of the new order introduced by the princeps.2n Repetition by moderns, however, obscures the fact that the phrase rarely surfaced in the age of Augustus himself. It finds voice occasionally in dedications offered by individuals or officials in Italian or provincial towns.213 But it does not represent a slogan emanating from the government.
Augustus, it is often alleged, placed limits on the extension of territory and advised that the empire be held within fixed bounds. But evidence for that conclusion is slim and dubious. Recovery of the standards from Parthia in 20 B.C. induced the princeps to announce that the realm could remain at its present extent - a posture that, at best, was only temporary and brief.214 He issued instructions directing generals not to pursue enemies beyond the Elbe, but that too was a temporary restraint designed to allow concentration on another conflict, not a delineation of boundaries.215 More significant, or so it would seem, was a document read to the Senate after Augustus' death and purporting to contain his advice that the empire be held within its present frontiers.216 The authenticity of that item remains in doubt. Tiberius may have had cause to seek posthumous Augustan sanction for policies he intended to promote. And the statement attributed to Augustus by Dio that he had never added possessions from the barbarian world is preposterous.217
The martial accomplishments of Augustus belie any systematic policy of limits or leanings toward pacifism. The princeps' appointees penetrated beyond the First. Cataract in Egypt, extended influence to Ethiopia and invaded Arabia. He converted Judaea into a province, rattled sabres at Parthia, and maintained an indirect hegemony in Armenia. Roman forces subjugated north-west Spain and carried campaigns against tribes in north Africa. Augustus or his surrogates fought Dalmatians and Pannonians, mounted a force against the Marcomanni, and laid the
211 Aug. RG 26.2. 2'2 Cf e.g., Stier 1975 (a 91) 18-42; Fears 1981 (c 267) 884-9.
ILS 3787, 3789; 1GRR iv 1173; cf. Weinstock i960 (f 617) 47~i°-
Dio Liv.9. i; cf. Lin. 10.4-3. 2'5 Strab. VII.1.4 (291C).
216 Tac. Ann. 1.11.4; Dio LVi.33.5-6.
2,7 Dio Lvi.33.6. Suetonius'assertion that Augustus had no ambition for empire or martial glory (Aug. 21.2) is nonsense. On these matters, see now Ober 1982 (c 293) 306-28.
groundwork for Roman provinces along the Danube. He routed Alpine peoples, opened passes in the mountains, reduced Raetia, and occupied Noricum. Romans crossed the Rhine, established garrisons in Germany, and dispatched armies to the Elbe. The record of conquest eclipsed that of all predecessors. The regime thrived on expansionism - or at least the reputation of expansionism.
Augustus left the impression of aggressiveness even where he had no intent to undertake aggression. Britain is a prime example. On three occasions, so Cassius Dio reports, the princeps let it be known that he was on the point of mounting an expedition against that remote island: in 34, 27 and 26 B.C. Each time other pressing needs conveniently intervened to postpone the venture: a rising in Dalmatia, unsettled conditions in Gaul, and the Cantabrian War respectively.218 In the eyes of contemporaries in the 30s and 20s, the invasion of Britain was a sure thing - as was its conquest. Repeated allusions in the poems of Virgil, Horace and Propertius attest to that public perception.219 Augustus could later abandon the idea altogether by producing a plausible justification: British kings had sent embassies, made offerings on the Capitol, and formally acknowledged the princeps' authority. It was as good as a conquest — and much cheaper.220 Britain could subsequently be ignored, a matter of policy, as Augustus explicitly characterized it.221 The earlier projection of an aggressive pose had equally been a matter of policy.
Reputation held pre-eminent place in the realm of Augustus. The precedents of the Republic helped shape the ideology of the Principate - not so much in constitutional matters as in the image of martial success. Pax rarely made an appearance as symbol of Republican aspirations. Victoria predominated as a numismatic slogan, triumphs represented the most coveted prizes, expansion of territory elicited ringing phrases from orators who trumpeted Roman mastery of the world.222 That is the proper context for comprehending the imperial posture of Augustus.223
Defeat of Antony and Cleopatra placed unprecedented power in the hands of the victor. He may have sought to bind up the wounds of the civil war, but he also made certain to commemorate the victory — and to institutionalize reminders of it. Two new cities rose as memorials to the achievement, each bearing the imposing designation of Nicopolis, one on the site of Octavian's camp at Actium, the other to mark the battle
2,1 Dio xlix.38.2, liii.22.5, liii.2;.2.
Virg. Eel. 1.67; G. 1.29, 111.25; Hor. Epod. vn.7; Carm. i.2i.ij, 1.31.29, m.4.34, 111.5.2-4, 1v.14.47; Prop. 11.27.J, iv.3.7; cf. Momigliano 1950 (c 290) 39—41.
Strab. iv.).3 (200C). These embassies need to be kept distinct from the arrival of British refugee princes as suppliants at the court of Augustus; RG 32.1. 221 Tac. Agr. xiii.
E.g. Cic. Leg. Мая. j 3; Миг. 22; Off. 1.38,11.26; Pii/. vm.12.F0r Victoria »s a symbol, see Fears 1981 (c 268) 773-804. On Republican attitudes toward militarism and conquest, see Harris 1979 (c 273) 10-41; cf. Brunt 1978 (c 257) 162-72; Jal 1982 (c 279) 143-50.